

THE  
ROUND TABLE  
*A Quarterly Review of*  
BRITISH  
COMMONWEALTH  
AFFAIRS

---



*Contents of Number 197*

THE SUMMIT VIA PARIS

CHINESE EXPANSION

DUPLESSIS AND HIS HEIRS

ON BEING AUSTRALIAN IN 1959

SELF-DETERMINATION IN ALGERIA

WASHINGTON AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

WE ARE SEVEN

NIGERIA: THE AFRICAN GIANT

And Articles from Correspondents in

UNITED KINGDOM IRELAND PAKISTAN CANADA

SOUTH AFRICA AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND

RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

December 1959

*Price 7s. 6d.*

By Air Mail Ten Shillings



THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.

THE ROUND TABLE, which appears every March, June, September and December, can be obtained through any bookseller or through:

GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: THE ROUND TABLE, LTD., 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W. 1.

CANADA: H. W. Macdonnell, 1404 Montreal Trust Building, 67 Yonge Street, Toronto, Ontario.

AUSTRALIA: Angus & Robertson, Ltd., 89-95 Castlereagh Street, Sydney, and 66-68 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne.

NEW ZEALAND: The Secretary, THE ROUND TABLE, G.P.O. Box No. 877, Wellington.

Any would-be reader of THE ROUND TABLE who has difficulty in obtaining it through his usual bookseller is requested to write at once to the nearest of these addresses.

The price of THE ROUND TABLE is 7s. 6d. or \$1.25 per copy, and the annual subscriptions (including postage) 30s., in U.S.A. and Canada \$5. There is an air edition at 10s. or \$2.50 per copy, or 40s. or \$10 per annum. The air edition is sent by air freight to Australia and New Zealand: the annual subscription is 35s. sterling.

Covers for binding volumes may be obtained at the price of 3s. 6d. from THE ROUND TABLE, Ltd., London, who will also supply back numbers of THE ROUND TABLE, if stocks allow. A limited number of copies of the Index and Title-page are annually available, free of charge, to those subscribers who bind THE ROUND TABLE, and may be obtained on application to any of the above agents, or to THE ROUND TABLE, Ltd., 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W. 1.

#### PERMISSION TO REPRINT

For permission to reprint matter that has appeared in THE ROUND TABLE application should be made to the Editor, 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W. 1, or, in Canada and New Zealand, to the Hon. Secretaries of THE ROUND TABLE Groups whose addresses are given above.

# THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Summit via Paris	3
Chinese Expansion	8
Duplessis and His Heirs	17
On Being Australian in 1959	26
Self-Determination in Algeria	32
Washington after Khrushchev	41
We are Seven	47
Nigeria: the African Giant	55
United Kingdom: The General Election	64
Ireland: External Relations	74
Pakistan: An Encounter at the Summit	80
Canada: Oil and its Rivals	84
South Africa: The Flux of Parties	90
Australia: Trends in Primary Production	95
New Zealand: Race Relations in International Sport	101
Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Emergency Measures	107

No. 197

December 1959

Price 7/6

By air mail 10/-

London: THE ROUND TABLE, LTD.

# THE SUMMIT VIA PARIS

## WESTERN POWERS IN QUEST OF UNITY

AS the last month of the frosty fifties slips away, the world turns its back on the year of international *tête-à-têtes*, and looks forward with a rather tremulous aspiration to a year of general concourse and the uncertain promise of a thaw. We have watched with hope and anxiety inextricably intertwined the series of personal visits by the leaders of the Powers—Mr. Macmillan to Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev to Washington, Dr. Adenauer to London, Mr. Eisenhower, uniquely adventurous in the history of the Presidency, to eleven capitals of the Old World. There have been awkward moments and ill-tempered utterances, but no explosions; nothing has been settled, but attitudes and purposes are better understood. The complex of bilateral conversations, it is generally agreed, has done no harm to the prospects of world peace; the measure of what good has been done falls to be taken when the exchange of pacific sentiments is tested in the concrete process of negotiation at the summit conference or conferences and the consultations between the Western Powers by which they must be preceded.

Making every allowance for the obvious motives of propaganda, Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on October 31 sounded a note of desire for understanding which to many Western ears rang truer than any Russian utterance for some years past. The West must not be outdone in giving evidence of that its pacific intentions are sincere; and indeed such evidence can be read, and no doubt has been read by Mr. Khrushchev, in the conspicuous relaxation of the rigid attitude of suspicion hitherto characteristic of the State Department. "The first cracks", says Mr. Khrushchev, "have appeared in the ice of the cold war." Those cracks appear to be real, and the West can scarcely without discourtesy and discredit decline to treat them as real. The danger that may arise from so doing lies in the possibility that Mr. Khrushchev's conciliatory words mask a manoeuvre to divide the Western allies from one another. Such a motive in Soviet policy has been detected often enough before, and could easily underlie certain passages in the speech—for example, the complimentary reference to self-determination in Algeria—and it is necessary for the Western Powers to be on their guard against it. Indeed, the consolidation of a united front to face what is still the adversary if not the enemy is the essential purpose of the Paris conference on December 19.

The more flexible attitude lately apparent in Washington, combined with the effect of the British general election, which assures continuity for the policy of Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, should make Anglo-American co-operation at the summit and on the approaches easier than it has sometimes been. The more closely the Anglo-Saxon Powers act together, however, the more jealously they will be looked upon by France; and the authority of France, relatively to her allies, is steadily advancing. Her economic

recovery from the ruin of 1940 and the further devastation of 1944, notwithstanding the long drain of her resources into Asia and North Africa, has been astonishing. France, which needs so little that she cannot produce from her own soil, has demonstrated once more that she is the most naturally rich country in the Western world. To do the Fourth Republic justice, this great economic resurgence was already accomplished before the political revolution of last year. Nevertheless, the cult of personality, if it has ever been truly uprooted from Moscow, is certainly burgeoning afresh in Paris; and the quest of Western unity today means first and foremost finding common ground with the cold, angular, masterful, unshakably patriotic figure of General de Gaulle.

The first rapture is over: few now think that the secret of social regeneration was revealed on the Treize Mai any more infallibly than on the Quatorze Juillet or the Dix-Neuf Brumaire. General de Gaulle has alienated many of the finest French minds by his restrictions on the press and on freedom of speech. He has split his own supporters—in a manner wholly to his credit—by his policy in Algeria, and by his reaction to the "Affaire Mitterand". But there is no prospect of any combination in France that would be strong enough to supersede him. The most distinguished French Socialist, M. Guy Mollet, in his strictures upon the régime does not go much beyond a complaint that the General makes no institutional provision for the future when his commanding personality is removed from the scene. It is the recurrent criticism of all dictatorships; but for the present the crucial fact is that whenever France has been great in world affairs it has been under authoritarian rule, and today authority is firmly entrenched. All parties in their private counsels must be conscious that there is no visible future for their country except under de Gaulle—all parties, that is, except the Communists, who do not think in terms of a national future at all.

The difficulty, then, for the British and American leaders in Paris will be to induce General de Gaulle to march in step with them; and its source is in his evident preference for a more devious route than that which leads direct to the summit. His mission is to re-establish the greatness of France first, and to meet the Russians afterwards. Every month by which the summit conference is delayed is likely to seem to him a month gained. Forced as he is by the hard economic facts of power politics to concede to the United States the first place in the Western alliance, he will never reconcile himself to acceptance of the third. For the very reason that the result of the British general election consolidates the partnership between Great Britain and the United States it is likely to be distasteful to General de Gaulle. He would have felt more comfortable with the Labour Party in office, pursuing—if, indeed, it would have pursued—a "little England" policy; for he is reluctant to acknowledge Britain's place in the front rank of the West unless or until France is able to share it. He has given the first place in his diplomacy to the organization of the common market, in which the leadership of France is assured. Whether he aims eventually at the development of the economic into a political combination he has not disclosed; probably the intense nationalism which is the foundation of his thought would forbid him to

contemplate any compromise of the sovereignty of France. But the evident design to assume the leadership of a Western Europe detached from both the United States and Great Britain and able to speak to them on equal terms tends to claim time for readjustment of inter-allied relationships and to postpone the day when a united Western strategy for the summit can be formulated.

While the jealousy of General de Gaulle for the prestige of France maintains a constant presumption on his side against immediate acquiescence in any Anglo-American initiative, the visits of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Paris and Dr. Adenauer to London have yielded real progress in mutual understanding between the West European allies and smoothed away some obstacles to a concerted approach to the summit. There will be difficulties in the economic background for as long as the European Economic Community and the Outer Seven fail to come to terms. But if there were doubts of the genuineness of both the French and the German desire for a release of tension in Europe, they have been dissipated. The French impression that Great Britain contemplated discussions limited to the arid and unpromising topic of Berlin has been removed, and with it the correlative British delusion that General de Gaulle would be unwilling to meet the Russians at all until the entire range of East-West contention all round the globe could be brought to an issue, with the prospect of a simultaneous settlement. Already the Western Powers are more nearly in step than seemed possible a month ago.

### Second Front of the Cold War

If President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan fail at the Paris conference to overcome General de Gaulle's reluctance to move quickly to the summit, it is possible that Mr. Khrushchev, on his visit in the New Year, may succeed. In his speech of October 31 he stretched out both hands to the General, both acknowledging his recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a contribution to the peace of Europe and complimenting him on his proposals for the settlement of the Algerian question. This notable gesture was no doubt intended, and may well be effective, to create in advance a favourable atmosphere for the conversations in Paris, on which Mr. Khrushchev may be expected to rely for an accelerated advance to the summit. His desire for a *détente* in Europe has been proclaimed too explicitly at home for its genuineness to be seriously doubted, whatever room there may be for divergent interpretations of his motive. For many years the peace propaganda of the Soviets has been transparently directed towards splitting the unity of the West. But it has had its effect on the domestic audience, and made it progressively more difficult to swing Russian opinion behind a bellicose policy. Even this may be a calculated effect. The immense scientific and industrial achievements of the Soviet Union since the war, of which the sputniks and luniks are the spectacular evidence for the outer world, have engendered in its rulers an ever-growing confidence in the economic potential of their social system. They are convinced that the inherent stresses of "capitalism" have doomed Western European civilization to disruption, and that they can achieve their object of world supremacy without resort to arms. The potential *casus belli* in

Europe remain, but are ceasing to inspire such provocative language as heretofore. Even the ultimatum on Berlin, it now begins to appear, may have been planned less to precipitate a crisis than to force a meeting at the summit. Both sides alike may be asking themselves whether we really wish to go on menacing one another over these stale, though unsettled, issues. It is possible that the summit, when it is reached, may reveal a determination in Mr. Khrushchev to seal off the Western front of the cold war—in order to turn to more urgent affairs. Hopes have begun to be expressed that the process of sealing may leave chances for some of the subjugated countries of Eastern Europe to escape through the barbed wire; but it is decidedly sanguine to count as yet on anything of the sort.

There is no doubt that the decline in the tactical intensity of the cold war corresponds to a real change in the strategical situation. When Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev met in Washington they might be excused if they saw themselves as an Octavian and an Antony dividing the empire of the world. But at least Mr. Khrushchev was certainly conscious that the foundations of their predominance were not impregnable. The European Lepidus might perhaps be partially ignored, but the "external proletariat" on the frontiers could not be left out of account. As Mr. Denis Healey aptly observed in the debate on the Address at Westminster, the effects of the revolution in Asia and Africa may be progressively to diminish the relative strength of both the United States and the Soviet Union in world affairs. The Soviet leaders, who are accustomed to think in terms of long periods and masses of people, are very conscious of these trends.

So it should not be surprising if Mr. Khrushchev begins now to deploy his main power to face east rather than west. An article elsewhere in this issue,\* following on another published in June,† analyses some of the events that have been taking place on the Himalayan frontier. They may prove to be of world-shaping significance, the opening moves of the inevitable struggle between India and China for the soul of Central Asia. That struggle must be watched anxiously from the Kremlin; for if China has the better of the contest her eventual rivalry for the mastery of Asia can no more be mitigated by their common profession of the Marxist faith than was the struggle between Bourbon and Hapsburg for supremacy in Europe by the loyalty of both to the Catholic Church.

The great empty spaces of the Soviet provinces in Asia are exposed to the remorseless pressure of the huge Chinese population, growing with every generation heavier. Tibet has recently discharged some of the functions of a buffer state: now its usefulness for that purpose may soon be at an end. The Russians have tried other buffers in the past—Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang: none has lasted. Today the thrust of China is right up against the borders of Uzbekistan.

Here in Asia, then, is in the not very long run the vulnerable flank of the Soviet Union; and whether Mr. Khrushchev does or does not press for the inclusion of China in the summit conferences it is certain that his conduct of

\* See "Chinese Expansion", p. 8.

† See "The Challenge of Tibet", *THE ROUND TABLE*, no. 195, June 1959, p. 218.

negotiations will be profoundly influenced by concern for his eastward ramparts. But if for that reason he works to relax the tension in Europe, that does not mean that he has abandoned the contest there. He believes that time is on his side, and that the disruptive forces within capitalism will give him a bloodless victory. It behoves the Western governments and peoples to prove the Marxian analysis wrong, which must be done by other means than physical force. Meanwhile the Russians' desire for release from the dreary attrition of the arms race may be taken to be as genuine as our own. Whatever advance they make towards a peaceful resolution of differences, we must be ready to meet them at least half-way, while keeping our powder dry.

# CHINESE EXPANSION

## ASIAN COMMUNISM ON THE MARCH

FOR the hundred years before the Communist revolution in China, the country had been in decay. China, formerly one of the most majestic States in the world, had become abnormally weak at a time when the West had become abnormally strong. Thus during this time the pressures had been from outside upon the Chinese Government, not from China outwards.

Chinese armies were regarded with contempt, especially after China's failure in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. At the end of the nineteenth century, a partition of China between the Western countries had been tentatively discussed. If China was saved from this fate, it was less because of the difficulties which lay in attempting its conquest than because the Western countries feared that the balance of power would be too much disturbed if China was attached in unequal proportions to their colonial empires.

Yet, even during this period of China's prostration and shame, one fact stood out. However weak the Chinese Government might have become, the Chinese race remained vigorous; while the power of the Chinese state was contracting, the Chinese people had been expanding, both filling up the parts of the Chinese empire formerly inhabited by non-Chinese and also going oversea to live under foreign governments. They flooded over Manchuria. They encroached on the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. They pressed down into South-east Asia. Though the Chinese Government gave them no support, the people by private enterprise carried on an adventurous expansion abroad. They were hardy, shrewd, patient, nearly always able to survive better than the people among whom they settled. For the time being the settlers oversea became detached from their motherland. But by long-standing Chinese legal tradition a Chinese who went abroad could never shed his nationality. He might acquire the citizenship of the new countries into which he penetrated, but he combined this with his original Chinese citizenship.

The coming to power of the Communists brought to an end the decline of Chinese State power. There had been clear signs of recovery under the Kuomintang, but these were interrupted by the war with Japan and the civil war with the Communists. It was soon apparent that the Communists would give China a formidable government. The West, including America, could no longer exert pressure upon it, and this changed the political pattern in East Asia. Already, a little before the revolution, the West had surrendered to the Kuomintang Government its concessions and its extra-territorial privileges; if they had still existed when the Chinese Communist Government was set up, the clash between China and the West might have been even more intractable. In fact, the first months of Communist government did not reveal the troubles which were coming. The stage was set in such a way that China, if it desired, could quickly find a new and dignified place in the world. The American navy had sailed away from the Chinese ports. By its

speedy recognition of the Communist Government, Britain signified that it was willing to accept China's legitimate ambition to decide its own fate. If the Communists had limited their ambitions and had humoured America, they could fairly soon have gained admission to the United Nations.

Thus it did not seem necessary that the revolution in China should bring with it any very grave international problems. China had ceased to suffer aggression. It was not expected that it would quickly become an aggressor. There was no sense of urgency about the question of how to live with China. The other very large country in Asia, India, was disposed to welcome China's revival as a part of the Asian revival in general. In China's recovery it saw no threat to itself.

That was in the autumn of 1949. Yet among people with historical vision there was already uneasiness. It seemed unnatural that a revolution in such a huge country should leave other countries undisturbed. The French revolution had started twenty years of war; the Russian revolution had kept the world even longer in unrest. Would the Chinese revolution really make less stir? A revolution usually releases energies in a people, and there was a fear that these might get mixed up with ambitions to restore China's past glories. Before the nineteenth century, China had usually been incomparably the strongest power in the Far East; the small countries in its orbit had accepted its overlordship. In the political practices of the time, a polite despatch of gifts by a lesser king to placate the Emperor at Peking had been interpreted as the recognition of Chinese sovereignty. Nepal, Burma, Viet Nam, Cambodia and other border territories had all sent such gifts. Would the new Communist Government feel that as the custodian of China's national interests it must reassert these claims to sovereignty, and would it construe sovereignty in a twentieth-century way as entitling it to take full control of these subordinate countries? The Kuomintang had shown signs of wishing to do so, but it was too weak.

These were the questions at the back of the mind of many people in 1949. They were not expressed loudly. At least in this country, it was thought better to give China the benefit of the doubt.

There were anxieties also about the expansion of the Chinese people. Was this to continue? How was it to be regulated? Would the Chinese who were already settled overseas call on the Communist Government in Peking to cast its protection over them?

### Korea to Bandung

THE world's experiences with the new China during the first few years of the régime were not easy to interpret. On the one hand, China intervened in the Korean war, and was designated by the United Nations as an aggressor. On the other hand it managed to convince many of its small neighbours that it was a good neighbour. Its affirmation of this, their acceptance of it, was the high-light of the Bandung conference in 1955.

China's part in the Korean war was not conclusive proof of an expansionist spirit. As far as is known, Peking did not abet North Korea in attacking the south; it is even doubtful if it knew that the attack was to be made, though

Russia certainly did. Peking sent in its armies, disguised as volunteers, when the United Nations forces, which were principally American, drove the North Koreans back behind their original frontier, the 38th Parallel, and declared themselves bent on reuniting the two halves of the country under United Nations protection. Probably, China believed quite genuinely that this was a threat to its vital interests. Geographically, Korea is a peculiarly important territory strategically, at least in terms of war before the atom bomb. It has been described variously as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan and a dagger pointed at the heart of China. If Korea passed under American control, China felt that America would have a military foothold on its borders from which it could plan the subversion of Chinese Communism.

That America was determined to overthrow Chinese Communism, Peking never doubted. The new governing class had formed its ideas about foreign politics when it was living as a guerrilla government in the caves of Yunan. Cut off from contacts with the outside world, it had accepted at its face value the world picture given by Russia and, before its dissolution, the Comintern. It was sure that America would never tolerate Communism in China, and it had not been impressed by America's disengagement when the Peking Government was set up. If, within a year of the establishment of the Government, America was establishing itself in Korea, that seemed to confirm its belief that America was plotting its overthrow.

That conviction was certainly sincere, however wrong, and China's actions during the Korean war are all reconcilable with it. China wanted above all to deny Korea to America. It wanted Korea as a buffer State. Given these fixed beliefs, China's pursuit of its aim was not unreasonable.

Significantly, most of the countries in Asia were inclined to acquit China, even though they might align themselves formally with the majority in the United Nations. They still saw China as a friendly power; its advance in strength was regarded as an advance in the strength of Asia; any humbling of the West was received with pleasure, open or secret, for even the countries of Asia which had been guided by their reason to co-operate with the West still in their emotions felt—and inevitably—a continuing resentment because of the past century of Western arrogance. Even if the accounts of Communist excesses in China itself were disturbing, free Asia dismissed most of them as propaganda by America; or, if it had to accept them as true, it noticed that China was not as yet trying to export its new and rather terrifying civilization. The accord between China and most of the rest of Asia continued long after the Korean war. It received expression in the Five Principles of non-interference, non-intervention and good neighbourliness proclaimed by Chou En-lai and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru at Delhi in 1954.

These warm sentiments culminated in the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, held in 1955. The conference was summoned by the countries of what was known as the Colombo group—India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. But Chou En-lai stole it and dominated it. Chou En-lai is an exceedingly impressive diplomatist, suave, supple, with a flexibility which hides his resolution. Some of the countries taking part in the conference had gone

there to express their fears about a revival of Chinese imperialism. By this time they had a certain amount of evidence: for example, China had invaded its former dependency Tibet, and forced it to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty. An attack on China was made by Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon; he was supported by Turkey. But the attacks rebounded. Chou En-lai gave out reassurance to all China's neighbours. He was reasonableness itself. He used his great powers of personal charm. Support rallied to his side, and against Sir John Kotelawala and those who had backed him. Nehru threw his influence on China's side. Chou En-lai disarmed suspicion by raising, before anyone else did, the problem of Chinese overseas, whom previous governments had insisted on treating as Chinese citizens; he offered to negotiate a treaty with Indonesia, where their problems were acute, by which each Chinese would have to opt for Chinese citizenship. Dual citizenship would be ended.

### Aggression in Tibet

THE Bandung conference was the high point of the fraternization of China and its neighbours. The cordiality at first persisted. Chou En-lai and Nehru again found themselves in harmony when Chou En-lai visited India in 1956. But, little by little, the climate changed.

China's self-confidence grew. It felt itself impregnable at home. It was fortified by Russian aid, but had not been treated by Russia as a satellite. At the time of the Polish and Hungarian risings, it had intervened in Europe with its advice. This was the first initiative by an Asian country in Europe since the siege of Vienna in 1688. It began to interest itself in Middle East affairs. In its eyes, nearly all events supported its confidence, which had been strong from the start, that Communism was the wave of the future; China had been able to ride with the wave. With this ideological ratification came a return of the memory of the days when China, the Middle Kingdom or Flowery Kingdom, had seemed to be the centre of the world, with peripheral States drawing heavily upon it for their civilization. Probably the Communists at Peking began to take it for granted that this state of affairs would be restored much sooner than they had at first dared to expect.

The turning point was China's repressive action in Tibet. Perhaps this action happened earlier than China had wished; perhaps its hand was forced. China's relations with Tibet have been complex. Ethnographically, Tibet is absolutely distinct from China; culturally it is more attached to India, or to an India of the past, than to China; but politically it has for two centuries been involved with China. In the days of the Manchu Emperors, the Dalai Lama was a kind of feudatory of Peking. The exact degree of Chinese authority in Tibet varied, but at times was high. After the fall of the Manchus, Tibet became virtually independent. Next to China, Britain was the country mainly interested in Tibet, because of its interest in having a buffer State to preserve the security of India. Britain welcomed the *de facto* independence of Tibet; but in a time of waning imperial enterprise it was unwilling to affront China and perhaps incur world censure by forcing through a *de jure* recognition of Tibet's rupture with China. In 1914 it had persuaded Chinese pleni-

potentiaries at a conference at Simla to limit China's rights in Tibet, but the plenipotentiaries were afterwards repudiated by Peking; Britain accepted the fact. When the Kuomintang Government established itself in China, China's suzerainty in Tibet was again affirmed, though more formally than in reality. After the Communist revolution, the new Government within a year sent an army to Tibet, and by force of arms compelled the Dalai Lama to accept a treaty. The Dalai Lama said much later that he had been tricked as well as bullied, and that his seal on the treaty was in fact made by the Chinese and affixed without his knowledge, and he had been made to accept the *fait accompli*. The treaty gave China military control of Tibet and a clear recognition of actual sovereignty. Peking promised to leave untouched the country's social structure and the apparatus of lama government.

From the start, the Chinese Red Army, with its conviction of its mission to spread Communism, was more active in Tibet than might have been expected from the terms of this treaty. Tibet provoked its iconoclasm and its reforming zeal. Tibet is the most intensely religious country in the world; lamaism is its life; medieval Christendom, even in its most enthusiastic religious phase, must seem a secular civilization in comparison with Tibet. Superstition is heavily mixed with true Buddhist religion. But, however anachronistic this civilization of Mahayana Buddhism may seem, it satisfies the Tibetans. They did not want it changed. Before the Communists arrived, there had been no criticism of society. There were no Tibetan Voltaires.

Besides the lamas and the landowners there was a large class of poor farmers and serfs. They were undoubtedly oppressed, at least in Central Tibet; in the East conditions were better. The Chinese concentrated on them. They were the instruments by which China hoped to bring about a revolution. But as soon as the intentions of the Chinese became clear, a rising began among the fierce tribal people of East Tibet, the Khambas.

At first the Khamba revolt was as much against the Tibetan rulers at Lhasa as against the Chinese. But as the Chinese pressure grew, Tibetans united. Slowly the Khamba revolt spread westward. In February 1959 the Khamba insurgents were dangerously close to Lhasa, and the attitude of the Dalai Lama was undeclared. The Chinese decided that the best way of putting down the rebellion was to engage the prestige of the Dalai Lama ostentatiously in repressing it. Therefore it demanded that his Tibetan army should move against the Khambas. This was the crisis. The Dalai Lama fled to India: that he escaped the Chinese vigilance seems almost a miracle, unless perhaps the Chinese commanders, having failed to get him to assent to the use of his army, were glad to see him go. The Chinese asserted that their hands were no longer tied at all by their agreements with the Dalai Lama to respect his autonomy. They strengthened their armies, and set themselves with great vigour to modernize one of the last countries which had ignored modern civilization. The lamas were to be treated much as the monks in Henry VIII's England.

The reaction in the rest of Asia must have taken them by surprise. In a month, the propaganda of years was undone. Free Asia is still religious. Ceylon, Burma, Thailand are devoutly Buddhist, though of a different sect

from that of Tibet. The attack on the lamas scandalized them. India's attitude was peculiar; India, where Buddhism was once widespread, had long ago ceased to be Buddhist. But Buddha is recognized as an avatar of Vishnu, and Hindus regard Buddhists as acceptable co-religionists. China's rough handling of Buddhism made India realize how skin deep was its new secularism. In most political cliques and parties there was an instinctive condemnation of China. The Socialists were among the loudest. Indians suddenly found that for years they had deceived themselves about China.

China may well have been astonished at this emotion in India. It may have regarded it as hypocritical. Undoubtedly the more conservative groups in India used the anti-Chinese sentiment as a stick to beat Mr. Nehru, since he had become associated with the trusting attitude towards China; in expressing their horror of Chinese actions they were really trying to change the leadership of the Congress Party. The Chinese might complain that India's opinion was childishly ingenuous. India had accepted China's military action against Tibet in 1950; once it agreed that Tibet was Chinese territory and that events there were a matter of Chinese domestic jurisdiction, India could no longer complain about the Tibetan policy of Peking.

China was therefore inclined to be contemptuous of Indian opinion. Moreover, by this time it was indifferent to Indian censure. From its position of strength, it saw no reason why it should not be ruthless. The campaign of modernization in Tibet was given new momentum. Propaganda called on the serfs to rise and displace the landlords. Lamas were put to productive labour.

### The Indian Frontier

THE timing of China's drastic acts in Lhasa was decided on, not by Peking, but by circumstance. The Khamba revolt had to be crushed. But China's next aggressive moves were made deliberately. If China had outraged the Indian people by its attack on Buddhist institutions, it went on to outrage the Indian Government by disclosing for the first time that it did not mean to accept the existing international frontier. Why it chose to reveal its intentions so openly, and why it chose this moment for doing so, are still not clear.

In August, a newspaper in India discovered that Chinese forces had crossed the Indian frontier, and that the Chinese, in building a road from Tibet to Sinkiang, had driven it across Indian territory. The Indian Government had known about this for some time, but had not made it public because they hoped, by peaceful means and by invoking the Panchshila, to persuade the Chinese Government to vacate the usurped territory. The revelation caused great excitement. For a week Mr. Nehru made speeches almost daily in the Indian Parliament. The Government of India issued a white paper describing the course of its disputes with China.

From this, the Indian public learned for the first time that the quarrel was not over minute pockets of mountain land, which could be adjusted by a little give and take on either side. It threatened to be a major dispute involving questions of the recent history of India and China.

The clash came about because the two countries are starting from different premises. India regards itself as the heir of the British Raj. It claims that the frontiers of the Raj are its own frontiers. Part of this frontier is the McMahon line, agreed on between India and the Tibetan authorities at the instance of the then Secretary of the Foreign Department, Sir Henry McMahon. It extends from the State of Bhutan to Burma. The principle on which it was drawn was that it should follow the crest of the Himalayas, though there are minor deviations. It has never been demarcated on the ground, but, following the principle, it is easy to see where it lies. Nehru said that he was willing to contemplate minor adjustments of the line, a few miles this way or that, but he would not give up the principle that India should extend to the Himalayan crest.

The result is that India includes quite large areas which, where they are inhabited at all, are inhabited by peoples who have no ethnographical connexion with the Indian peoples. They are Tibetans, Monbas, Akas, Dafias, Miris, Abors and Mishmis.

The Chinese case is that the McMahon line was the product of imperialism. British power, having conquered India, pressed out beyond India as far as it could into adjacent territories. In doing so it invaded lands under the authority of Lhasa, and, by virtue of this, under the ultimate authority of Peking. The McMahon line, says Peking, was fixed arbitrarily by the British. It was not recognized or accepted by the Chinese Government.

The Chinese argue that the new Indian State, the successor State to the British Raj, claims to be based on national principles. India's liberation took place in the name of nationalism. The new Indian Government was entitled to the territories inhabited by Indian peoples, but its claims to former imperialist boundaries lapsed, at least morally, where these included areas inhabited almost exclusively by non-Indian peoples. China would therefore demand back about 40,000 square miles which were formerly under Tibetan jurisdiction, and which were not inhabited by Indians.

The weakness of the Chinese claim is that China's own occupancy of Tibet is the result of imperialism—China's own imperialism. Claims on India by Tibet are a concern of Tibet, not of China. This might have been a strong argument with which India could have rebutted China's claims. But India cannot use it because by an agreement made in 1954 it recognized, at least inferentially, that China was sovereign over Tibet. Tibet was described as the Tibetan region of China.

Besides the dispute over the McMahon line, the frontier was challenged by China in Ladakh, which is the north-eastern part of Kashmir. Here, said China, no valid demarcation of the frontier had ever been made. India's demarcation had been unilateral. Its invocation of a treaty between Tibet and a general of Ranjit Singh in 1842 failed—said Peking—because this treaty had not been ratified by Peking. Similarly, China refused to recognize the Indian version of the frontier in what is called the Ari sector, running between Tibet on the one side and Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh on the other.

In a letter to Nehru in September 1959, Chou En-lai stated that the

Chinese Government "absolutely does not recognize the McMahon line". Just as serious for India, it hinted that it did not recognize India's right to negotiate on behalf of the border States of Bhutan and Sikkim when China put forward demands to them for the restoration of Tibetan territory. India claims to be the heir of past treaties between these States and Britain giving the Government in Delhi the control of their foreign relations.

China's claims caused the more dismay in India because they were unexpected. India had been its advocate to the world. It had emphasized the importance of the Chinese Revolution. It had urged year by year the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Whenever China had done anything which exposed it to particular criticism, India had asked for charitable judgment. Now China had bitten off the hand which fed it—at the elbow.

Nehru and Chou En-lai disagreed about whether China had gone back on previous undertakings. Nehru quoted a minute which he had recorded after a conversation with Chou En-lai in 1956. "Because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of opinion that they should give recognition to the McMahon line." Chou's version was that China had not earlier made plain its repudiation of the McMahon line "because conditions were not yet ripe, and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question".

The dispute had a curious lack of reality because, at least in Ladakh, it was about practically uninhabited territory. Even the strategic value of the debated area, unquestionable a decade or two ago, had become doubtful. Once, India would have been at a strategic disadvantage if China gained control of the Himalayas: China could mount an offensive so much the more easily. But in conditions of modern warfare, attack would come from air strips far removed from the frontier. Moreover, if India was in danger from China, the danger was not from invasion, but from infiltration, penetration and political warfare. In spite of this, Nehru could not condone the Chinese aggression. It struck at his prestige. The right wing in India, which had waited so long for an issue on which to assail him, would have been given their opportunity if he had failed to reply to the Chinese challenge. Anything connected with the Himalayas can stir up strong passions in India. The Himalayas are "the abode of the gods". Even the secular Mr. Nehru hinted at this Indian special interest in his latest message to Chou En-Lai.

Some lookers-on, impressed by the folly of the Chinese in doing anything which might threaten Nehru's overthrow, looked for causal reasons for Chinese action. They suggested that the Chinese were probing India's defences; they suggested that the Chinese were furious at India's giving asylum to the Dalai Lama; they suggested that the Chinese were indignant at Russia's interest in India, and wished to humiliate this rival; they suggested that the Chinese army in Tibet had got out of hand and was taking independent action. This last was very improbable. The Chinese army seems to be under tighter political discipline than any other army in the world.

The Chinese, after encountering the first resistance by India, persevered

with their demands. If they had acted carelessly, and had desired to reconsider their action in the light of the reaction it provoked, they could have backed out without loss of face. Instead they persisted, and that was ominous for the future. In its behaviour, the Chinese Government suggested more and more that it was reverting to old Chinese tradition—a determination to stand by any frontier claims where it thought that it had a case, regardless of the consequences to itself of pressing them at an ill-chosen moment.

### Imperialism Resurgent

**C**HINA has not yet showed elsewhere how seriously it will pursue its expansionist aims. It has border disputes with Burma not yet resolved. But the basic fear in Asia is not that China will push out its frontiers by a few thousand square miles here and there. The fear is growing: it is that China will prove again, as in the past, an imperialist power, and that it will be the more dangerous to its neighbours because it is modernized, revitalized, the servant of one of the most dynamic ideologies known in history, with powerful forces working for it beyond its frontiers in the local Communist parties and in the oversea Chinese. The hope that China may be restrained by a more prudent and perhaps sated Russia is not very strong. Russia seems to have advised caution over the border dispute with India. But the Chinese Red Army, in its more private demonstrations, is hardly more respectful of Russia than of other foreign barbarians.

At any time since the Chinese Revolution, these prospects might have been clear. But at first, Asia was disposed to be enthusiastic about the Chinese revolution as an experiment in new social forms, from which all countries might learn. Chinese Communism seemed more relevant to the problems of Asia than Russian Communism; however poor Russia may appear to the West, in Asian eyes it is an advanced country economically, and Communism there is the European rich man's Communism, as opposed to Chinese Communism which is the Asian poor man's Communism. This diverted attention from China as a possible expansionist power. Moreover the Chinese had lulled suspicion by proclaiming themselves to be the champions of Asian nationalism against Western imperialism. Like all countries everywhere, the Asian countries were more vigilant against the danger which had ended than against the danger which was rising. The Tibetan affair at last undeceived them, and there may now be new directions in the policies of some of the countries which feel themselves threatened. They are already taking precautions against the oversea Chinese; the Indonesian Government is striking at the sources of their wealth and driving them out of business.

China could still cause these counter-measures to be moderated if it reaffirmed the Panchshila, and by its actions showed that it would honour them. But it may now feel that it is no longer necessary to conciliate anyone. What it does in the next few months should be revealing.

# DUPLESSIS AND HIS HEIRS

## A GREAT TRANSITION IN QUEBEC

ON September 7, 1959, in the remote mining community of Schefferville in the wilderness of Northern Quebec, the career ended of one of the outstanding political figures of the past two decades in Canada, Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec. Mr. Duplessis' record of political success is almost unparalleled even in Canada, which is noted for the longevity of its political administration. With the exception of an interlude during the Second World War, he guided the destinies of Canada's largest and second most populous Province for well over twenty years during an important era in its development. During the years since 1936, when he first came into office, French Canada has experienced a far-reaching social and economic revolution. Its economic progress has been very great and there has been a large-scale movement of the French-speaking population from the farms and the small villages to the fast-growing industrial centers such as Montreal, Trois Rivières, Sherbrooke and Granby. The Province has become one of the great industrial centers of North America.

It is difficult to assess to what degree Mr. Duplessis and his Administration have been directly responsible for these far-reaching changes. But nevertheless it is certain that he has left the imprint of his strong and autocratic personality on the political structure of the province. Of the recent Premiers of the ten Canadian Provinces, his was by far the most colorful and vivid figure and he went the furthest in steering a policy of his own independently of the Federal Government in Ottawa. During his long terms of office, he won much unfavorable publicity in the other provinces of Canada because of his illiberal measures, such as the passage of the famous Padlock Law in 1937, which gave the Quebec Government drastic powers to restrict the freedom of public assembly, and his persecution of the Protestant religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. But he was essentially a product of the unique political and social conditions of French Canada and this factor must be taken into account in evaluating his achievements.

Mr. Duplessis was a shrewd demagogue. He understood very well the mind and outlook of his fellow French-Canadians, and he was able to play with almost uncanny skill upon their deep-rooted suspicions of the English Canadians in the other provinces and their fear of an undue degree of intervention by the Federal Government in Ottawa in the internal affairs of their native Province. This was the greatest source of his political strength. He always posed as the fearless defender of the rights of the French-Canadians and the autonomy of the Province of Quebec against the sinister, centralizing designs of the Administrations which have been in power in Ottawa since the end of the nineteen-thirties.

This explains many of the policies he pursued, which seemed to many residents of the other provinces to be purely obstructive in character. For

example, he always blocked in a very determined manner all proposals of the Federal Government at Ottawa for redivision of the taxing powers in such matters as income and inheritance taxes, because such an arrangement might deprive Quebec of legislative powers which were rightfully hers. This also explains his long-continued opposition to the new National Hospital Insurance plan which was put into operation last year by the Progressive Conservative Administration of John Diefenbaker in co-operation with most of the other Provinces. This same attitude was also shown in the opposition of his Administration to any form of direct financial aid by the Federal Government to the universities and other institutions of higher education in the Province of Quebec. It also appeared in his refusal to co-operate with the other Provinces and the Federal Government in the completion of the Trans-Canada Highway between Halifax and Vancouver.

This negative attitude towards proposals for the centralizing of legislative powers on the part of the Federal Government, particularly in the fields of taxation and finance, has made his Administration a thorn in the side of successive Federal Administrations, and there is no doubt that his sudden and unexpected removal from the scene was greeted with something approaching relief in certain political and governmental circles in Ottawa.

#### A Personal Creation

DUPLESSIS and his Union Nationale Party, which was his personal creation, came to power in Quebec for the first time during the depression period of the nineteen-thirties. The Union Nationale originally represented a loose coalition between Nationalists, Conservative machine politicians and Liberals who were disgusted with the corruption of the preceding Tashereau Liberal Administration. Basically, however, this movement was a product of the wave of deep dissatisfaction among the French-Canadian masses at the control of the great majority of the banks, the insurance companies and the large corporations of their native Province by alien English Canadian, British and American groups. They felt at that time and they still feel today that they are not masters in their own house.

But almost immediately upon assuming office in 1936 Mr. Duplessis showed himself to be no political reformer but an exceedingly astute opportunist. He quickly relegated the Nationalist reformers to a position of minor importance in his party and formed an alliance with the same big business interests in the Province which he had attacked so vigorously while in Opposition. During the period since 1936, he has done little to enable the French-Canadians to get more control over the economic institutions of their own Province. Indeed his policies have given the English- and American-controlled corporations the means to make their domination over the economy of the Province even more complete and all-embracing than in the past. This phase of his policies is best studied in connexion with the recent opening up of a vast new mineral empire in Northern Quebec. This is a huge, empty, wilderness region of rocky plateaux and mountains intersected by hundreds of lakes and rivers, which extends northwards from the north shore of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence for several hundred miles to the barren lands of the

Ungava and Hudson Straits. This area, which is larger than several European countries combined, has recently been found to contain very rich reserves of iron ore, copper, nickel and other valuable industrial minerals. During the past few years the Union Nationale have given American and European corporations, including the United States Steel Corporation and the Krupp interests in Western Germany, a practically free hand to exploit these reserves. French-Canadian capital is playing a very minor role indeed in these developments. And today the participation of French-Canadian business and financial groups in the development of the natural resources of the province is probably even less than it was twenty years ago when the Union Nationale first came to power.

During this period Mr. Duplessis, in addition to courting big business, has based his régime chiefly on the support of the rural population of the Province and the more conservative-minded groups among the local French-Canadian Catholic clergy. And here he has been greatly aided by the electoral system of the province. In Quebec, as in most of the other Canadian Provinces, the rural regions of the Province are greatly over-represented in the Provincial Legislature in Quebec City, at the expense of Montreal and the new industrial cities and towns. And it is in the rural regions of the Province that Mr. Duplessis' anti-Ottawa and anti-English attitudes have found the most sympathetic support. It is no wonder that in the past many of these rural areas have been almost solidly Union Nationale. And in return the Quebec Government has been of great aid to the farmer. It has given help to agricultural educational institutions and to the producers' and the consumers' co-operatives which are now widespread in the rural area and to the *caisses populaires* or co-operative savings banks. It has also spent a good deal of money on rural electrification schemes and on aid to the colonization movement whose aim has been to bring French-speaking settlers into the virgin forest lands in the Laurentian Shield Plateau to the north and the west of Ottawa and Montreal. A minor example of Mr. Duplessis' wooing of the farm vote has been his ban on the sale of margarine in the Province because of the competition it offers to butter producers there.

### Duplessis and Labor

**B**UT on the other hand, his Administration has done little to improve the situation of the fast-growing French-speaking working class in the industrial cities and towns. In comparison with most of the other Canadian Provinces and particularly Saskatchewan and British Columbia, the record of Quebec in the fields of labor and welfare legislation has been meager, with the exception of a policy of generous aid to technical education. Indeed Mr. Duplessis' Administration on many occasions has shown itself to be definitely hostile to the idea of free and democratically functioning labor unions. And this attitude has brought him into increasingly sharp conflict with several of the labor groups in the Province.

This is significant because organized labor has emerged as an important social and political force in Quebec during the past twenty years. This is shown by the fact that the total union membership in this Province increased

from about 75,000 in 1940 to over 350,000 in 1958, a growth of over 500 per cent in less than two decades. Quebec today has become one of the great strongholds of unionism in Canada.

Labor organization in Quebec is concentrated in two large Federations, the Canadian Labor Congress, which represents a recent fusion of the former Canadian Congress of Labor with the Trades and Labor Congress, and the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labor, whose membership is exclusively confined to the French-speaking wage-earners in the Province of Quebec. About one-third of the organizers in the Province are members of the Catholic organization, and the rest are members of the unions which are affiliated with the Canadian Labor Congress in Canada and with the combined A.F.L.-C.I.O. in the United States. The Canadian Labor Congress in Quebec as in the other Canadian provinces represents fusion between two Federations of widely different policies and outlooks. The former Trades and Labor Congress represented the narrow type of craft unionism with limited political and legislative aims which has become associated with the name of Samuel Gompers, the founder of the American Federation of Labor in the United States. The Canadian Congress of Labor, on the other hand, represented a broad type of industrial unionism with an advanced and comprehensive political and legislative program.

The Canadian and Catholic Federation of Labor, on the other hand, is a purely indigenous product of French Canada and has no exact parallel elsewhere on the North American continent. Its ties are rather with the Catholic labor movements in some of the countries of Western Europe such as France, Belgium and Austria. It was originally founded by the Catholic clergy and by French-Canadian nationalist groups in the early part of the present century as a means of combating the spread of the American type of unionism among the French-speaking industrial workers of the Province, and as an agency for the diffusion of the social and labor doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church as set forth in such encyclicals as *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. Originally the policies and the activities of the Federation were completely controlled and directed by the local Catholic clergy, and its policies in such matters as strike action and drives for higher wages and better working conditions were cautious and conservative in the extreme, and had a nationalist tinge. However, since the end of the Second World War, there have been decided changes in these policies and in the general outlook of the Confederation. Its direction has passed into the hands of young and progressive-minded labor officials including Gerard Picard, its past President, and Jean Marchand, its present Secretary; and under their competent guidance its tactics have taken on a new aggressiveness and militancy. During the past decade it has conducted a number of strikes, which have been among the most violent and hard-fought labor disputes in the whole history of Canada and which have brought it into sharp conflict with the Union Nationale Administration. The first of these battles took place in the asbestos mines in an area about one hundred miles north-east of Montreal. Then there followed the industrial dispute in the textile manufacturing town of Louisville, near Trois Rivières, in the winter of 1952-53 and the long-drawn-out strike in the

copper mines at Murdochville in the Gaspé Peninsula in 1957. In all of these disputes, the Provincial Government intervened directly in favor of the employers and against the Catholic Confederation, using tactics which were often both brutal and arbitrary; and as a result the rift between Duplessis and the Federation has become ever wider.

One result of this series of developments has been the growing disillusionment of the unions affiliated with either the Catholic Confederation of Labor or the Canadian Congress of Labor with the policies of the two old-line political parties, the Union Nationale and the Liberal. They have come to regard both of these political parties as agents and tools of big business and high finance. There has been increasing among the officials of these two federations and the younger and more radical-minded of the French-Canadian intellectuals a demand for the formation of a new left-wing party in the Province which would represent the interests of labor and of allied progressive groups. This party would be quite separate from the new national labor party which is being promoted by the Canadian Labor Congress at the present time, and would confine its efforts to the Quebec provincial field and to the issues which are of particular interest to the Quebec voter and union member. No definite decision has ever been reached on this whole question, but there is no doubt that, now that the overwhelming personality of Mr. Duplessis has disappeared from the provincial political arena, discussion of this type will become even more widespread among Quebec labor officials than in the past.

#### Electoral Strength of Union Nationale

**B**UT it is hardly necessary to point out that there are many obstacles which block the success of a political experiment of this type in Quebec at the present time. In the first place, there is the firm control of the Union Nationale over the electoral machinery of the Province, which has already been discussed. Then organized labor in Quebec, in spite of the great progress it has made during recent years, is not yet strong enough by itself alone to form the basis of a new political party without the support of other groups. And there is the fact that some unions in the Province, and particularly those in the Canadian Congress of Labor who were formerly affiliated with the Trades and Labor Congress, are strongly opposed to this type of political experimentation. They believe that the rôle of labor in the political field should be limited to the putting of pressure on members of the old-line parties both in the Provincial Legislature and in the House of Commons in Ottawa for the passage of legislation which seems to be in the interest of the wage-earners and the union members. And experience has already shown that in Canada as in the United States it is very difficult for labor unions to exert direct influence on the voting habits and the political activities of their members.

This cleavage between the Catholic Confederation of Labor and the Union Nationale, which has already been discussed, is typical of the intellectual evolution which has been taking place among members of the local French-Canadian Catholic clergy during the past few years. Many of these men realize clearly that the social doctrines and policies which were formulated

by the Catholic Church in French-Canada half a century ago, when the Province was overwhelmingly rural in its mode of life, are no longer suited to the present-day scene with its complex new industrial conflicts and social problems. They have come to see that these doctrines must be modified to meet this new set of conditions. Particularly significant in this connexion has been the conflict between the Union Nationale Administration and the brilliant Dominican scholar, Father Georges Henri Lévesque, the former head of the faculty of Social Sciences at Laval University in Quebec City. Father Lévesque, whose progressive social teachings have had a vast influence on the younger generation of French-Canadian scholars and social scientists, has long been very critical of many of the social and labor policies of the Union Nationale, which he regards as outmoded and not in harmony with present-day conditions. A short time ago he resigned from his post at Laval University and retired to a Dominican Friary located on the outskirts of Quebec City. It is possible that the Union Nationale Administration through its control over the University may have had something to do with this move, and it is certain that Father Lévesque's retirement from active teaching must have been pleasing to Duplessis.

In the same connexion, it is significant that, at the time of the last provincial elections in the summer of 1956, two Catholic priests, one of them also on the staff of Laval University, wrote and published a pamphlet which received wide distribution throughout the Province and which attacked in unsparing terms the methods of political corruption long practised by the Union Nationale, and pointed out the absence of true democracy in the functioning of representative institutions in the Province.

#### The New Leaders

DUPLESSIS occupied such a prominent place in the political life of the Province that his death has created a very fluid political situation there. The leadership of the Union Nationale, and the Provincial Premiership for the time being, have passed to the former Minister of Health and Social Welfare in the Union Nationale Cabinet, a youngish Montreal lawyer, Paul Sauvé. Mr. Sauvé like the other members of this Cabinet, which was completely dominated by Duplessis, is something of an unknown quantity in provincial politics. But during the brief period since he assumed office, he has already shown himself to be a political leader of considerable adroitness and finesse and as possessing a method and an approach which were not typical of his predecessor. Although he has announced publicly that he intends to carry on the policies of the Union Nationale which were inaugurated by Duplessis, certain new trends are already beginning to become apparent. This is particularly true in connexion with the vexed question of the relations between Quebec and the Federal Government. In Ottawa Mr. Sauvé has announced that he is prepared to take steps to end the long-continued conflict between the Federal and the Provincial authorities over Federal financial aid to the Quebec universities. Any solution of this problem would be greeted with enthusiasm by the universities concerned, including McGill and the University of Montreal, since they desperately need any finan-

cial aid which Ottawa can give them. Mr. Sauvé has also recently announced that he is looking into the question of the participation of Quebec in the new National Hospital Insurance scheme, and that he would like to bring the controversy between Ottawa and Quebec over the allocation of taxing powers in the income-tax and succession-duty field to an end. He is also obviously trying to hold out the olive branch to organized labor and other sectors of the Quebec electorate which have been strongly opposed to Duplessis' policies in the past.

However, Mr. Sauvé is merely a caretaker Premier who will hold office until the next provincial elections, which will almost certainly take place by the summer of 1960; and the results of this contest will show the quality of his leadership.

In the meantime the other political groups in the Province have been taken by surprise by the sudden death of Mr. Duplessis. Since the last provincial elections which were held in 1956, the position of the Union Nationale in the Provincial Legislature has been one of overwhelming strength since it controls seventy-five of the ninety-two seats there. The Quebec wing of the Liberal Party, which holds most of the remaining seats, has long suffered from mediocre and ineffective leadership and has received little direct aid from the national wing of the party in Ottawa. Jean Lesage the present leader of the party in the Provincial Legislature and the former Minister of Northern Affairs in the Saint Laurent Liberal Administration in Ottawa, which went out of office there in 1957, is a comparative new-comer to the provincial political scene, since he was only placed in his present post in the spring of 1958 and has not yet made any very strong impression on the Quebec electorate. His attacks on the Union Nationale to date have not been characterized by much adroitness or skill, and although he has made some attempts to win the support of organized labor he has met with little success in this direction. The Quebec wing of the left-wing Co-operative Commonwealth Federation is too weak in Quebec to be a serious political factor there at the present time.

There remains, however, Jean Drapeau, the former Mayor of Montreal. He showed himself to be a capable and honest administrator as mayor of Canada's largest city, but he has a somewhat angular and humorless personality, and he seems to lack the qualities of personal magnetism which helped to give Duplessis such a strong hold on the Quebec electorate. During the past year Mr. Drapeau has been building up a province-wide organization called the Civic Action League, with himself as honorary president and the professed aim of political education. Some observers believe that the ultimate aim of this organization is the capture of control of the Provincial Legislature with Mr. Drapeau as Premier; but its plans are still shrouded in mystery. A short time ago the Civic Action League issued a public statement, which was reproduced in most of the Montreal newspapers, in which it announced that it did not intend to enter any candidates in provincial election contests at the present time. Recently Mr. Drapeau published a book in which he set forth this program. But this work is not very enlightening. In it, he reveals himself in many respects as being as much of a nationalist and an autonomist as

Duplessis. He proposes a recasting of the relations between the Federal Government and the provinces by which each province would be endowed with its own constitution and with even wider legislative powers than it enjoys at the present time. In addition to being completely unworkable from the practical political standpoint such proposals are quite contrary to the general trend of political and economic developments in Canada in recent years. In the legislative field his only constructive proposal is for the nationalization of hydro-electric power and other public utilities by the Quebec Government; this is hardly very original, since such a system has been in operation in the neighbouring Province of Ontario for almost half a century.

#### Relations with Ottawa

AND finally there is the complicated question of the relations between the Union Nationale Administration in Quebec City and the Federal Progressive Conservative Administration of John Diefenbaker in Ottawa, which has been in office since 1957. During the past decade the Progressive Conservatives have been very weak in Quebec and, to a large extent, have left the provincial field to Mr. Duplessis. The latter in turn always kept his Union Nationale Administration from being too closely identified with the Progressive Conservatives in Ottawa, since the latter party in the eyes of the average French-Canadian voter has been identified with British imperialism and with Toronto high finance. But ever since 1957 the Progressive Conservatives have been staging a remarkable comeback in Quebec. In the last Federal election in 1958, for the first time since the First World War, they succeeded in capturing over thirty seats in many regions of the Province. Mr. Diefenbaker appears to enjoy more popularity among the French-Canadian electorate than any Conservative national political leader since the days of Sir John Macdonald in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The fatal identification of the Conservatives in the minds of the Quebec electorate with the policy of oversea conscription, which was an unhappy legacy of the crisis of the First World War, at last seems to be disappearing. And several Quebec members of the Progressive Conservative Party who were elected to the House of Commons in 1958 for the first time have had close ties with the Union Nationale in the past. One of them was a Deputy Minister at Quebec for almost a decade and another was Provincial Crown Prosecutor for an even longer period. And, with a Premier of Mr. Sauvé's diplomatic and conciliatory type in office in Quebec City, the relations between the two political groups may become even more friendly and intimate than in the past. This is a factor of some importance in Canadian Federal politics since in the past many French-Canadian supporters of the Union Nationale have tended to vote Liberal in Federal elections. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Diefenbaker will be able to change this trend.

As the situation stands at the present time, it may be said that although there is widespread dissatisfaction with the Union Nationale and its policies among certain groups in the Quebec electorate, this discontent has not yet been able to make itself effectively felt in the realm of practical politics. But

the provincial Liberals will certainly have to strengthen their organization and devise a constructive legislative program if they expect to win a victory against heavy odds in the next provincial election. Mr. Lesage will have to show qualities of leadership and personal magnetism which he has not yet shown himself to possess. This is particularly true if Mr. Sauvé proves to be as resourceful and clever a political leader as he appears at the present time.

At all events, from the broader standpoint, whatever turn the trend of political developments may take in Quebec during the next year or two, one thing is certain. The narrow and extremist French-Canadian nationalism and separatism which helped to keep Duplessis in power there for so many years is beginning to disappear even in those regions of the Province which have been the least exposed to modern cultural influences. As the result of the larger-scale migration of the rural population to the cities and the influence of such mass media as the movies, the radio, television, &c., the intellectual horizon of the average French-Canadian is very much broader today than it was even twenty years ago. In this lie the best hopes for the future better understanding and co-operation between the two major racial groups in Canada.

Canada,

November 1959.

# ON BEING AUSTRALIAN IN 1959

## THE DIGGERS COME TO TOWN

*(From a Correspondent)*

IN two world wars during the first half of the twentieth century the "Digger" tradition (fearless soldiers of fearful indiscipline until the last minute) was added to Australian mythology; but otherwise it was a quiet and comparatively flat period when the rate of population growth gradually decreased and nothing grew so well as the spirit of suburbia. By the middle of the century half the population lived in private houses in the low-density suburbs of a few principal cities, and another quarter lived in smaller townships. It was a comparatively comfortable existence, and it was often described by visitors as smug and spiritless: a whole nation isolated in its intellectual life like a provincial town in Europe. The pioneering qualities which had marked the nineteenth century hung in suspension, while there developed a cult of the average, of the glorified common man, and of mediocrity. During this time numerous creative talents, grown in the healthy circumstances of sunshine and a meaty diet, left for recognition abroad, and a stodgy air of conservatism in scientific, technological and artistic enterprises settled over the community.

There were, of course, isolated exceptions when the pioneering spirit was translated into the terms of the twentieth century: notably, the foundations of the steel, paper and brown coal industries, and the Commonwealth scientific research organization which is now known as C.S.I.R.O. Technical knowledge grew through the nineteen-thirties, laying the foundation of later change, but nothing greatly disturbed the surface indolence before the disruption of the Second World War. The change did not begin to appear until the worst rigours of economic and social readjustment to peace were over, about 1954.

Then, with a 10 per cent injection of European migrants and a new boom in industry, a realization of the potentialities of the country returned. Many Australians began again to look ahead and swell with vicarious pride at the thought of what Australia could be one day—probably by the end of the century the guardian of Western ideals in South East Asia, perhaps the leader of the British Commonwealth, as is sometimes wishfully forecast, even an almost-equal partner of the U.S.A. On National days, editorials and speeches began to revive all the attractive grandiose visions which were last enjoyed in the eighteen-eighties, when Australia first sensed the full power of her unrealized resources. The era of slouch seemed to be over. The new mood built up its own momentum and today the feeling of being an Australian is radically more exciting and disturbing than the flat resignation to that circumstance to which most of us a few years ago had become accustomed.

Once the economy rested almost entirely on the sheep's back. Once the manufacturer was content to produce a shoddy version of a British or American model. Once the Australian working man, from labourer to

professional, was more or less conscientious in regard to what he considered his normal day's work, but his measure of self-improvement was the time he could gain for watching sport or doing nothing. Once the service in shops, hotels and restaurants was offensively casual. In the years immediately following the last war the economy was racked at frequent intervals by strikes; and walking to work during a tram or train stoppage was a familiar, recurrent burden to the city worker.

Now, it is often claimed, there are proportionately more factory workers in Australia than in America, and the ever-increasing load of refrigerators, power lawnmowers, television sets, washing-machines and labour-saving devices which burden the working man is almost entirely made in Australia. Exports of industrial goods, including iron and steel products, aircraft, vehicles and light electrical equipment, are rising continuously. Competition raises the standards of manufacture and urgent advertising presses up the standards of living. A greater stake in stability and the sobering influence of monthly time-payment demands have finally subdued most of the latent rebelliousness in the wild colonial boy.

From 1940 until 1954 the housing problem was considered to be of such magnitude and urgency that heavy restrictions were placed on almost all kinds of building other than houses, and a government permit was required even for houses that exceeded an area of 1,250 square feet. This was the size arbitrarily fixed to represent a fair average and sufficient area for a healthy typical family. Only 20 per cent of the building industry's resources were spent on other works, while separate private houses were built in proportion to population at almost double the rate of the U.S.A. or the United Kingdom.

Now industrial and commercial construction has revived in spectacular measure. About 1956 there came a boom which threw the building industry into the greatest activity since it made the grotesque stucco palaces of the late nineteenth century. Expenditure on new construction for the year 1956-57 amounted to £361,000,000—more than a quarter of the total investments for that year. In 1957-58 buildings costing more than £100,000,000 were completed in Sydney alone. At present, each of the four corners of one intersection in the business district of Melbourne—Bourke and Queen Streets—has deep holes excavated behind builders' hoardings. To the west along Bourke Street a racket of rubble and wreckers' dust, steel skeletons and rising curtain walls suggests a city bravely recovering after some major disaster. But the only disaster was the sloth and the caution which are now behind Australia.

The new confidence has concrete foundations in big public works, the most impressive of which is the twenty-five-year project in the Snowy Mountains, where coastal rivers are being diverted back through the range to add water to the dry interior and electricity to neighbouring States. It is balanced by school and university buildings and projects described as "luxury" works like municipal swimming pools and civic fountains, and with "cultural" buildings like Sydney's opera house and a music bowl and art gallery in Melbourne, all of which would have been politically impossible a few years ago. In short, Australia has become ambitious.

Australia has always been self-sufficient if not opulent in the essential materials for subsistence, and the production of foodstuffs, steel, beer, basic building materials and hardwood for furniture is steadily on the rise, keeping pace with the rapidly growing population. But during a century and a half before 1950 virtually every pleasant non-essential flavouring or ornament of life was imported. Today, most of the literally ornamental trimmings are made at home. Plastics of all kinds are manufactured and used with rare enthusiasm. In the higher fields of culture original Australian production is not so self-assured. Australian culture is something like a sturdy little boat battling across lonely waters surging with cross-currents from Europe and America. The boat is equipped with a strong thrashing screw but as yet an ineffectual rudder. The physical isolation of Australia from her sisters of the West was never felt strongly enough to be valuable; it was not sharp enough to free creative minds to work out their own solutions. The oceans have worked as a valve permitting only a one-way passage of ideas: inwards always from the higher-pressure areas, continuously inflating a feeling of inadequacy and frustration among the local practitioners of all arts. Modern communications have of course modified the antipodean isolation, but they still cannot bring to even the best Australian a continuity of intercourse with other first-class minds in his own field.

#### Old and New Australians

WHAT does it feel like to be an Australian in 1959? First you try to decide what sort of Australian you are. Are you native born or New Australian? Are you content with the trend of the national social and cultural development, or do you watch self-consciously every Australian creation, as you would watch your child reciting in public, proud and fearful, glowing inwardly at every small success and yet more painfully conscious of the faults than anyone else? Do you take Australia for granted, accepting the charm of the old myths, of mateship, independence and rugged individualism, along with the bad coffee, bad teeth and bad manners; the uninhibited *flair* of some individuals along with the deplorable standard of taste of the uneducated public?

There are many kinds of Australian, even inside each of us Australians, and it is of course difficult if not impossible to generalize on their feelings. Yet being an Australian clearly is a different feeling from being an American or an Englishman or even a neighbouring New Zealander. It is a combination of secure and supreme confidence on the physical level, and just doubts on the intellectual and artistic levels. It is a feeling of advanced national adolescence, with towering self-assurance and yet brief spasms of corrosive self-doubt. If the present writer can find no better words to describe it, perhaps this is because it is not a feeling that can be described in so many matter-of-fact words. It is a mood for artists to capture, in print and drama, on film and stage, in all the media of popular entertainment. And a depressing aspect of Australia today is that artists rarely make attempts to capture it.

The pace of the central stream of physical development has been too fast to allow many delicate seeds of expression to take root and multiply. While

the general prosperity rises, the opportunities for artists in the commercialized media are declining. Australia has accepted certain levels of artistic proficiency and sophistication in filmed, printed, recorded form, yet has not the population to support local production at similar standards. Most of the material of popular culture is imported at comparatively low cost, and Australian artists find such difficulty in competing with it that they often give up trying. The more talented still frequently leave the country to find fortune abroad and the less talented find other work for bread and butter. Composers write background music for radio serials. Painters decorate pots. Writers fill corners of magazines between the syndicated novelettes. Yet there are of course isolated examples of creativity. Two of the most popular books of the last two years, while having no pretensions or claim to the rank of literature, indicate that the Australian still does enjoy, better than any importation, seeing himself in the mirror of the lively arts. These books were attempts to capture the present Australian mood in broad satire. *They're a Weird Mob* by "Nino Culotta" (Patrick O'Grady) purported to see the Australian working man through the eyes of a New Australian—an Italian migrant. It pictured Australians with the traditional traits of easy-going toughness and robust cynicism thinly veiling hearts of gold. It represented the self-assured side of Australian adolescence, and it was remarkably successful. The second book, *So You Want to be an Australian*, was commissioned by publishers to catch the wave of shallow introspection. It was a trifle tossed off by the prolific writer Cyril Pearl, and it pricked masochistically into the more obvious sore points of the more sensitive Australians: the lazy acceptance of discomforts and mediocrity, the vandalism, worship of sport, coyness in the relations between the sexes, prim censorship and so on. It was a wicked book tearing wildly at Australia's features, yet strangely, between the lines of satire and sarcasm, a basic pride of country was easily read. This little book represented the adolescent doubts of Australia at their most distressing, and it was moderately successful.

The Australian who has not travelled abroad finds great difficulty in relating his standards to those of world capitals. He is inclined to excesses of pride or shame when assessing his urban environment. In another recent best-seller, *On the Beach*, the expatriate English author Nevil Shute recorded the insecure pride of Australia as extending even to the attitude to the unique landscape. The heroine, an Australian girl, is described showing her American hero the gentle valleys of Berwick, near Melbourne. "Is it beautiful?" she asks him. "I mean, is it as beautiful as places in America or England? . . . One sort of thinks that everything in England or America must be much better. That this is alright for Australia, but that's not saying much." When a Hollywood company arrived to film *On the Beach* in Melbourne, the same sort of question was asked again in countless different ways by reporters and interviewers of the visiting celebrities.

No country can be so anxious to hear well of itself. Distinguished visitors like Professor Brogan have interpreted the Australians' questions as a desire to be told they are like Americans. John Ely Burchard has noted more perceptively that the key recurrent question is ". . . is it of world standard?"

The Australian questioners have in fact little interest in what the visitor thinks; they are seeking for their own benefit a datum on the world cultural scale. When Australia establishes this datum and can measure her own works from this point, feeling secure in her own judgments and able to drop the "it's alright for Australia" attitude, then she will have reached a major plateau in her cultural development.

### Imported Ideas

THERE are, at last, signs that she has at least one foot on such a plateau. For the first time Australian creative work is finding acceptance abroad. The success of the artist Sidney Nolan in Europe and the U.S.A. plainly injected confidence into his colleagues and contemporaries at home. Each Australian novel that succeeds abroad, like Patrick White's *Voss*, encourages the underpaid serious writers of Australia. So the standards rise. The fate of the play *Summer of the Seventeenth Doll* was watched with touching anxiety as a sort of trial balloon for Australia in the world's theatre. But still no consistent Australian character of any significance or distinction has been created in any art, and perhaps now in the modern world of scrambled cultures it never will be. Yet the development of local talent against the competition of a continuous flood of imported ideas is a matter of concern to many Australians.

At present the American influence is overwhelming in most forms of popular entertainment, the juvenile conception of the good life is a confused image of Hollywood, and vulgar taste follows American fashion as in a mesmerized trance. At other levels Australia regards the U.S.A. with awe, admiration and, despite a feeling of being distantly related, no less than the usual jealousy. The present Government is obedient if not obsequious to America's foreign policy, on the premise that the two countries' interests are identical.

Still there remains an undercurrent of feeling that Australia is somehow better balanced and will always stop short of the extremes of Americanism. Many powerful elements in Australia still accept the idea of progress with reluctance, and on the popular plane newness has no special attraction for its own sake. Inclined as she is to follow America, Australia does keep a foot on the brake. She may be no better adjusted, but she lacks the final hard drive. Thus Australia has fewer and smaller pools than America—both swimming and unemployment.

The influence of England is very different. It runs silent and deep. It is negligible in the fields of art and popular taste and entertainment, but it remains the backbone of conservative elements in Australian society. Englishmen are still habitually appointed for the decorative positions of Governors, where prestige and aura are required, by the same sort of thought process which puts Central Europeans into the resident conductors' stands of most symphony orchestras.

The term "Aust." in parenthesis, as in John Bull and Co. (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., is familiar in Australian business, a constant reminder of the continuing power of imported ideas and initiative. Australia has provided most of her

own capital for the industrial boom, but not always her own inventiveness. The oversea influence on finished products remains high. The bulk of Australian-made consumer goods, from cars to kitchen equipment, has been designed abroad. Mostly it is produced under licence to imported patterns. Australians, knowing they need outside ideas and money, continue to invite and welcome them. Just the same, they are impatient to be independent of them. While recognizing unashamedly her dependence on others, Australia is at last reaching the point where she demands a little respect. Her pride is enormous, but it is easily satisfied. Most success stories of the industrial boom surround those products which have somehow subtly boosted Australia's opinion of her own progress. The outstandingly popular cars, for instance, are not the ponderous chromed automatic V-eights of the Ford Motor Co. of Aust. Pty. Ltd. or Chrysler Aust. Ltd., nor the thrifty four cylinders of the British Motor Corp. (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., which somehow look apologetic on a bush road. The car that achieves nearly half of total car sales is the only car claiming to be "designed especially for Australian Conditions": the Holden, by General-Motors-Holdens Ltd. This medium-sized six is not only as fast and tough as an Australian Rules footballer, it also has a cynical appreciation of the *nuances* of Australian taste in every line from its two-tone plastic upholstery to its moderate chromium tail-fins: not too big, not too small. Notwithstanding the well-publicized fact that it returns a profit of up to £15,000,000 annually to its American parents, to Australians the Holden is proudly "Australia's Own Car".

Australia is in an exciting and disturbing state. It is exciting because, as American visitors almost invariably comment, it feels as the U.S.A. must have felt around 1900: about to break into a run. It is disturbing because the run might easily be an uninquiring, unthinking, undirected sprint across the surface of things. In 1959 Dr. Billy Graham drew the record crowds of his career in Australia.

# SELF-DETERMINATION IN ALGERIA

## ISSUES FOR THE REFERENDUM

**A**FFAIRS in Algeria have now entered a new phase. It has taken General de Gaulle sixteen months to free himself from men who called him back in the feverish May days of 1958 for different ends from those he was resolved to pursue. What lies ahead is uncertain; but, however events turn, there will be no renouncing the decision giving the Algerians the right to determine their own future, whether as an integral part of France, an autonomous federal associate or an independent State.

The friends of France abroad have been heartened by General de Gaulle's boldness and courage. In Paris it is recognized that, in its most unsatisfactory sense, "the spirit of May 13" meant settling the Algerian problem in disregard, if not in defiance, of much of world opinion and making a difficult situation worse by isolating France diplomatically. Since General de Gaulle talked over Algeria with President Eisenhower, it is even accepted in Paris that Algeria has, in a certain constructive sense, become an international issue—all of which is a great advance. Frenchmen whose mindfulness of their country's great revolutionary and enlightening tradition has deepened their distress over the fighting are feeling encouraged as to the future. All except the die-hards are glad that the tail is no longer wagging the dog and, for the first time for as long as most people can remember, Paris is no longer dictated to by Algiers on the conduct of local affairs.

The Moslem nationalists of the rebellion claim that it is they who have, in effect, brought about most of this, that they have wrested reforms from the French by taking up arms. This greatly over-simplifies history. It omits all the intensely complex interchanges over Algeria that went on inside the French Parliament and business world for nearly twenty years before the rebellion broke out, the struggles of party politics, the interplay of loyalties and the activities of pressure groups that were involved with it. French governments have striven for political reform for Algeria for nearly a quarter of a century. A glance back at the project which became known as the Blum-Violette Agreement during the Front Populaire government shows how far things have evolved since 1937. The Agreement proposed to extend political rights of French citizenship to a limited number of Moslems (about 25,000 in all) who had either served as officers in the French army or as N.C.O.s for fifteen years, those who held degrees, were elders in village councils, county councillors, elected representatives of Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Agriculture or had the rank of Commander in the Legion of Honour. It was a mild attempt at integration, at receiving Moslems into the French political family; and it aroused the sharpest hostility among the Algerian Europeans. They condemned it as a mortal threat to French sovereignty, an attempt to turn the indigenous population, which they described as indifferent to politics, away from its peaceful occupations—and

the Agreement remained a dead letter. A decade later the National Assembly in Paris brought a fresh attempt at reform to a head by voting the 1947 Statute by a considerable majority. This took the idea of integration much farther. But well before the Statute was signed by the President of the Republic, M. Auriol, and promulgated as the law of the land, the Europeans had manifested unflinching opposition to it. Denouncing integration, they rejected the single electoral roll (Moslems and Europeans together) which was provided for, the institution of self-administering Moslem *communes* and civic equity between members of the two communities. The outcome was that the Statute was never applied. The sudden spectacular conversion of the Europeans to the principle of integration at the time of the May uprising had the desperation of an endeavour to consolidate European supremacy by confounding the 9 million Moslems with the 43 million French on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Against this record, the distance covered since General de Gaulle's arrival is impressive. The single electoral roll is there, parliamentary and municipal elections have been held under it, women have the vote, a programme of industrialization of the sort that the Europeans have hitherto resisted has been started and, the supreme step, Algerians given the legal right to withdraw from the French body politic by voting in a referendum to be held in the visible future.

Yet everything remains in the balance. The parties to the struggle, the Moslem masses, the rebels, the French army, the Europeans, the French Government, the Moroccans and Tunisians, all seem aware that the new phase of events could be decisive and are all moving with the greatest care.

The patient, suffering masses of the Moslem population, the central victims of the Algerian tragedy, are torn between the requirements of the French army at one moment, the exactions and cruelties of the rebels at the next. To secure difficult stretches of country against the rebel *guerrilleros*, entire communities, which at the best of times have lived at subsistence level (it is estimated that 4 million under-fifteens eat meat only three times a year) have been uprooted and regrouped in camps. More than a million men, women and children are now living in these camps—and conditions in some are reported to be very hard. One of the more painful aspects of this policy has been the necessity to restrain nomads from following the wandering way of life they have always practised and settle them in the camps. Yet this main body of the Moslem population, dogged, long-suffering and uncomplaining, is manifestly more than what Dostoevsky called mere ethnical material. The rebels continue to recruit from it men who must know that they have few chances of surviving an engagement with anything but a small French force, and often, because of French air control, not then. It is here that liberal-minded Frenchmen, who do not hesitate to denounce the abominable rebel cruelties, nevertheless believe they are observing the historical process by which a body of people achieves the cohesion of a nation. In 1936 Ferhat Abbas, now the Prime Minister of the self-styled Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.), made a statement since frequently quoted against him

and the nationalist cause. "If I had discovered the Algerian nation", he said, "I should be a nationalist. But I shall not die for the Algerian motherland, because that motherland does not exist. I have not found it. I have interrogated history, I have interrogated the living and the dead. I have visited the cemeteries. Nobody has spoken to me of a motherland." This seems to have been nothing else than the expression of an under-privileged Moslem's passionate desire to be received into the French nation as a full French citizen, as Messieurs Blum and Violette were proposing integration should do. But a nation's history begins somewhere. And the notion that Algerian Moslems have since forged themselves into a nation in the furnace of war (partly recognized two years ago by M. Guy Mollet in his acknowledgment of the "Algerian personality") seems now to have been implicitly conceded in the offer of a referendum and is one of the central features of the situation.

### The Uncommitted Moslem Élite

**B**UT what General de Gaulle has been after all along and must continue to try for is to induce the second element in the Moslem population, the educated *élite*, large numbers of whom are still uncommitted to one side or the other, to come forward as the representative Algerians with whom he can negotiate the political future. It is why he has pressed on with the repeated elections, for the National Assembly, then for the Senate, then the municipalities. But either for fear of being murdered by the rebels or for other reasons the men have failed to respond. Similarly, Moslem senior civil servants prefer to stay where they are. As for the rebels, while their numbers are not noticeably growing, they do not seem to be diminishing at any speed. After General de Gaulle returned from his recent visit to Kabylia where General Challe, the C.-in-C., has been attacking in force, there was a suspicion that he had been given a rather too glowing account of French successes. "The officers", said one French observer, "answered his questions with that forced optimism which is the rule in the French army when one speaks to a politician or a superior officer"—as acute a remark about the French army as one could wish. The suspicion has since been strengthened by a delegation of Gaullist deputies who have returned from Algeria reporting an improvement in zones where army reserves have been committed since the beginning of the year, but not in other areas like North Constantine and the Aurès mountains where the rebels remain "strongly organized". Not long back the Aurès were declared fairly clear. It is the classic, exasperatingly wearisome pattern of guerrilla war.

Since the days of May 1958 the Europeans have become much divided. The crucial question on their side for the future is whether they can reunite voluntarily or fuse into a fresh community of action under the impulsion of some event which they judge too dangerous, such as negotiations between the Debré government and the rebel National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). The peculiar Corsican-Italian atmosphere of conspiracy persists and, whatever their dissensions about method, the Europeans in general have not shifted one degree from their insistence that integration is the one road to

salvation for France and Algeria alike. One of their characteristic assertions is that they are resolved not to be led to the point of "having to choose between a coffin and a suitcase"—i.e. death from the rebels or embarking for France.

There are four movements of extreme, including Fascist, views with headquarters in Algiers, any of which at a pinch could recruit help from one of the two main students' associations and from nearly a dozen smaller groups ranging from Poujadists to royalists. Certain of these movements make no bones about their ambition to extend activities beyond Algeria and promote a new order of things in metropolitan France. The murderous attack on General Salan showed that some Europeans do not hesitate to use gangster methods in pursuit of their ends. It would be entirely wrong, however, to think of the Europeans as all or even mostly rich, wicked *colons* or counter-terrorists. Great numbers are modestly-off employees, shopkeepers, municipal workers and so forth, whose grandparents were born in the country, who look on Algeria truly as their homeland where they do not want to be turned into foreigners, and who are only defending themselves against eviction. The Ex-servicemen's and Reserve Officers' Committee groups together the strongest numbers of this category of Europeans (members of the various ex-servicemen's associations, about 130,000 in all) but is patchy in its influence. Some of its members, for instance those in Oran, decline to follow the leaders in opposing General de Gaulle's referendum policy. The ex-servicemen, however, have many friends in the army and, since their members are in the Territorials and local equivalents of the Home Guard, they have communication with the regulars and are privy to certain army secrets. None of these European movements could do anything in the political sense without the army, and almost certainly none will try.

### Grievances of the Army

ABOUT the army there is a certain amount that is unknown. General de Gaulle has handled it with great skill, announcing important decisions to it in advance (such as the self-determination plan), reassuring it, testing its feelings and giving it pledges, such as that there will be no political negotiation with the F.L.N. Since May 1958, the French army has taken the attitude that it has been the scapegoat for all the mistakes and disasters of the last twenty years and doesn't intend to stand it any longer. It is really a gratuitous accusation. No sensible Frenchman has blamed the army for the decline of French influence, the successive and ruinous devaluations of the franc, the political instability, even what is still regarded by many as the "loss" of Morocco, Tunisia, Pondicherry or Guinea. But whether or not this attitude has been deliberately fostered (and it often seems to have been), it has helped the army to justify a brasher, more pugnacious rôle in national affairs and in particular to consolidate itself in Algeria. Officers now speak of the army's mission in Algeria as lasting for another twenty-five years, for "generations". The lack of civil servants, which has been blamed as one of the serious contributory causes of the rebellion, has certainly obliged the

army to take over very many sectors of Algerian public affairs; and recruits for the civil administration are still not appearing in anything like the numbers wanted. For this reason alone, officers argue, there can be no question of the army's abandoning Algeria. If it did, even after pacification, the country would fall back into the dangerous state of under-administration it was in when the rebellion began. Military action alone cannot solve the Algerian problem, the argument goes on, and if the army simply stood by in idleness after mastering the rebel *guerrilleros*, its campaigning would have been largely pointless. So that, failing the arrival of a host of civil servants of all grades (some say as many as 200,000), the army must carry on.

Along with this, Frenchmen at home are told, is the army's desire "not to be cheated out of victory" this time. The army's future attitude on one aspect is therefore clear in advance; it will not submit purely and simply to evacuating Algeria.

Finally, of those directly involved, the Tunisians and Moroccans are each committed to supporting the rebel "government" and have only in slightly differing degrees made their active help to the rebels public policy. M. Bourguiba, the Tunisian President, is generally regarded as a man of moderating influence who would like to induce the F.L.N. to come to terms with the French. The Moroccans often seem to see him rather differently and attribute part of what he says on the subject to his ambition to become the political leader of a united Maghreb. A disinclination to encourage such a tendency may well have been one reason why the Moroccans declined M. Bourguiba's invitation to discuss General de Gaulle's offer with the Algerians in Tunis. Similarly, what looked very much like an attempt by the King of Morocco to offer himself to General de Gaulle as mediator broke down at the last minute after weeks of negotiating a meeting, and after the King had made his way to Paris with elaborate detours through Switzerland and St. Germain and was waiting at his hotel a few hundred yards from the Elysée. Overnight, officially on the strength of a minor frontier incident, the King put off the medical treatment he was said to have come for and hurried back home while General de Gaulle departed in another direction on holiday to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. Presumably the King had wanted to introduce political mediation and the General, who has great esteem for His Majesty, let him know that he could not agree.

### *Francisation*

OBVIOUSLY, no régime could support a problem of the magnitude of the Algerian problem as a permanent thing. The future of the Fifth Republic doubtless depends on the ability of its leaders to find some solution which will lift the enormous political, financial and emotional strain of the war and eliminate the subsidiary dangers which it keeps on engendering. General de Gaulle is evidently so aware of this that in offering self-determination, including the power of secession, to Algeria, he has preferred risking his authority in a trial with the Europeans of Algeria, their supporters in France and possibly some sections of the army, to resigning himself to the prospect of letting the war drag on indefinitely. At the same time, this does not mean

any slackening in the General's resolve to prosecute the military campaign with all vigour. General de Gaulle has formulated his own solution in two parts. The first, the Constantine Plan, responds to the necessity of raising Algeria from the status of an under-developed area where some of the 7 million rural population live in a way that has scarcely changed for four centuries and where, in the General's own term, the issue is nothing less than one of *de-clochardisation* (raising the people from vagrancy). Almost the first thing he did in tackling the Algerian problem was to appoint an economist, M. Delouvrier, as government Delegate General in Algiers. Under the Constantine Plan (named from the town, one of the poorest in the country and the cradle of the rebellion, where General de Gaulle announced it), French industry is now responding to the invitation to create new undertakings in Algeria or to transfer plant there from France. Nearly 100 firms have already committed themselves to capital investments totalling more than £15 million which will create about 9,300 permanent new jobs; the French Government is investing £124 million this year alone and the State Investment Bureau for Algeria is confident that between 50,000 and 60,000 permanent new jobs will have been created by early 1960. A steel plant is to go up at Bone, the pipeline from the Sahara oilfield of Hassi Messaoud is as good as completed and natural gas from the Sahara will be piped to Bone and Algiers by the second half of 1961. Along with this, a complex of new measures covering agricultural reform and land redistribution, the accession of Moslems to the civil service and a vast new educational programme to increase school attendance from the present 600,000 to 2½ million in six years is in hand.

The second part of General de Gaulle's solution is the proposal to hold a referendum four years at latest after the country has been pacified, when Algerians will be able to determine their own future by choosing one of three courses. The first is that Algeria should become an integral part of France. This solution, which goes as far as, if not farther than, the integration advocated by the Europeans, has the name of *francisation*. The second is for Algeria to become a territory enjoying internal autonomy (government of the Algerians by Algerians), basing itself on aid from France and working in close association with France as regards economy, schooling, defence and foreign affairs. This is known as *association*. In General de Gaulle's view there would be no evolution from such a state once it was chosen, and in that respect an internally autonomous Algeria would differ from the autonomous States of the French African Community, which can, under the Constitution, move on to independence (as the Sudan and Senegal intend doing). The third is for Algeria to secede from the French body politic, that is, become independent. General de Gaulle has made it clear that he would deplore such a choice and that, though he is offering it, it is inconceivable to him that Algerians should choose it. He has declared that if they do so, France will take steps to protect the Europeans and Moslems loyal to France by regrouping them, and to secure access to the Sahara oil. (This is interpreted as meaning partition.) The population of metropolitan France will be called on to ratify the Algerians' choice in a separate referendum.

In passing it may be noted that the offer of these three courses is General de Gaulle's acknowledgement that, because of the pressures put on the population by one side and the other, he has so far been foiled in his efforts to bring forward through elections a sufficiently representative body of Moslems with whom to negotiate the country's future. The Europeans maintain that the General's solemn undertaking to negotiate the future statute with those who were elected carried no qualification and that if therefore he now declines to negotiate with their elected deputies, senators and mayors, he is going back on his word.

### Complexities of the Choice

THE Europeans have naturally chosen *francisation*; they violently condemn the offer of secession and the idea of *association* only slightly less strongly. Ferhat Abbas, in the name of the rebel "government" declares that the two sides are agreed as to the right of Algerians to self-determination. But his government makes two fundamental objections to the referendum scheme—that by the implied partition it assails Algerian territorial integrity and that the population of metropolitan France can have no rights over decisions to be made by Algerians, whether in ratification of their choice or otherwise, such a notion being contrary to the very principle of self-determination. (Even Messali Hadj, leader of the minority Algerian nationalist movement M.N.A., who has welcomed General de Gaulle's statement, makes reserves about the Sahara which he considers "Algerian".)

Some of the complexities of the Algerian issue begin to appear here. Plainly General de Gaulle is entitled to call on the French people to express its views on his policy, of which the Algerian referendum would be part and, on their side, the Algerians could have no grounds for contesting that right. On the other hand, if some areas of Algeria (like Oran) were to opt in the referendum for *association*, others (like Setif) for independence through secession and still others (like Algiers) for *francisation*, it might be difficult to settle exactly what voters in metropolitan France were ratifying—and more confusing if it were clear that they had declined to ratify at all. It is to be feared, moreover, that if some sort of partition could be worked out it would not heal the breach between the two communities but only perpetuate tension and create the risk of renewed fighting later.

The question of a cease-fire is complicated by the rebel "government's" insistence that it is the sole representative and political executive of the Algerian people, and by General de Gaulle's firm refusal either to recognize anything of the sort or to treat with the rebel "government's" emissaries on any subject beyond a cease-fire. M. Debré, the Prime Minister, has affirmed that France alone will settle the conditions of the referendum since it is to be held on French soil. The rebels contend that the problems raised by five years of war and the conditions under which the referendum is to be held cannot be settled solely by both sides' making public declarations and that meetings and negotiations are necessary. The French Government, say the rebels, cannot reasonably proclaim its adherence to the free play of demo-

cratic voting and at the same time monopolize the right to lay down the rules.

It is almost universally believed in France that the army would intervene if it thought that negotiations had been started with the F.L.N. on political issues. For the army, this would imply an unjustifiable acceptance of defeat—that France was abandoning the struggle. Not only with the army but among many civilians in France, political negotiation with the F.L.N. has become synonymous with French “abandonment” of Algeria. The Europeans in Algeria would react vigorously.

The army does not seem over-enthusiastic about General de Gaulle's second choice (evidently his own preference) of internal autonomy and association with France. The rapid transition from internal autonomy to full independence in Tunisia, and the fresh example of the Mali Federation in Black Africa, have persuaded many officers and men that there is a lively risk that the same thing may happen with an autonomous Algeria. The recent statement attributed to Ferhat Abbas that “internal autonomy means independence two months afterwards” has made them certain.

General de Gaulle's most acute anxieties, in fact, are likely to begin with a cease-fire. It would be as inconceivable to the French army to leave the rebels armed during a cease-fire while referendum voting booths were put up as it would be for them to stand by while Ferhat Abbas, Ben Bella or any other of the rebel leaders campaigned in the heart of Algiers on the other side of the street from Europeans. Yet this opportunity seems to be what General de Gaulle's statement implies; refusing to admit the Ferhat Abbas “government” as representative of the Algerian people and equally declining to put it and its supporters beyond the law entirely has meant offering them the right to prove their following at the hustings. To be asked to protect the electoral liberty of those they are now fighting—men who have been guilty of barbarous and unwarlike terrorism against Moslem and French women, children and old people—would seem to many French officers to be an intolerable affront. Numbers of them are already persuaded that it would take the rebels only a couple of months or so after a cease-fire to gain a strong position with the Moslem population.

The rebel “government” may well have a problem of obedience. It is impossible to say how certain the “Ministers” are of exerting the full political authority they claim over the commanders in the field—about whom the outside world knows very little except that they are fierce, resourceful and ruthless. On the whole, it seems that the most politically active part of the French army favours *francisation*; just after General de Gaulle's speech announcing self-determination, soldiers were going round Algiers sticking up little notices saying Algeria must remain French for ever. No doubt some officers, like the Europeans, are impressed by the juridical argument. In written parliamentary answers, Monsieur Debré has acknowledged that Algeria consists of *départements* with the same legal status as metropolitan *départements*, as distinct from the oversea territories. Opponents of secession point out, with justice, that while the Constitution provides for the African territories' accession to independence, nothing in the Constitution authorizes

the right to secession to be extended to the metropolitan or Algerian *départements*.

### Diplomatic Repercussions

THE Algerian war has greatly hampered French diplomacy and at times disturbed relations with the most constant of France's allies. One has only to remember the exasperation in Paris at the British dispatch of arms to Tunisia, the irritation at the Anglo-American "good offices" mission after the Sakiet bombing, the dismay at American abstention in the 1958 U.N. debate on Algeria. On the whole, however, the attitude of Britain and the Commonwealth countries outside Africa—an attitude of diplomatic support and forbearance from passing judgments, with genuine distress at an ally's difficulties—has been much appreciated in Paris. In the last years of the Fourth Republic, suspicion of Britain and America was rife, possibly because of some half-formulated fear of their trying to force a weakened and unstable France into a disastrous compromise with the rebels. There was a good deal of talk about the Anglo-Americans' being after "the riches of the Sahara" which France had discovered—talk which was not officially discouraged. But that sort of thing has now died out; and, if French spokesmen are still occasionally inclined to call for thorough-going allied support for French actions in Algeria while declaring simultaneously that Algeria is a strictly French domestic problem of nobody else's concern, at least they do not seem to feel this necessitates any very spectacular demonstrations in response. The action of Ghana in recognizing the rebel "government" is another matter. It is regarded as an unfriendly act and the French Ambassador has been withdrawn from Accra.

As for the United States, there is now a more sincere recognition in Paris that what the State Department is anxious about is not to promote any given solution in Algeria more than another, so much as to see some solution acceptable to France arrived at there which will restore peace and remove the painful necessity of choosing between traditional allies and African-Asian countries, where it is anxious not to lose influence to Russia.

The Algerian war has inevitably had an effect on African states north and south of the Sahara, including the territories of the French Community. The recent meeting at Monrovia, attended, among others, by Ghana and Guinea, showed the readiness of African states to promote the cause of Algerian independence. Leaders of the French Community declare that they put complete trust in General de Gaulle's ability to find a solution, preferably a negotiated one which respects the interests of both sides. They have great understanding of what General de Gaulle is trying to preserve. M. Mamadou Dia, President of Senegal, has, for instance, declared publicly that if his son, now a French conscript, were to be called to serve in Algeria, he would do nothing to oppose it. Other African leaders feel that at the present day, independence is not always the fulfilment of a golden dream and that the future lies with *les grands ensembles*. At the same time they are persuaded that the future of France in Africa as a whole is bound to be conditioned by the outcome of the Algerian conflict.

# WASHINGTON AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

## THE NEW HIGH-LEVEL DIPLOMACY

FINALLY, and after many postponements, the United States is coming directly to grips with—is prepared to negotiate on equal terms with—the “new” Soviet Union of Premier Nikita Khrushchev. This step will probably be recorded in the history books as the most important diplomatic engagement undertaken by the Eisenhower Administration, surpassing the termination of the Korean War and the firm posture adopted at the Formosa Strait. Its immediate signs are the exchange of State visits between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower. One doubts that this *rapprochement* would have been possible had Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lived; certainly the surrounding atmosphere would have been frostier. The future—the major dividends and ultimate values of high-level negotiations and summit talks which may continue for years—is clouded. But the process has begun.

By simply agreeing to the Khrushchev visit to the United States, Washington in effect has recognized the Soviet Union as a nation possessing equal physical power, a step which Mr. Dulles was most reluctant to take. By welcoming Mr. Khrushchev it has accorded the ebullient Soviet Chairman that special cloak of prestige and statesmanship which he had so long sought. The resultant calmer atmosphere—if it persists—will have important impact on NATO, on Moscow's relations with its satellites and on the behaviour of the U.S.S.R.'s grim and Stalinist ally, Communist China.

There are of course pitfalls aplenty. Who can say how long the dove of peaceful coexistence will fly? It can be shot down by new intransigence at the conference table, and by old suspicions. But the initial omens are hopeful.

There are challenges and opportunities arising from the Khrushchev visit which will profoundly test Washington's negotiating talents and the President's leadership. The basic challenge, stated very simply, is how to interpret—how to deal with—how to respond in policy to—what might be called “the Khrushchev initiative”. What steps shall Washington be prepared to take as regards disarmament, Berlin, or Soviet-American trade relations?

Shortly after the Hollywood frivolities and the Iowa cornfield-visting and the Camp David talks were finally finished, there were deposited on President Eisenhower's desk a series of detailed reports and analyses of everything Mr. Khrushchev and his chief advisers had said during the American visit—whether concerning disarmament, capitalism, Berlin, trade prospects or the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

From this distillation a number of tentative conclusions have been reached, which could form the bases of the new American diplomacy *vis-à-vis* Moscow, at the summit in early December, and at the next confrontation between the

two leaders in Moscow in late spring. These conclusions can be briefly stated:

1. That the Soviet Union may be ready and anxious to get the power relationships of the world into better and more durable order before Communist China makes its inevitable bid for parity with the older powers.
2. That Premier Khrushchev is eager to bring to his own people the tremendous fruits of better living which a reduction of the arms burden would permit—to go down in history as the modern Peter the Great who led his country full tilt into the twentieth century.
3. That the Soviet Premier's views were somewhat changed by his American tour—he increased his respect for American strength and social-industrial achievements. He discovered that Communist dogma is incorrect when it asserts that the common people are always downtrodden and sullenly against the government in a capitalist system.
4. And that Premier Khrushchev is a “man in a hurry” who is under compulsion—he is not a young man—to accomplish a very great deal in a few years. He is still, of course, a person of tremendous vitality.

Abetting these reports has been the relief and approval manifested by high American officials at the conduct of Mr. Khrushchev on his return to Moscow and during his subsequent visit to Peking. In Moscow he confirmed Mr. Eisenhower's “understanding” that the deadline for a Berlin settlement had been lifted. In Peking he repeatedly—at least in public utterance—admonished the militant Marxists of China that Communism's triumph over capitalism should not be accomplished by war and that the era for peaceful coexistence had dawned. Most competent observers believe that, while Moscow and Peking will remain united in their necessary alliance, nevertheless relations between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung have cooled and there is a distinct ideological cleavage visible.

### A Problem of Leadership

WASHINGTON recognizes that these are fascinating portents and prospects. But the business of formulating effective policy to “seize time by the forelock” is not so simple in the Eisenhower Administration. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the United Nations, recently complained privately how difficult it is to wrest a new “position paper” out of the labyrinthine governmental machinery.

This is partly a problem of presidential leadership. Mr. Eisenhower has repeatedly been reluctant to knock heads together and force agreement on key questions. It took months to persuade the interested parties in the State Department, the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission to agree to a definite United States proposal for suspending nuclear weapons tests, and there is still sniping dissent, even now, to the policy finally established. In tackling the more hazardous phases of disarmament, it will be even more difficult to develop a united front within the régime.

Fortunately this reduction of tensions with the Soviet Union has long stirred the President's enthusiasm. In a recent speech at his boyhood home-

town of Alilene, Kansas, he confided that the aspiration which "dominates" his thinking today is that a sound disarmament plan shall be agreed to, by East and West, and the savings therefrom channelled into a great international program for helping the less-developed countries.

A plan to bring into the White House a special personal assistant, who would devote his attention to promoting interdepartmental agreement on high policy, is under consideration. A quiet congressional committee headed by Senator Jackson of Washington State is pondering ways to improve the Government's decision-making machinery. These adjuncts will help, but final decisions belong to Mr. Eisenhower.

The fact that neither side—East or West—is presently prepared to shift its policy on Berlin has led some diplomats to question whether it is wise to rush into an early discussion of that subject; perhaps it can be postponed until Mr. Eisenhower's visit to Moscow. As for disarmament, Washington probably cannot compress its policy-framing within the necessary time limits. This summer the President forehandedly set up a special committee on disarmament headed by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston attorney, to survey the whole American disarmament "package". But Mr. Coolidge was given until January 1 to bring in his report. Once the report is in hand, the President still has to discuss its details with the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, the Atomic Energy Commission and other key agencies. Then it has to be cleared with Washington's European allies. Hence officials in Washington believe that it will be well beyond December before substantive proposals can be ready for realistic negotiation.

At the core of the problem is the question of how to handle Mr. Khrushchev's sweeping bid for total disarmament in four years. Is this a believable goal? The ten-nation East-West disarmament conference is expected to convene at Geneva about March 1. Ahead of this session, it is difficult to see what the heads of government could discuss concretely. Hence it is generally anticipated that the most a December summit meeting could accomplish would be to issue general directions to lower-level negotiators on Berlin and disarmament—and to maintain the forward momentum of the new "Camp David spirit".

The summitteers might of course take a look at the American-Soviet-British talks on banning nuclear tests, which have made substantial progress at Geneva. Remaining differences on an agreed test ban might be resolved.

### The President Expects a Thaw

THESE are the technical, the concrete, matters. Beyond them is the "new" atmosphere. It may be a dangerous euphoria. Yet Polish diplomatists in Washington, for instance, report that Mr. Khrushchev's preachments on disarmament and the reduction of tensions have already had visible repercussions in Warsaw; there is less polarization of viewpoints into stubborn East-West positions, and plans have been promulgated within the régime to reduce arms manufacture for the Warsaw Pact and to direct the economy into a larger output of consumer items. If this trend continues, who can say where it will eventually lead?

Meanwhile President Eisenhower's own popularity graph has risen to unprecedented heights, directly owing to his "search for peace". The President complimented the American people on their behaviour as the Khrushchev tour moved like a flash flood across the nation. The people were dignified and courteous; they managed to make evident the innate strength and purpose of America. These same encomiums are undoubtedly deserved by Mr. Eisenhower himself, plus an added tribute for courage in extending the invitation in the first place.

Obviously the President invited Mr. Khrushchev because the Geneva foreign ministers' talks had become totally stalled, and because it was better to keep talking at a new level than to glower and fume and withhold from Mr. Khrushchev that American visit for which he so obviously hankered. But no president enjoying less of the public regard and esteem than Mr. Eisenhower possesses would have dared to invite the Soviet Premier. For his part, the President personally believes that progress can be made *via* further discussions, hence that a summit meeting can accomplish something constructive. He was able to lift the Soviet deadline on Berlin. He realizes that the Soviet Premier cannot be expected to abandon—openly—all demands and concerns over Berlin. But Mr. Khrushchev has conceded that there is no cut-off point to future negotiations—no pistol pointed at anyone's head. The Soviet chairman has quite evidently also said things about international guarantees for West Berlin, including a United Nations guarantee, which the United States is prepared to explore, along with some kind of recognition that the East Berlin régime is an accomplished fact.

Mr. Eisenhower believes that the urgency has indeed been lifted from many questions. The postponed Eisenhower visit to Moscow affords opportunity for further discussion. This is a thaw, a time for quiet unilateral shifts in position, an opportunity for basic reassessments.

In the matter of arms control, Mr. Khrushchev asked the President to examine his United Nations "total" disarmament proposals most carefully. He was sometimes mercurial and indefinite in the Camp David talks but he made clear to the President how much the Soviet Government would like to reduce arms expenditures and pour those funds and that manpower into the economic achievements of his Seven-Year Plan.

In response, it should be recalled, Mr. Eisenhower invited his closest and most influential Cabinet colleague, Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson, to Camp David to describe to the Soviet Chairman the Administration's concern over the fact that it cannot provide for armaments, build sufficient schools, airports and social services and still balance the budget and fight inflation. There was most certainly a meeting of minds on the proposition that arms reduction is deeply desirable, even as there was a consensus on the proposition that a mounting arms race could lead only to an eventual miscalculation and a holocaust for mankind.

Meantime the President was confirming at Camp David his impression—and indeed it was Vice President Nixon's impression earlier—that Premier Khrushchev is dynamic, tough, unyielding and realistic, yet withal a pragmatic Marxist who will modify his theory if another formula will improve

Soviet factory production or upgrade farm output. Obviously the Premier had come to the United States with the brash, bold intention of impressing the American people, through his several speeches and press conferences, with the thesis that the Soviet Union is fast becoming the world's predominant power. He freely and frequently predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in production, and would goodnaturedly "wave at you as we go by".

### A Challenge to Complacency

IN many ways the Khrushchev visit was a salutary event for the American people. Millions of Americans saw the Soviet leader on television, heard him on the radio or read his comments. Heretofore, to some of these millions—brought up on McCarthy-type propaganda—the Soviet Union has been an evil place and every aspect of communist society has been the work of the devil. Now these citizens have an expanded concept of the U.S.S.R. They did not cheer Mr. Khrushchev, but he dented their established opinions. The Soviet moon shot which coincided with the Chairman's arrival advised doubters that Russia is indeed no longer a land populated exclusively by peasants in log huts.

There was another long-range impact of the trip—the political issue it has framed. Mr. Eisenhower began to shape this issue, which can play a persuasive rôle in the 1960 presidential elections, when he visited Western Europe. It is, plainly and simply, the issue of "peace", and the contention that the Republican Party of Messrs. Eisenhower and Nixon is the party most capable of winning the peace. The Republicans are preparing to make full use of this issue in the campaign.

The President's peace quest could, of course, prove abortive; and sentiment could sharply shift as it did in Britain after Chamberlain's "peace in our time" bid failed and Munich became a word of opprobrium. If the President's venture collapses and hopes are dashed, the Democrats will benefit as the party of more hard-headed realism—simply because they are not directly associated with this diplomacy.

The 1960 crop of presidential candidates will also benefit or lose, according to the stances they take and the outcome of the peace crusade. The candidate who has profited the most so far is Vice President Richard Nixon. His position soared in the public opinion polls (which are still rather carefully studied in the United States) after his own visit to Russia and his "kitchen cabinet" argument with Mr. Khrushchev. He looms popularly as the man best able to "handle" the tough Soviet leaders.

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York is least identified with the new diplomacy, if indeed he is not marked down as somewhat hostile to it. Democratic candidates have not taken prominent positions one way or another—except Adlai Stevenson, who warmly welcomed the Khrushchev visit and exchanged lively banter with the Soviet chairman before the television cameras at the Garst farm in Iowa.

As the campaign progresses—and with Mr. Eisenhower visiting Moscow next June just before the national nominating conventions—the peace issue

will mount and any and every responsible candidate will have to stand and be counted as to how he views the *rapprochement* with Russia. Premier Khrushchev, incidentally, has displayed small favoritism among candidates, having publicly criticized just about every one of them so far, including Messrs. Nixon and Rockefeller but excluding Mr. Stevenson.

So the first phase of this East-West diplomatic initiative is over. A remaining question which powerfully concerns many thoughtful observers is whether this nation has really perceived the basic challenge implicit in the Soviet Premier's pride and unyielding toughness. This was the pride of a man who is heading a society which knows where it is going. How does Western civilization measure up, it is asked, in comparison to the monolithic Soviet state run by a self-selected *élite*? Walter Lippmann warns us that "we Americans talk about ourselves these days as if we were a completed society, one which has achieved its purposes, and has no further great business to transact".

Signs of this complacency are visible. So is the lack of warning from high quarters, including the White House, concerning this apathy. When a society has no proud goals, it strays off into moral negligence and the wasting of assets. Premier Khrushchev rang an alarm bell, in the opinion of many citizens, in his remarks as he watched a "can can" dance being photographed at a Hollywood film studio. He commented: "It is immoral. It could be of interest only to those who are oversatiated. We will not import that picture into the Soviet Union."

There is an extra pound of prudery in the U.S.S.R. today. Yet how much subtle dissipation of goals and ideals can the American dream endure? The Roman Empire fell because, with dissolution eating into its basic strengths, it could not quite summon the purpose and vigor to conquer the Germanic tribes beyond the Elbe. Today the United States, though tremendously gifted, has not yet found the purpose to catch up with the Soviet Union in the space race and the missile race. It seems almost on the verge of abandoning its purpose of graduating sufficient engineers annually, or maintaining a school system befitting a great nation. Are these the first unwitting surrenders?

Of course the time is fast approaching when most all Americans will enjoy the fairly good material life: an automobile and television set, a paid vacation, a steady job, good food and an adequate home. The Soviets have a long way to go to catch up in terms of consumer goods and pleasant living. But are these the last goals of civilization? What of the arts, what of projects to assist the underdeveloped peoples, what of progress in discovering the great spiritual laws of the universe?

The Khrushchev visit shows where the Soviet materialists are so powerfully heading. Perhaps a new Administration in Washington, and a further reassessment of the American world rôle in the months ahead—by the citizenry at all levels—will reveal to this nation that it can never pose as a completed society with "no further great business to transact".

United States of America,  
November 1959.

# WE ARE SEVEN

## A SECOND FREE TRADE AREA

ON July 21 and 22 Ministers from seven countries—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal and the United Kingdom—met at Stockholm and decided to set up a free trade association among themselves. The British Ministers present were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Heathcoat Amory, and the then Paymaster General, Mr. Maudling. The details of the agreement between the Ministers, together with a plan which had been worked out for them by officials, were published as a White Paper in July 1959, Cmnd. 823.

By the time it happened, this had come to seem almost inevitable. But, looked at as the culmination of European economic negotiation over a decade, it is really very surprising. That it has happened is explicable only in terms of the developments in European economic organization since the Messina Conference in June 1955. Had the seven countries who met in Stockholm in July 1959 taken the Messina communiqué as seriously as the Six have taken the Stockholm communiqué, and had the seven countries been willing to commit themselves in the summer of 1955 as fully as they had been ready to commit themselves by the end of 1958 in the Free Trade Area negotiations and as they have committed themselves in the Stockholm communiqué, no doubt the developments of the last four years would have been very different.

The objectives of the six countries in establishing their several Communities, and still more their aspirations, were political. Inevitably, the methods adopted for achieving the objective of creating a single market affect all the trading partners of the Six throughout the world. But in particular they affect, and must continue to affect, their relations with their European neighbours with whom they have been associated since 1948 in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.). In many respects the methods adopted to create the Communities were a development of the trading and financial arrangements which had been worked out in O.E.E.C., and were clearly likely to have most formidable effects on those relationships. The effects of the first of the Communities, that for Coal and Steel (E.C.S.C.), were not unmanageable, and it should not be impossible to work out arrangements with Euratom. But the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) covers all trade and economic policy. If the European countries not forming part of the Six made grave errors in misinterpreting the aspirations of the Six, the Six also failed to appreciate the extent to which their plans would affect their European neighbours. The significance of all these movements cannot be fully seized if too much emphasis is laid on the short-term impact of trade patterns, the threat to established export interests and the like, important though these are. A pattern of economic organization which was not without political overtones had been built up in Western Europe. However far this fell short of the ideals which some people may

have had at the end of the war for European organization, it still was not negligible; it was part of the pattern within which European countries had come to live. It was not at all clear how this could survive unless some arrangements could be worked out between the Six and the rest.

An attempt to find such a settlement began in 1956. Given that the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade makes provision for Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas, but precludes Preferential Groupings, it was natural that thought should have been given to the possibility of a Free Trade Area covering all O.E.E.C. within which the Customs Union of the Six would have its own existence. The idea was first suggested officially in the Report of the Spaak Committee of 1956 and was quickly taken up in July 1956, when the O.E.E.C. Council set up a Working Party to examine the technical feasibility of such a project. If at that time serious doubt had been cast on the technical feasibility of a Free Trade Area, and still more if there had been any real sign that any European government did not welcome such developments, negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area would never have begun, and Europe would have been spared the shock which followed the final breakdown of negotiations in November 1958.

The impossibility of what came to be called a multilateral solution might have become apparent at that stage for a variety of reasons. First, all technical complications of Customs Unions, Free Trade Areas and the like being put on one side, the Six having contemplated the abolition of tariffs on all trade between themselves, no arrangements to associate the Six and the Non-Six in any European organization could have been effective if any European countries outside the Six had been unwilling to abolish their tariffs on European trade. If the United Kingdom, for example, had decided that, however unfortunate the consequences for her export trade might be, it was not prepared to allow German goods into the United Kingdom free of duty and other restrictions, the idea of a European Free Trade Area would have been still-born.

A second major reason for failure at that time would have been an indication that any important government in Europe did not rate continued co-operation between European countries sufficiently highly to be willing to make an effort to find a solution. In 1956 there was no sign of this. On the contrary, by the end of that year, while it was clear that there were many points of national importance which were going to present some difficulties for the negotiators and that the organization of a Free Trade Area called for the solution of intellectual problems of some complexity, which had never hitherto been solved, there was no sign that any European governments did not at that stage positively want an economic organization which would cover all the members of O.E.E.C., provided of course that it was not by its nature likely to disrupt the proposed Customs Union of the Six.

#### Negotiations within O.E.E.C.

**I**N the event, in January 1957, the O.E.E.C. Working Party reported favourably on the technical possibilities of a Free Trade Area, and the negotiations within O.E.E.C. were launched. In October 1957 an Inter-

governmental Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Maudling, the Paymaster General, was established to draw up a Convention. By November 1958 the negotiations had clearly failed. Despite the many technical points of difficulty which could have provided a reason for the breakdown, it is clear that the major reason for the breakdown was the lack of a common political desire throughout Europe to succeed.

November and December 1958, therefore, created a situation of extreme disquiet for the members of O.E.E.C. outside the Six and some not inconsiderable concern to some governments within the Six. The situation was clearly much worse than it would have been had the discussions of 1956 suggested that no solution was practicable. There had been two years of fairly intensive public discussion of the project. Many had become enamoured of it. Very many had come to fear the economic consequences of failure to get it. The two years' talking probably led many concerned to exaggerate the immediate consequences for European trade of the early stages of the development of the Customs Union of the Six.

The natural tendency was to leave things to quiet down. There was some hope that the complicated technical discussions which preceded the establishment of non-resident convertibility for most European currencies on December 27 would provide a new basis for governmental co-operation within O.E.E.C. The first task which had to be dealt with was the working out of quota arrangements for 1959. These would not have been necessary had the Free Trade Area negotiations succeeded, since the Convention would have covered the point. But by January it had to be faced. The French liberalization to 90 per cent made it easier in that it reduced the volume of merchandise covered by quotas. There was some hope that the Anglo-French negotiations, undertaken against the background of the convertibility decisions, could have produced a solution which would have been capable of being generalized, thus avoiding the necessity for reverting to detailed bilateral negotiations on quotas in a form only too reminiscent of the late 'forties. But this proved impracticable. And, though the substance of the several bilateral agreements which were negotiated in the Spring of 1959 was much more satisfactory to everyone concerned than at one time had seemed likely, the form of them indicated a danger that substantive questions in future would be settled by bilateral bargaining rather than by multilateral agreements. It began to look as though not only might things get worse but the O.E.E.C. machinery and institutions would break down. However attractive in theory the idea of doing nothing on the major negotiations until the time was more ripe and meanwhile continuing co-operation in O.E.E.C. might appear, the first three months of 1959 made it doubtful whether this would be practicable.

Meanwhile, the European Commission had been instructed by the six governments to prepare a report on the next stage in the negotiations. The report proved unacceptable to the governments of the Six and was a great shock to the other members of O.E.E.C. It seemed to cast grave doubts on whether the European Commission itself saw any point at all in a European solution of any kind, certainly a solution of any substance.

It did not appear, therefore, that waiting was likely to produce a satisfactory result at all quickly.

Naturally enough, there was renewed discussion in several countries outside the Six on the possibility of joining the Six or of making some separate arrangement with them. So far as the first course was concerned, the few who examined the problem concluded that whatever might have been practicable in the past and whatever the more distant future might hold, this was not a course open at the present. The Treaty of Rome is not an open treaty which anybody can join simply by signing at the appropriate place. Every new entrant will have to negotiate his way in. For some this might be quite easy. But for others, and most of all for the United Kingdom, it would be an immensely complex operation, even if the United Kingdom had been prepared itself to move. The other course—separate bilateral arrangements with the Six—might still have been practical politics, but this was not an alluring prospect for the Non-Six. Of the various countries concerned, only the United Kingdom is by itself powerful enough not to feel disturbed at the possibility of such arrangements.

By Easter more and more governments of the Non-Six were being forced to consider the probability that the only way forward was by forming some grouping among themselves.

#### Natural Growth of Co-operation

CO-OPERATION among the seven who have now reached agreement at Stockholm had grown quite naturally out of the discussions in the Maudling Committee in 1957 and 1958. Of the Non-Six, four countries—Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Turkey—had asked for special positions and had made it clear that they were not prepared to contemplate early dismantling of their protective arrangements. But the remaining seven had made it clear that, subject to specific reservations by Portugal and Austria, they were willing to dismantle tariffs and other restrictions as fast as the Six. As the breakdown approached and the problems of what could be done immediately in the trade field became acute, the co-operation between these seven governments became closer.

Gradually, out of the discussions among these countries there developed a case for a Free Trade Area arrangement among themselves. It was made up of a variety of arguments. First, there was the fear that if nothing were done on the side of the Seven all the forces of inertia generally would lead to a postponement to the Greek kalends of any European solution. The industrial and commercial communities would get used to living in the new Europe, some bilateral arrangements would be made embracing some countries; the situation would develop gradually and almost imperceptibly, but by the end there would be no European economic co-operation.

Secondly, if the Seven did nothing they might find themselves unable to move if later the Six became anxious to make a move. At the end of 1958 industrial opinion throughout the seven countries was ready to accept gradual dismantling of tariffs. If tariffs could be dismantled among the Seven at the same rate as they were dismantled among the Six, then subsequent

arrangements to bring the two together would not present difficulties on that score. But if nothing happened on the side of the Seven, in three or four years time they might be unable to bring down their tariffs fast enough to match what the Six had by then done.

Thirdly, the interest of the Six in a settlement with the Seven would be increased. Arrangements of the kind which have been discussed in Europe for three or four years are not brought about solely by commercial factors. But it is no bad thing to have commercial interests on both sides equally interested in a solution. Once there were developments within the Seven similar to those within the Six, the exporters of the Six would have an interest in a solution similar to that of the exporters among the Seven. The Seven are nearly as important an export market to the Six as the Six are to the Seven. Of course, this would not be an effective interest if, for political reasons, the Six did not want a settlement. But once they came to want a solution arrangements among the Seven would create an important commercial reinforcement to that view.

Fourthly, it is probable that, once all the members of the E.E.C. become anxious to reach a European settlement, the existence of the Stockholm Group will be a positive assistance. The fear that a European Free Trade Area would destroy, or in some way weaken, the Community was a not unimportant factor in leading to the breakdown in 1958. The institutional arrangements then presented grave difficulties. But a settlement between the Community and the Stockholm Group, accompanied by arrangements with the less-developed European countries, would present no such difficulties and could imply no threat to the integrity of the Six.

Finally, there is a belief that once arrangements of the kind contemplated by the Ministers of the Stockholm Group have been introduced it will be possible to continue useful economic co-operation among the European countries within O.E.E.C. even if a settlement between the Six and the Seven is delayed for some time. Of course, the Seven will not be so powerful as the Six, but they will be strong enough and have a sufficient sense of solidarity among themselves to help O.E.E.C. to continue to operate as an effective instrument.

These arguments finally prevailed with all the seven countries. Naturally Denmark, with her own especially difficult problem, was the slowest to make up her mind. She needed to be assured that in the short run, as well as the long, not only would she gain some reciprocal advantage in trade within the Seven but also she would not suffer in the markets of the Six.

There is no point in setting out here the details of the agreements reached at Stockholm. They are set out in the White Paper, and have been analysed elsewhere.\* Moreover, by the time these words appear a definitive treaty may be near signature.

The arrangements envisaged by the Ministers at Stockholm were inherently very simple. This simplicity flows from two sources. First, for the most part the seven countries who took part in the Stockholm negotiations had advocated simple rather than complicated solutions in the negotiations of 1957

\* The European Free Trade Association, by Miriam Camps.

and 1958. They did this not necessarily because they thought a Free Trade Area would be simple to operate, but because they were willing to leave the complications to be worked out under the pressure of events. On the side of the Six the attitude to this problem was complicated by the fact that, having already negotiated the Treaty of Rome and safeguarded a number of specific national positions, they were anxious that these solutions should not be reopened in a simple Free Trade Area framework.

But the second reason is probably more important. The dominating desire among the Seven is to do nothing which would subsequently hinder negotiations with the Six. Whatever the outcome of those negotiations will be—and there is a not inconsiderable range of possibilities—it will be easier to reach it if the structure of the Seven to begin with is simple rather than complicated.

### Objections to the Plan

IS this solution likely to promote a satisfactory settlement in the long run? The critics of the arrangement fall into two groups. There are those who dislike it on straight commercial grounds. They fear that the competition to which the United Kingdom will be exposed will be damaging for particular sectors or firms. It would be odd if the economic organization of the United Kingdom over a decade were to be wholly unchanged by such an arrangement. It is not likely that the whole of our resources of men and money are so perfectly laid out now that no change is likely. There are many sectors where the proposed arrangements should be advantageous to United Kingdom export interests. But if there can be no switch of resources at all we shall be unable to take advantage of these opportunities. This is cold comfort to individual firms who may suffer. But ten years is a long time and, provided the level of activity remains high both in the United Kingdom and in Europe generally, the adaptation will probably take place gradually and almost imperceptibly.

Some of these interests were opposed to the wider Free Trade Area proposals in 1957 and 1958. Others were willing to accept, or at least acquiesce in, those wider arrangements but considered the more limited proposals within the Seven more dangerous. There are some products where our partners within the Seven have considerable natural advantages not only over the United Kingdom but also over most of Europe. There is a fear that, for example, Swedish paper manufacturers, denied the opportunity of expanding their exports to the Community, will flood the United Kingdom market to the detriment of United Kingdom producers. Such a development is most unlikely. Such tariffs as there are on paper products will be reduced only gradually over ten years. If Swedish manufacturers were able to flood the market in the early years, there would surely be a claim that they were indulging in "unfair competition". But Swedish manufacturers are not likely to adopt such policies. They will not easily abandon their interest in the markets of the Community. Moreover, they will not want to take action that could easily lead to the invocation of escape clauses, or even the prolongation of the transition period for their products. Their interest, as with all producers within a Common Market, will be to see their exports expand, but in such a

way, and with such a rhythm, as will not call in question the basic assumptions on which the new policies are based.

The second objectors have quite a different case. It is held by some\* that whatever may be the European solution to this problem the ideal solution for the United Kingdom is to move closer towards the Six, and that the possibility of such a development will be seriously hampered by United Kingdom membership of the Stockholm Group. As a basis for considering this criticism one must form some judgment of what sort of arrangement the Six would like to have with the United Kingdom. It may well be that, if it had been as clear in 1955 as it became by 1958 that British industry was willing to see British tariffs against German goods abolished, quite different solutions would have been possible. But there is no evidence today that intimate relations with the United Kingdom in particular are desired by all the members of the Six. This situation may change. On the United Kingdom side, ideas of what is practicable in economic organization could well change as decisively in the next five years as they have changed in the last five. But, even if all these things happened, it is not certain that the United Kingdom would be impeded from moving towards the Six because of the existence of the Stockholm Group. There are perhaps some things which the United Kingdom, because of its size, would be prepared to do which other members of the Stockholm Group would not be prepared for. But, in general, it would be a significant change if over the years the United Kingdom were prepared to accept closer economic ties with the Six than most of the other members of the Seven. Indeed, in fairness to the other members of the Seven, it should be recognized that the complexities of the United Kingdom position often seem to preclude solutions which they, for their part, would be prepared to accept. The diversity of the United Kingdom economic interests in the world at large, and in particular the very diversity of the Commonwealth itself with whom our links are closest, impose on us a certain inflexibility of policy which very few small countries can afford. Certainly, within the realm of what seems to be possible today, or may become possible over five or ten years, the United Kingdom is more likely to be criticized by its partners within the Stockholm Group for not being willing to agree to moves likely to promote a settlement with the Six than to be hampered by its partners in reaching such a settlement. However desirable the Stockholm Group may appear in itself to the individual members of it, and for some it has considerable attractions at the moment, there is no government among the Seven which would proceed with the Stockholm Plan if it judged that another course would be more likely to promote a settlement with the Six. Still less would any government agree to the establishment of the Stockholm Group if it thought it was likely to be a hindrance to a settlement with the Six. There can be no doubt that the absence of any criticism of the move from the six governments of the Community has tended to confirm the Seven in the wisdom of their action. There is no reason to believe that, at any rate in the early years of the existence of the Group which is being formed, this fundamental interest will be changed.

\* *Ibid.*

If nothing happened for a decade then the Stockholm Group, like any other human institution, would develop its own *esprit*. But if ten years passed without a settlement with the Six, this would assuredly be a matter of the deepest regret to the governments which subscribed to the Stockholm communiqué.

But, if the formation of a Free Trade Area among the Seven seems today the best way towards a general European solution, there can be no certainty that such a solution can be found. Will the Seven then find they have committed themselves to a road which has in itself no attractions? The interests of each of them are very diverse. For the United Kingdom, there seems little reason to doubt that commercially it will be of great benefit. Among the Seven are many small countries with incomplete industrial economies, a very high standard of living and therefore a great propensity to import precisely those goods which the United Kingdom manufactures. There is here a market as valuable as Canada or Australia.

Politically, there is naturally less interest in the new grouping than there was in the wider grouping. It is at once too narrow, and too wide. But there are fewer incompatibilities of temper and policy within it than might have been expected in such a group. None of its members will want the new grouping to supplant the wider economic organizations, whether world-wide such as the I.M.F. and the G.A.T.T., or regional such as O.E.E.C. The grouping of the Seven is likely to remain what it has been from the beginning, a grouping of industrially developed European countries, formed to facilitate relations with the European Economic Community within the European framework of O.E.E.C.

# NIGERIA: THE AFRICAN GIANT

## A SURVEY ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

**T**WENTY years ago, with Egypt transformed into a British military base, and the Lion of Judah temporarily subjugate to a brief new Caesar, it was 99.4 per cent accurate to say that Africa was one vast colony. The 0.6 per cent represented Liberia's share of the continent's population. All other Africans lived in varying degrees of dependence—"guided" autonomy in Egypt and Zanzibar, protectorates and colonies almost everywhere else; or, in the case of South and South-West Africa, autonomous but non-representative government.

Today, two decades later, the Accra Conference powers number nine. With their estimated 1960 populations, these are: United Arab Republic (28 millions), Libya (1.25 millions), Tunisia (4 millions), Morocco (10.25 millions), Sudan (10.5 millions), Ethiopia (18 millions), Liberia (1.5 millions), Ghana (5.5 millions) and Guinea (3 millions). The combined total of 82 million independent, representatively-governed people constitutes 34.5 per cent of Africa's population.

During the year 1960 no less than six countries expect to attain independence, with a combined population of 52 millions. This will bring the independent, representatively-governed share of Africa's 244 million people to 55 per cent, and will mark a turning-point in the history of the continent. From Christmas on, colonial status, or caste rule on the South African pattern, will begin to be the exception, the "minority situation" on the African scene.

Five years later, in 1965, one may reasonably predict that 81 per cent of Africans will have achieved their inevitable goal. The 47 millions who are still expected to be then short of this objective include the 14 millions in South Africa (including the High Commission Territories), the 7.5 millions in the Central African Federation, Kenya's 7.5 and Uganda's 5.5 millions, Mozambique's 6 millions and Angola's 4.5 millions.

The six countries whose flags will be broken at the mastheads outside United Nations this year are: the U.N. territory of Cameroons under French trusteeship, with 3.5 million population, due for independence under the name Kamerun on January 1; the U.N. territory of Togoland under French trusteeship, with 1.2 million population, due for independence under the name Togo on April 27; Mali, with 6.5 million population, which hopes to exercise its constitutional right to leave the Afro-French Community in the spring; Nigeria, with 39.5 million population, due for freedom on October 1; and the U.N. territories of Somalia (Italian trusteeship, 1.6 millions) and Somaliland (British trusteeship, 0.7 millions) which expect independence towards the end of the year, and which are expected to merge in a single state.

The star turn, of course, is Nigeria. One human being in six in Africa is a

Nigerian. There never was a nation on this fractionalized continent of such demographic proportions (though there have been, and remain, some with vaster land surfaces). The spirited attempts to unite two or three former French West African colonies, or to join Ghana and Guinea, look small and insignificant beside the giant federation existing in Nigeria. But size is both Nigeria's strength and Nigeria's weakness.

If one looks back into the past, one finds that Nigeria does not correspond to any of the African empires. Old Ghana was a semi-desert, semi-savannah kingdom to the north, the last bastion against the Berbers, themselves being pressed away from the Mediterranean littoral by the invasion of Islam. Old Ghana never touched the coast. Mali and the huge empire of Song'ai were similarly internal kingdoms, spreading from the Western Sudan to Lake Chad and up to what is now Libya. The coastal areas of West Africa were a series of much smaller, usually richer little kingdoms and chieftaincies. With the forest as their best ally, they held off the attacks of the north, but warred constantly amongst themselves and dissipated the area's strength on a massive scale by selling their prisoners of war to European slave-traders. Accurate figures are hard to come by, but if one says that roughly half the population of West Africa disappeared into slavery one will not be far wrong. Rather less than half of those taken survived the journey to the Americas.

It is a doctrine of West Africanists to say that West Africa is "horizontal, not vertical". The great Sudanic, Islamic portion, with a more or less common culture and way of life, runs across from Dakar, through the eastern tip of the Gambia, and then parallel to the curving coast, including in its sweep about two-thirds of Guinea; it then swings slightly north, enters Ghana just south of Wa, and follows, roughly, the tenth parallel of latitude.

The coastal Africans are more diverse in their cultures, but they too, to a fair degree, have points in common. They intermingled extensively. The people of Accra, the Ga, came from Calabar, 800 miles up the beach, at the time of the French revolution. Words spoken in the Akan language of Nzima, in the Ivory Coast, reappear in the predominantly Bantu languages of Kamerun.

The Berlin Conference of 1884, however, saw West Africa in vertical lines, with port-space for everyone—or, at all costs, for everyone at the Conference. Nigeria and Ghana, and the two geographical eccentricities drawn for diplomatic reasons between them—Dahomey for France, Togoland for Germany—are the most outstanding examples of the "vertical" outlook. In each case the artificial creations have become accepted now by their populations, with the vertical nations building whatever unity exists around the old kingdoms of the coastal or near-coastal part—the Fanti and Asante kingdoms of Ghana, the remarkable little Ewe principalities in the southern third of Togoland (which may one day emerge as the West African Switzerland), the bloody Fon or Dahomi warrior kingdom of Abome. In Nigeria the same has been true, but with tragically less completeness.

The two southern regions of the federation—Eastern and Western Nigeria—have provided almost all the country's leadership, its teachers, its managers, its politicians, its professional people, but have never managed, as yet, to

subjugate their more numerous northern co-citizens. Asante and southern Ghanaians outnumber the scattered Frafra, Grunshi, Dagomba and other northern Ghanaian populations; but Nigeria is so "northern" in majority that it has that almost unthinkable phenomenon, to West Africanists—a Hausa Prime Minister.

Nigeria has much the same Eurafican historical background as the other West African countries. The Portuguese, with the papal licence to monopolize West African trade, were the first European influence along the southern creeks and rivers. They made trading agreements with kingdoms like Warri, one of whose crown princes married a Portuguese princess in the seventeenth century and forthwith permitted the Jesuits to evangelize. Catholics still outnumber Protestants in the land around the Delta, a situation unique in English-speaking West Africa. The Portuguese sailed and marched to Benin, whose seventeenth-century bronzes (some of which depict Portuguese traders) are Africa's most sought-after works of art; they had regular commercial relations with the smaller chieftaincies in the Niger Delta—Boni, the Efik nation around Calabar, and so on.

With the Reformation came competition from those nations which no longer regarded the papal licence as binding—Holland, Britain, Brandenburg, Denmark. When slaving began in earnest, this did not involve penetration into the interior by the European or American buyers, who collected their booty in the creeks. The association with Europe was still, essentially, a coastal affair.

It was not until the last century that regular commerce began with such large agglomerations as Ife, whose exquisite pre-Renaissance stone carvings are still being unearthed by the Yoruba Historical Research Unit, or with the vast Yoruba camp for warrior mercenaries at Ibadan—now West Africa's largest city.

Nigeria, from Britain's point of view, is a dependency owed largely to the selfish, romantic efforts of the nineteenth-century "buccaneer" traders, all generically referred to now as "palm-oil ruffians". These were here the empire-builders, and one day, when Africans can look back on British as we look back on Roman imperialism, the saga of those indomitable "ruffians" will be sung by the novelists of the Guinea Coast. These were the people who opened up Africa to Europe, and Europe to Africa, on terms to which both sides were suited by their natures—trade. These were the people who were prepared to trek up-country under conditions of difficulty rarely found today, when even travel-writers carry their stocks of paludrine and their portable ice-boxes "made in U.S.A.".

The ruffians dropped their drums off as they went inland, making trading arrangements with the chiefs. Later, camped at the mouths of rivers, they kept watch for the oil-drums floating down, gathered them up and resold their produce to the shippers. Trade covered vastly more than palm, of course, though palm for the nascent soap industries of Europe was the big attraction. Some traders installed floating hulks in the creeks and lagoons, where they exchanged the cotton piece-goods, *jigida* beads and patent medicines of Manchester and Hamburg for local agricultural and mineral produce. Under

the shadow of yellow fever, river blindness, malaria, dysentery and other morbid challenges to the human constitution, living off boiled water and mashed yams and bully beef, drinking the cloudy palm wine and the mortal methylated spirits, they would stick it out for a year or so in the hope of sailing for Plymouth with a few thousand pounds in pocket. If they did this successfully, they invariably came back for more: Plymouth was more comfortable, but not quite the same. They founded relatively extensive Eurafrican families which, as Trader Horn has pointed out, monopolized the first administrative and junior executive jobs in the nascent colony.

These trading adventurers made colonization both possible and inevitable. Eventually the charter companies, who did the things on a bigger scale than the trading "counters", could command armed assistance from the Motherland; and finally came the military hand of Westminster itself. When Lugard entered Sokoto after heavy fighting, Nigeria was made.

The most enthusiastic nationalists in Nigeria today invariably end their diatribes against British imperialism's sins of omission and commission on a generous note: "We have one thing to thank Britain for. They gave us Nigeria."

That Nigeria is a British creation is something of which all Nigerians are conscious. The word itself, of course, is not African, but a suitable title for a country drained by West Africa's main watercourse, the Niger, the black river—another excellent name in these days when people are, at last, proud to be black. Today, on the eve of independence, Britain's largest dependency and Africa's largest nation is sharply divided on many things, but determined to survive its divisions and remain a single country. Politics are bitter, rivalries are intense, the north and the south are as far apart, psychologically, as they ever were. But on one thing the most opposite political leaders are agreed: Nigeria must stay together; for, in spite of its problems, its shattering shortcomings, time and reason should make it Africa's most important nation.

### The Battle for Power

THE general election to be held in December will decide what party or coalition will hold the reins of power when the colony becomes a nation, next October. There are a dozen parties: three main ones, their allies, and some small splinter groups. They are fighting for 312 seats—174 in the north, 72 in the east, 63 in the west, and 3 for the Federal territory of Lagos.

The Action Group (A.G.), which is in power in Western Nigeria, proposes a foreign policy of alignment with the Western block of nations, non-entanglement in Pan-Africanism and opposition to "Arab imperialism"; its constitutional policy involves the creation of three and possibly four new states in the Federation, to satisfy the demands of the minority peoples, who number nearly half the population of the country; there is an ambitious social welfare programme which involves old age pensions, unemployment pay and a national minimum wage of five shillings a day, double that paid in the north at present.

The National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), the governing party in Eastern Nigeria, wants a foreign policy of positive neutralism similar to Nkrumah's but with similarly close ties with Britain and the United States, active Pan-Africanism, and friendly relations with President Nasser. Its domestic programme is less of a vote-catcher than the A.G.'s, but it does include support for the N.T.U.C. claim for 30 to 50 per cent wage increases for junior government servants, and free secondary education.

The Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), which is in power in the north and holds nearly half the seats in the out-going federal Parliament, has a foreign policy similar to that of the A.G., is fiercely opposed to the creation of new states (one and possibly two of which would carve enormous chunks out of the north) and offers little at home except a promise of "justice and progress for all". This promise is hardly borne out by its present régime in the north, in which public speakers of opposing parties may be horsewhipped or gaoled on the orders of the Alkali courts, or beaten up by Native Authority police faithful to the emirs.

The United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) and the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons (D.P.N.C.) of Dr. K. Ozuanda Mbadiwe, a wealthy and massive figure known to his followers as the "Elephant of Destiny", are allied to the A.G. The Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.) has an electoral alliance with the N.C.N.C. Most of the smaller parties come under the protection of one or other of the Big Three. One that stands alone is the Dynamic Party of Chike Obi, a mathematics lecturer at University College of Ibadan, who wants a return to unitary government.

The leaders differ as widely as their parties. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Prime Minister of Western Nigeria and leader of the A.G., is a round, imposing figure, well-surrounded by good advisers, who has proved the biggest administrative success in the Nigerian political scene. His speeches are rather wearying and over-long to listen to, and one is reminded by them that Chief Awolowo is a devout Methodist of the fundamentalist persuasion. But his electoral campaign, partly devised by an energetic team of Madison Avenue public relations experts, is as professional and twentieth-century as anything that could be imagined.

Chief Awolowo drops himself out of the clouds, where Shango, the Yoruba war-god, lives, by helicopter to reach his rallies. He bombs the villages with leaflets and bright balloons, bearing party symbols, for the children. There are free gifts for the rubbernecks—pencils, T-shirts, book-matches, all bearing the party's palm-tree. He has, unchallengeably, the most attractive policy for the average Nigerian worker, and the best record as a Premier.

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, still young-looking and handsome at fifty-six, is the father of Nigerian nationalism. An exciting speaker to listen to, he is a moody man, rising to peaks of optimism and dropping down to despair with ease. Surrounded by rather inefficient collaborators, his régime in the east has come under considerable criticism for mismanagement of funds, nepotism and so on, for most of which he is certainly not personally responsible. He is, of all Nigerians, the one who looks most like a national leader. Because of his

historic rôle in the constitutional struggle, which started when he was a journalist, he is respected by his opponents. Nigeria will owe its independence to him more than to anyone else.

The Sarduna of Sokoto, the Premier of the north and President General of the N.P.C., is a very different kettle of fish. Proud to the point of arrogance, the absolute monarch of about 2 million Fulani and Hausa as well as premier of 22 million northerners, he is the heir apparent to the Sultanate of Sokoto, the present incumbent being his uncle. The Sultan of Sokoto is the spiritual leader of almost all Muslims south of the Sahara. To be free to take on this papal pinnacle of the Faith, when it becomes vacant, the Sarduna is not contesting the federal election.

His deputy, Alhaji Abu Bakar Tafawa Balewa, the present Federal Premier, is a different man again. A schoolmaster in a party composed almost exclusively of non-literates, a commoner who has risen to the top of a party leadership composed almost exclusively of kings, princes and high-priests, he is also Nigeria's most statesmanlike personality and one of the most fascinating figures in the West African political scene.

To most people in Nigeria, whether Nigerian or expatriate, he is a modest self-effacing figure with little personality but a great deal of integrity, the "small boy" of the Sarduna. This is a legend he himself does little to dispel, but it is far from the truth, except as regards his undisputed integrity. Alhaji Balewa is a very skilful and determined politician who has now reached the top of the Nigerian political tree, and will stay there if it is humanly possible to do so.

It is true the Sarduna shoe-horned him into the number two spot in the party, and hence into the Premiership of Africa's largest country, with the intention of ruling through him. But for an *éminence grise* to exist he must be cleverer and more able than the king he creates, and this is not the case here. Alhaji Balewa rules in his own right, and has managed remarkably well to hold together a coalition cabinet composed of parties who vilify each other daily in the exuberant Nigerian press, which often confuses freedom with licence, or on the political platform. He is his feudal party's most democratic and tangible force.

Who will win? None except a few fanatical militants in the various parties expect any party to secure an outright majority. If the A.G. increases its majority in the west, wins a few eastern seats again, scores heavily in the Middle Belt (the south of the north) as is expected, and wins some seats in Bornu, in north-eastern Nigeria (which is nonconformist enough to refuse the spiritual guidance of the Sultan of Sokoto) it should get about 120 seats. But, as a safe prediction, one cannot say more than that it will win between 100 and 140.

The N.P.C.'s fortunes depend on the success or failure of the A.G. and the N.E.P.U. The N.P.C. can only lose ground or stand still. It cannot advance, electorally. It will win between 70 and 130 seats. The N.C.N.C. and its allies will win between 70 and 120.

A reasonable guess would be: A.G., 119; N.P.C., 99; N.C.N.C., 94; but each of these figures could be twenty more or twenty less. These figures

include allies as part of the larger parties, and ignore the minor parties and independents, who may win a seat or two.

### A Marriage of Convenience

THE N.P.C. and the N.C.N.C., who have nothing in common except hatred for the A.G. (the N.C.N.C. is even allied to the N.E.P.U., the Northern Opposition), have announced their intention of forming a coalition government. The scope for quarrels here is almost indefinitely extensible. It is a marriage of convenience, loathsome to both. To begin with, it is assumed that the price of N.C.N.C. support will be that the Premiership go to Dr. Azikiwe. But if the N.P.C. outnumber the N.C.N.C. by a reasonable figure, they may well insist on an N.P.C. nominee, Alhaji Balewa.

Presumably, whichever party in the coalition does not get the Premiership will get the foreign ministry. The foreign policies of the two parties are poles apart. At home, they diverge just as widely. Under the N.P.C. régime, Northern Nigeria is the only place in West Africa where women cannot vote. But the N.C.N.C. is strongly for the emancipation of women, and has more women supporters than men. The N.C.N.C. is socialist, the N.P.C. is for absolute monarchies, a State religion with its own somewhat ruthless courts, and for narrow local nationalism. Whereas Nigeria has a policy of "Nigerianization" of the public service, the N.P.C. has a policy of "Northernization"—meaning getting rid of Southern Nigerians who hold responsible posts in the North.

Such a coalition would be very fortunate if it lasted five years. The potential Leader of the Opposition, Chief Awolowo, can be expected to score points off the coalition's divisions and disagreements, and at the *next* general election may well emerge as the commander of a majority of all Nigeria, though presumably a slim one.

Many voices, besides the intellectual one of Chike Obi, are raised against the country's federal constitution—though, electorally, it would be impossible to oppose this. The three states which, since 1954, replace the unitary colonial conception of government, are drawn along ethnic or language lines. Three-quarters of the west's 8 millions are Yoruba. Two-thirds of the east's 9 millions are Ibo. Only 8 million of the north's 22 millions are Hausa and Fulani, but well over half its communities have Fulani chiefs.

If federalism had to be adopted because of Nigeria's vast size and linguistic diversity, more than three states would have been a less dangerous solution, though costly. Alternatively, three states could have been drawn along lines of longitude, so that state loyalty would not just be a question of "tribal" loyalty (language loyalty would be more accurate, for what are popularly referred to as "tribes" in West Africa are in fact language groups, composed of descendants of many different tribes and clans); and so that, in each state, north and south would have to learn to work together. The west, today, is half-Muslim, but has a Methodist premier, so a half-north, half-south state could be expected to work. Only the N.C.N.C., among the major parties, has had the courage to go slightly towards unitarism. It proposes increased powers for the central government, and the division of the country into

eight "provinces" of limited autonomy—presumably a parallel to county councils.

In terms of development, infrastructural and economic, Nigeria is booming. The national income of £312 million surpasses that of all six countries of British East Africa and the Central African Federation put together. It is up 50 per cent in six years. Bank deposits are up 300 per cent over the same period. Cement sales have risen 450 per cent. Schools are rising as fast as teachers can be found to fill them—faster, to tell the truth. Western Nigeria's 8 million people have 139 secondary schools with over 80,000 pupils. This compares favourably with sixty-four secondary schools for 5,500,000 Ghanaians, and spectacularly with two secondary schools (800 pupils) for 3 million Guineans.

There is a favourable trade balance, despite considerable imports of capital equipment. Trade missions arrive constantly from all over the world. New factories are going up all over the country. Nigeria will, by 1964, be self-supporting in crude and diesel oil, and earning £5,250,000 a year sending crude oil to Britain to be refined. Its cocoa production has risen, since the war, from 80,000 tons to nearly 150,000, and may eventually even overtake the 250,000 tons of the world's top producer, Ghana. Agricultural modernization on the lines of Israel's *mishvei* (modified *kibbutzim*, permitting private ownership of land) are being developed in the west and will presumably spread.

### Nationalism and Sentiment

THIS is the bright side, something that will presumably persist even if the political divisions continue, and even if there is a little bloodshed, as most thinking people fear. But the country remains uneasy. Race relations are nowhere near so good as in Ghana. Nigerianization has been slower than was hoped; there is a dire lack of qualified Nigerians for top jobs. Expatriates are blamed for not training Nigerians fast enough or well enough, for wanting to hold on to their jobs. There is some truth in this allegation. But expatriates are also blamed for nearly everything else, and being without a voice to defend themselves they are beginning to show signs of weariness at this attitude.

Compensation for expatriate officers who decide not to remain in Nigeria—the "list B officers" who can go whenever they wish, by giving twelve months notice—is generous, and many are thinking of taking it. Where else, it is reasoned, would a £2,000 a year man get £8,000 capital and a pension of £700 a year from the age of, say, thirty-eight? Out of 657 senior officials, only 52 have applied for "list A"—a permanent career in Nigeria. Out of 61 superscale posts in the police, 53 are held by expatriates, and only 2 are prepared to stay in the country indefinitely.

This does not mean that the country's services may collapse after independence, for other expatriate help would be available, if necessary—Britons, Americans, Indians, West Indians, Israelis and so on, on contract. But the outlook is not encouraging, as regards either efficiency or race relations,

though the latter may automatically improve after independence, as has often been the case elsewhere.

Internationally, Nigeria's emergence as a nation will have very far-reaching effects, at all events in Africa. Though two of the three main parties eschew Pan-Africanism, they will have to play a rôle in it. Chief Awolowo has roundly condemned Dr. Nkrumah's attempts to shape a political confederation, a United States of West Africa; he has said that even to talk of these things is to "sow disharmony, distrust and suspicion among those states". Alhaji Balewa says that Nigeria must tell Ghana and Guinea "freely and frankly" that it wants no part of any scheme for political union. With over half the population of West Africa, from Mauritania to the Cameroons, united under one government in Lagos, that government can well afford to regard uniting the rest as a lot of headache for little result. Even "Zik" (Dr. Azikiwe) is less Pan-African than he was, and less so than Seku Ture or Dr. Nkrumah.

But it is hard to see how Nigeria can sit in the councils of the Independent African States, as she has every intention of doing, without participating. Nor can she very well participate without being a leading participant. She is too big to sit on the sidelines. Under Nigerian influence, Pan-Africanism may well become more limited in its immediate aims, more in line with the cautious thinking of Ethiopia and Liberia—pooled research, educational and cultural exchanges, very limited economic agreements, a common front at U.N.—but, in this form, Pan-Africanism may well become less of an intellectual chimera and more of a useful reality.

With the birth of Nigeria, the age of nationalism is over in West Africa. Some sentimental *relent* may remain: the squabbles over Nigerianization, the talk of replacing English or French as national languages by one of the transcribed vernacular ones, the talk of an "African way of doing things" (which Chief Awolowo has described as a "euphemism for not yet being able to do things competitively"), but nationalism's goal is achieved in West Africa. Whether Sierra Leone becomes independent in 1963 or 1964, whether Dahomey goes out of the French Community with Mali, or stays on until the Voltaic and Niger Republics go, means little or nothing in the eyes of history. The imperialists have agreed to go, or have gone, and the great challenge of freedom is here.

George Padmore, a nationalist and a rebel at heart, said not long before he died: "The great problem facing West Africa today is not liberation any more, but efficiency."

If one takes this word to include not just a competitive degree of competence in administration and business, but also every other important value in society, from integrity and ethics to modern agriculture and hygiene; if one takes it to mean not just improving but catching up with a modern world that is itself not standing still; if we take it to mean responsibility in politics and journalism, a willingness to accept other points of view, a sense of devotion to a task rather than to a salary (Padmore probably had all or most of these things in mind, for he was strong in his strictures on West Africa), then efficiency is indeed the great challenge facing Nigeria.

# UNITED KINGDOM

## THE GENERAL ELECTION

AT 1 a.m. on Friday, October 9, four hours after the polling booths had closed their doors and three hours after the first result had been declared, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour leader, did an unprecedented thing in British politics. With more than 400 results still to be announced he went before the television cameras to say that he conceded the election to Mr. Macmillan. Nor could anybody imagine that he was being precipitate. Whether the party managers and politicians put their trust in old-fashioned rules of thumb or in newfangled electronic computing machines, it was plain almost from the beginning that the Government would be returned to office with a majority increased to 100 or more. (In fact, it turned out to be precisely 100.) There could be no doubt. The outcome depended on what happened in between 50 and 60 marginal seats on which Labour, having no faith in a swing of the pendulum in their favour, had concentrated their organizational resources; and the earliest batch of declarations showed two significant trends. First, the Government were not merely holding on to their own marginal seats and consolidating their position but they were capturing Labour marginals in London and the south. Secondly, Liberal candidatures (there were twice as many as in 1955) were doing rather more damage to Labour than to the Government. These trends continued through all the results, except in Scotland, Lancashire and Wales. North of the border Labour won three government seats (but the Government recovered Kelvingrove, lost in a by-election) and there was a small swing in their favour; in Lancashire they took one seat and roughly held on elsewhere to their share of the poll; and in Wales they were, as usual, dominant. Everywhere else the Government were picking up seats or increasing their majorities.

The state of the parties in the Commons, compared with the position at the dissolution on September 18, became:

	<i>New House</i>	<i>Old House</i>	<i>Net gains</i>	<i>Net losses</i>
Conservatives and allies . . .	365	341	23	..
Labour . . . . .	258	281	..	23
Liberal . . . . .	6	6	..	..
Independent . . . . .	1	1	..	..

Thus, the Conservative Government returned with a majority of 107\* over the Labour Opposition, and a majority of 100 over all other parties, compared with majorities of 60 and 54 respectively in the former House of Commons.

Out of a total electorate of 35,389,029 the number of electors who voted was 27,862,708, or 78·7 per cent, compared with 76·8 per cent in May 1955,

\* Reduced to 106 by the subsequent election of Sir Harry Hylton-Foster as Speaker.

82.6 per cent in October 1951, 84 per cent in February 1950 and 72.8 per cent in July 1945. The total votes cast for the different parties in 1959, 1955 and 1951 were as follows:

	1959	1955	1951
Conservatives and allies . . . . .	13,750,935	13,310,891	13,718,199
Labour . . . . .	12,216,166	12,405,254	13,935,917
Liberal . . . . .	1,640,761	722,402	743,512
Communists . . . . .	30,897	33,144	21,640
Others . . . . .	223,949	288,038	177,326

Thus, the Labour vote has been continuously falling since 1951. It is worth noting that Mr. Macmillan, leading his party for the first time in a general election, made history—since the Reform Act of 1832 no political party had previously won three consecutive general elections, twice increasing their majority, while continuously in office.

Although throughout the three-week campaign Conservative Central Office were receiving reports from the constituencies that gave them every reason to believe they would win, the size of their victory exceeded expectations. After the event some Conservative M.P.s declared that they saw from the beginning portents of a triumph that would give Mr. Macmillan a majority of 100 votes or more in the Commons, but the general informed opinion until almost the end was that the Government would be given a close-run race and would probably get back with their majority about halved. For nobody had been able to detect with certainty the small swing that settled the issue; it amounted, as Mr. Gaitskell pointed out in trying to console his rank and file, to the movement to the Right of about 3 votes in every 200 cast. Moreover, although the opinion polls until the end showed the Government in the lead (first by a good margin and then by a short head) “don’t knows” or “won’t says” at the unprecedented figure of nearly 20 per cent suggested that Mr. Gaitskell could still win on the post. And it always seemed likely that the result would depend on Labour’s success in polling their maximum vote in the marginal seats, for the lesson of their failure in the 1955 election appeared to be that there had been large-scale abstention by apathetic Labour voters rather than a genuine swing to the Conservatives.

It proved to be an extraordinarily difficult election to predict, and hardly less difficult to interpret with certainty. Mr. Macmillan, before he turned to remodelling his Ministry, thought he saw in the result convincing evidence that at last the Conservatives had managed a break-through in the politics of class which have artificially divided the nation for several decades. Mr. Gaitskell, having confessed that up to the end he believed Labour would win, said that after a third successive rebuff at the polls his party must not flinch from rethinking their policies and attitudes in contemporary terms. And Mr. Grimond, the Liberal leader, hinted that the time might have come when the radicals in the Labour and Liberal parties could make common cause.

One thing is sure: none of the three parties will ever be the same again

after this general election. For the Conservatives there is the exciting possibility that from now on, if they know what is good for them, they may reasonably look for solid support throughout the working class, especially among young men and women who base their voting behaviour not on memories of the bad days before the war but on the benefits of the affluent society that equips them with new houses, modern gadgets in the home and a car. For Labour it is inevitable that there should be yet another painful stocktaking, another agonizing reappraisal to find an electoral image that the new working class is willing to live with. For Mr. Grimond and his Liberals there is at least some basis (though less than some of them are apt to suggest) for the hope that their party may recover a little of the ground that has been lost in the last thirty years by giving direction to the radical impulses of the electors who are in recoil from the Conservatives on one side and Labour on the other.

### Towards One Nation?

**W**AS Mr. Macmillan on the mark when he suggested that the result of the general election revealed Britain moving nearer to the old Disraelian ideal of "one nation"? At any rate, many Labour M.P.s and some Labour leaders think so.

The better-off wage-earners and numerous salary earners [Mr. Douglas Jay, a confidant of Mr. Gaitskell, has written] are tending to regard the Labour Party as associated with a class to which they themselves don't belong. Few of them—least of all the women—feel themselves to be members of a "working class". We are in danger of fighting under the label of a class which no longer exists. If you doubt this, ask anyone who canvassed extensively in the last four weeks, particularly in the new housing estates. We must have a wider, cross-sectional appeal. What the public wants is a vigorous radical reforming open-minded party. . . . How do we exorcize the popular feeling that we are tied to a dying class? . . . We must also purge out of our propaganda, speeches and writings, the phrases which have kept this damaging myth alive: "The militant working class", "working-class solidarity", and all the rest. Society has changed; and the motor workers in the housing estates just don't feel that way any more than the salary-earners in the suburbs.

And Mr. George Thomson, one of the influential Labour M.P.s in Scotland, went on record with some cold comfort for any of his colleagues who made too much of the modest successes in Scotland. Labour won three seats from the Government, he declared, largely because of shifts in the voting population. As the years pass the Scots, too, he predicted, will begin to lose their traditional "class" characteristics and will respond to changing economic conditions by identifying themselves with the Conservatives, not with Labour.

Clearly, then, Mr. Macmillan promptly singled out one of the factors that moved votes to the Right in the general election. But the break-through is not yet massive, and if the breach is to be widened and consolidated it will behove the Government in the next four or five years to take very good care to maintain conditions of full employment concurrently with a stable cost

of living. In the particular interests of the Conservative Party, as well as the general interests of the country, these will be the Government's first and abiding objectives; and it is significant that the first Bill presented to the new Parliament has been designed to concentrate in the hands of the President of the Board of Trade all existing and some new powers to provide factories and create jobs in those localities where unemployment persists at a higher level than the national average. It is now to be made possible for the Government to act swiftly and flexibly not only when unemployment is a fact but when it is seen to be imminent; and this is important in a day when the economic pattern of Britain is beginning to change rapidly, as old industries decline and new industries develop.

### Reorienting Labour

AT the time of writing the rethinking and reorientation that Mr. Gaitskell promised for the Labour Party as the sequel to electoral defeat have made little or no progress, although the postponed annual conference was due to be held for two days during the last week-end in November at Blackpool. This was intended to be the occasion when about 1,500 delegates from the trade unions and the constituency parties would hear the analyses of Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan (who has succeeded Mr. James Griffiths in the deputy leadership) on what went wrong and how it should be put right, and also offer their own judgments on deficiencies of policy and organization. But it is already clear that Mr. Gaitskell and his chief lieutenants are determined to move cautiously. This is understandable. It will be some time before the research in depth, which the national executive committee has decided to carry out, will provide the facts on which confident conclusions about Labour's failure at the polls may be based; and it is also obvious that Mr. Gaitskell cannot afford to snatch rashly at all the early proposals for changes in policy and the party constitution. The future of the Labour Party as we know it is likely to depend upon the decisions that now have to be made, and they will not be reached in a rush. Nevertheless, the Labour Opposition in Parliament is hardly likely to be working at full power until the leaders have recharted their course, and until then the party workers in the country are hardly likely to be given a clear purpose.

Meanwhile, the great debate on Labour's policy and constitutional structure is raging unofficially. Mr. Jay, who would almost certainly have been President of the Board of Trade by now if Labour had won the election, set the hive buzzing with an extraordinarily candid article in *Forward*, a Labour periodical supported by the trade unions. He wrote in the immediate aftermath of the general election while the party in Parliament and in the country were still reeling from the shock of defeat, and it did not escape notice that Mr. Jay is closer than many to Mr. Gaitskell. Here is the passage from the article that caused most heart-burning among the faithful:

The word "nationalization" has become damaging to the Labour Party. This is a fact; and it is no use denying it, even if you deplore it. . . . The myth that we intended to nationalize anything and everything was very powerful in this

election—any canvasser will agree. We must destroy the myth decisively; otherwise we may never win again. . . .

If Labour is going to win we must remove the first two fatal handicaps; the class "image" and the myth of "nationalization". This won't be done by just not talking about it. We must now make it plain that we believe in social ownership through the Cooperative Movement, municipal enterprise and public investment; but that we do not believe in the extension of the public monopoly to manufacturing industry or distribution. The public has shown that it approves the existing public boards in the public utility industries, but does not want them extended further. We should say we accept this decision of the electorate and would in future propose no further nationalization.

It would not damage the real basic aim of the Movement if we agree to leave steel outside the bounds of compulsory public ownership. . . . It is really not worth jettisoning the things for which we really stand . . . for the sake of a form of ownership in steel.

Mr. Jay obviously intended to set the theme for the party's impending *post mortem*, but he had rushed in too early and spoken his mind too directly, if not crudely. His article immediately closed the ranks of the party by diverting their attention from their electoral wounds and by giving them one of their beloved internal conflicts. Now they knew where they stood. Some of the party's intellectuals, perhaps with the cognizance of Mr. Gaitskell, were sharpening the knife for the slaughter of the sacred cow of the State ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. They must be stopped. At their first private meeting in the new Parliament the Parliamentary Party showed that they had no intention of being intellectually argued into throwing out the baby with the bath water; and when Mr. Roy Jenkins, another intellectual close to Mr. Gaitskell, spoke vaguely about the damage done to Labour by nationalization policies he had a poor hearing.

But *Forward* had not finished yet. Mr. Jay's article was the first instalment of a serial on Labour's defeat, and the next contribution came from yet another intellectual who stands at Mr. Gaitskell's right hand—Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker. He, too, wrote critically of nationalization, though with more caution. (It is reckoned that Mr. Bevan had been thundering in the party's inner counsels.) Here is an extract from Mr. Gordon Walker's analysis:

One part of the working class was set against another. . . . In part it was due to our own alienation of the new working class—workers in the true sense, but with a new social attitude because of their possession of cars, washing machines and the like. The simple fact is that the Tories identified themselves with this new working class rather better than we did.

Canvassers who actually went out on the job of getting votes in the areas where the swing went against us know what happened. What was it that they had against Labour? Nationalization. The bumbledom of some Labour councils. The pampering of council tenants at their expense. One of the things that most struck me about the election was that in the pre-war council estates we still got massive support, but that in the post-war estates and new towns we barely held our own.

Our fundamental task . . . is to reunite and lead the working class. Of course

this does not mean watering down our principles. . . . We have to do what we have often had to do before—reaffirm and restate our principles in terms that appeal to the working class. Take the word nationalization. We must not be afraid to raise the question whether the word, as distinct from the idea, is not a handicap to us. This is one of the matters on which we ought to have open and not closed minds. . . . Nationalization is one means to an end. The exact boundary of nationalization must be a matter for democratic decision. One of the things we must take into account in considering this difficult problem is the democratically expressed views of the people in the last three general elections.

Whether or not Mr. Jay and Mr. Gordon Walker, as well as others who have followed their line, had taken Mr. Gaitskell into their confidence, the signs are that the internal attack on the canon of nationalization has been so badly timed and clumsily exploited that it will inhibit the Labour leaders from reviewing the policy as searchingly as they would probably wish. It would split the leadership itself, for both Mr. Bevan and Mr. Harold Wilson will have no truck with Mr. Jay's advice, and it would shake the confidence of the Parliamentary Party and the constituency cadres. Indeed, the whole party has now been put on guard against change in either policy or constitution; and the immediate prospect is that Labour will have to continue with its particular self-defeating brand of double talk, whereby a façade of unity is maintained by using the same words with different meanings. And that surely is not the answer to the problem that the electorate set for Labour on October 8.

### The Radical Crystal Ball

**W**HAT of the Liberals? From Mr. Grimond downwards they have been exuberant and cock-a-hoop, but their joy is only justified by the fact that they have checked their decline, not that they have established themselves as a party with a future. In cold fact, there were six Liberals in the last House of Commons and there are six Liberals in this (three of them unopposed by Conservatives); and any satisfaction there might have been about the seizing of North Devon from the Government must be moderated by the fact that the Government seized Torrington from the Liberals. Nearly twice as many candidates were fielded this time as in 1955, and the average vote for each candidate rose from 6,567 in 1955 to 7,561 in 1959. Of the 217 Liberal candidates, 55 lost their deposits because they failed to attract an eighth of the poll. Nevertheless, Mr. Grimond did succeed in showing that when Liberalism is given a radical emphasis it is capable of drawing off votes from Labour; and he did prove that in Britain today there is a scattered but considerable vote of protest against both Right and Left, not least among young men and women of the professional class. The Liberal problem now is to build upon what ground they possess during the next four or five years, for as Mr. Grimond has said the choice is to get on or get out. This will not be easy at a time when Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Butler are resolutely liberalizing the Conservative Party and putting it in tune with the times. There are going to be many good reasons why young men and women who want an effective political career should make a realistic appraisal between the opportunities of joining with Mr. Macmillan or with Mr. Grimond.

Nor should anyone take too seriously the kite Mr. Grimond flew immediately after the election:

I have been saying for a long time that what is wanted is a new radical party to take the place of the Socialist Party as an alternative to Conservatism. Of course, these are early days so soon after the general election to put such an idea into operation. . . . But I do feel that the general election has shown that the Liberal Party have a big following, indicating that the country wants something more than Conservatism and a Socialism which puts its faith in doctrines like nationalization.

I do not myself foresee any amalgamation in the near future with the Labour Party. Eventually there may be a change in our politics which would take the form of a new party run on radical lines and composed of former followers of both the Labour and Conservative Parties. I am not talking about any immediate coalition and I am merely speaking for myself.

In fact, there was an immediate coalition, though a very small one. Lord Ogmore, who served in Labour Ministries between 1945 and 1951, announced that he had decided to rejoin the Liberal Party. He explained that he sees the need to build up a progressive alternative government embracing the present resurgence of anti-Conservative sentiment without being limited by class alignment, and he is convinced "that the principle of nationalization is no longer acceptable to an increasing majority of the people".

#### Ministers and Measures

WITH his mandate to pursue policies of peace and prosperity overwhelmingly renewed, Mr. Macmillan turned to the task of reconstructing his Government, or at least of redressing the ministerial shop window. It was largely a bout of musical chairs. Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd fulfilled the general expectation and the Opposition hope by putting a term to his five years as Secretary of State for the Colonies and rejoining Guinness as an executive director. He continues as a member of the Commons; and in spite of the storm that broke upon him after the Devlin report on the Nyasaland emergency and the report on the death of eleven Mau Mau detainees in Hola camp he left office at his own wish with his reputation high. Indeed, there are many members of the Commons who would say that he proved himself, viewing his career whole, as one of the best Colonial Secretaries we have had.

Yet it was time for a change. There are good grounds for thinking that Mr. Lennox-Boyd was becoming rigid in his judgments; he had no doubt been committed by force of circumstance to attitudes that needed to be reviewed without prejudice. Mr. Macmillan has therefore given the post to Mr. Iain Macleod, the former Minister of Labour, the outstanding representative of the post-war brand of liberal or radical Conservative, whom Mr. Butler first brought into the service of Conservative Central Office after the war and then into Parliament. Mr. Macleod, who has one of the liveliest minds on the Treasury bench, quickly showed the Commons that he is ready to think out colonial problems afresh; and it will be surprising if he does not make a deep mark on the Colonial Office and on Africa in the next year or two.

Mr. Reginald Maudling, another protégé of Mr. Butler, a youngish man

of great parliamentary and administrative gifts who probably only needs raging political ambition to reach the highest offices, has been promoted from Paymaster General (where he tended to be the Government's handyman) to President of the Board of Trade. And Mr. Butler himself, a glutton for work, has added to his responsibilities as Home Secretary and Leader of the House by succeeding Lord Hailsham in the influential appointment of chairman of the Conservative Party Organization. This is a post that wonderfully suits Mr. Butler's particular gifts, and there need be little doubt that the change indicates Mr. Macmillan's determination to keep the Conservative Party at all levels on liberal courses.

Lord Hailsham has become the new Lord Privy Seal (a sinecure office Mr. Butler surrendered) to serve as Minister for Science. In many quarters there is doubt about what precisely he will be able to do, but if it were to prove only a matter of inspiring scientists and setting a new tempo for scientific and technological advance in Britain Lord Hailsham would bring enormous energy and imagination to his business. Mr. Duncan Sandys, who has been the Government's trouble-shooter in turn at the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Defence, as Minister of Aviation becomes the head of a new department whose responsibilities were formerly irrationally divided between the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Supply (now defunct). The concentration of the oversight of aviation, from the manufacture of aircraft for civil and military purposes to their use by the Services and air corporations, is a good example of Mr. Macmillan's empirical approach to contemporary problems. Mr. Sandys takes over at a time when the aircraft industry is in a serious dilemma. There is a need for the design and manufacturing resources to be rationalized and co-ordinated, and the capital resources to be concentrated, so that Britain may compete in the production of supersonic airliners in years to come; and there is need to be sure what types of aircraft B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. will need in the future. In addition, Mr. Sandys will be responsible for Britain's space research.

A new-comer to the Cabinet is Mr. Edward Heath, the former Chief Whip, who succeeded Mr. Macleod at the Ministry of Labour; and Mr. Ernest Marples, a practical business man who combines a gift for publicity with briskness of performance, has been promoted Minister of Transport with the prime task of modernizing the road system. The vacancy as Solicitor General created by the election of Sir Harry Hylton-Foster to be Speaker of the Commons has brought deserved promotion for Sir Jocelyn Simon, the former Financial Secretary to the Treasury.

It was quite unnecessary to wait for the first Queen's Speech of the new Parliament to be sure that Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Butler will be more concerned with efficient administration of the country's affairs than with a dramatic or exciting legislative programme. The prospectus for this Session, which specifically mentioned fifteen Bills, will keep Parliament fully occupied, but it sets a quiet key. The first major Bill introduced co-ordinates and enlarges the Government's powers for checking or preventing local unemployment in areas where old industries are declining, but there is nothing

radical or new in it. The most controversial measure will probably be Mr. Butler's Betting and Gaming Bill, which seeks to legalize betting shops, register bookmakers, drive street bookmakers indoors, and sweep away out-of-date laws on gaming. The rest of the legislation promises to be useful but rather routine.

Great Britain, November 1959.

### NORTHERN IRELAND

"RETURNED to Parliament" is literally true of the Unionist Party's performance in the general election. In the last House of Commons at Westminster it held for the first time all the twelve Northern Ireland seats: in the new this freakish monopoly is unbroken. But "no change" does not explain an election that was as quiet in tone as it was loud in its verdicts. It was observed by one Unionist that it was not so much a test of his own party's strength as of Nationalist sincerity, and in the event both were fully proved. The Unionists did not fail to demonstrate the constancy of faith in the British connexion: the Roman Catholic community triumphed in their turn by a decisive rejection of the republican party Sinn Fein, which when it is not making a show of democracy is plotting with the Irish Republican Army to overthrow the constitution by force of arms.

The figures tell their own story. At the general election of 1955 Sinn Fein contested the same twelve seats, gaining 152,310 votes and electing two members who were afterwards disqualified because they were convicted felons. This time twelve candidates (seven of them being in prison) received only 63,415 votes, and the necessity for the Unionist Party to lodge petitions to unseat did not arise. The thoughtfulness of the Catholic population's reaction is hardly in question. No public lead was given by the Church and only one Nationalist M.P. had the courage to call openly for abstention from the polls. The result can thus be considered, most of all in the sharply divided border counties of Armagh, Fermanagh and Tyrone, a spontaneous disavowal of violence and of the belief that Ireland can be united by any arbitrary method. The terrorist campaign carried on from the Republic persists, but on all counts the election has finally exposed its futility and the universal resentment of the state of emergency which it has caused. In 1955 Nationalists voted for Sinn Fein as the only way open to them of opposing Partition: it was not until the following year that the I.R.A. attack was launched. Since that time there has been a widening breach between the constitutionalists and those in favour of militant action. But where this leads is far from certain. The Nationalist Party, for all its incompatibility with Sinn Fein, was not strong enough to enter the election against it, and its leaders remain so divided between the ineffectual moderates and the embittered and frustrated that there is no promise yet of a united body that will speak purposefully for the Catholic minority in Parliament. That such is needed is plain, for it is a curious anomaly that some 350,000 anti-partition electors have no voice in the United Kingdom Parliament. As for that, the election

has quickly underlined the mistake that was made when the British Government deferred an increase in the number of Northern Ireland constituencies and a redistribution that would ensure a fairer Nationalist representation. In North Down and South Antrim, where the overspill of Belfast's population is being re-housed, the electorates are now far above the national average, and the Unionist majorities of the extraordinary order of 50,000 votes.

Other conclusions of the election are of subsidiary account. In Belfast the Northern Ireland Labour Party again made gains without getting within striking distance of the Unionists in possession; the Catholic-dominated Independent Labour Party only partly succeeded in attracting the votes denied to Sinn Fein, and a Liberal candidate, the first to be nominated in an imperial election in Ulster for thirty years, forfeited her deposit. The Liberal hopeful, however, was not lightly to be dismissed, for as a Catholic pledged to the Union she was a pioneer in attempting to bridge the sectarian gulf that began to open up with Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill. In Northern Ireland with its long memories and its black-and-white brands of loyalty organized Liberalism has little prospect of revival: a more relevant question is whether Unionism itself can become the home of the middle-class Catholics who have been persuaded of the benefits of the British system. For the party the choice again becomes one of turning away from its often unreasoning anti-Catholicism in an endeavour to embrace a wider section of conservatively-minded people. Since the election the Attorney General, Mr. Brian Maginness, has once more put forward the case for rethinking on this issue and for "a missionary zeal in continually gaining new adherents".

The Unionist Society, a young group within the party, has also begun a re-examination of its outlook, but from the leadership in general there is as yet little acknowledgment of the manner of the Sinn Fein defeat or of the political opportunities it may present. A fuller response probably must await the ultimate suppression of the I.R.A., which unhappily is prolonging the frontier war with attacks, like those of October 19, on police stations in Fermanagh and Tyrone. The larger body of Unionists, too, will continue to keep the minority at arm's length so long as the Government in the Republic withholds formal recognition of Northern Ireland as a lawful part of the United Kingdom. On this Mr. Lemass and Lord Brookeborough have lately been exchanging speeches at regular intervals with little sign of arriving at a basis of agreement.

For the next few years at least political developments in Ireland look as though they must turn on this clear-cut issue of recognition and on the rate of Mr. Lemass's progress towards the taking of this step by his own party and public opinion in the South. In this the spurning of Sinn Fein by the people in the North it aims to liberate may play some part. Evidence that there are already those in the Republic who advocate acceptance of Northern Ireland as she is, a status ratified by the Treaty of 1925, but afterwards repudiated by Mr. de Valera, will be found in the article on Ireland overleaf. But there is no disposition North or South to minimize the formidable political consequences of a policy which would entail amendment of the Republic's thirty-two-county constitution.

Northern Ireland, November 1959.

# IRELAND

## EXTERNAL RELATIONS

**S**MALL countries are apt to suffer from an exaggerated sense of their own importance. In our case, for various reasons, this natural tendency has increased with age. At first, after the Civil War, our domestic discords, coupled with the need to rebuild our shattered economy, prevented our politicians from embarking on external adventures. With Mr. de Valera's accession to power in the early thirties, and his subsequent election as President of the Council of the League of Nations, the position changed. His forthright and sensible homilies at Geneva edified, if they did not convert, the assembled statesmen. But he took a firm stand in support of the Covenant during the Abyssinian crisis; and later, in spite of strong domestic criticism, he also supported the policy of non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War. His later policy of neutrality during the Second World War, although doubtless justified in the circumstances, led to a negative attitude towards world affairs which became intensified on the signing of the Atlantic Pact in 1949. Mr. Sean Mac Bride, then Minister for External Affairs, declared on behalf of Mr. Costello's inter-party Government that the existence of Partition made it impossible for us to join in the Pact. This ingenious excuse for shirking our responsibilities as regards European defence has since remained the only constant element in our foreign policy. Even as recently as last September the Irish delegation to the Council of Europe, with the creditable exception of Mr. Declan Costello, T.D., voted against a recommendation calling for a united front of European Powers in any East-West negotiations.

### From China to Peru

**B**UT we have compensated for our refusal to face our European responsibilities by our excursions at U.N. into remoter regions. Relaxing in the *ambiance* of that first-class international club, our representatives have, indeed, "surveyed mankind from China to Peru" in a most altruistic fashion. While the representatives of other small European countries have wisely kept mute, Mr. Aiken, our Minister for External Affairs, has leapt into the fray on every possible, and indeed impossible, occasion. His vote at the General Assembly in favour of a discussion on the admission of Communist China, which he has recently repeated, and which was given with our Government's entire approval, must have annoyed the American State Department, and it provoked angry protests from several members of the Irish and American Catholic hierarchies. Mr. Aiken's answer was that it is the duty of the Assembly to discuss any problem which involves dangerous possibilities of conflict. The Irish delegation has also condemned French policy in Algeria and has joined with Malaya in demanding a discussion on the Chinese aggression in Tibet. The fact that China, which is not represented in the Assembly, disputes the sovereign status of Tibet made it difficult to raise the matter, and the much-watered-down item which the Assembly has agreed to discuss merely refers to the interference with "the human rights of the Tibetan

people" and contains no mention of the Peking Government. Mr. Kuznetsov, the Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, declared that the Irish intervention was only another American move in the cold war and that "their talk about human rights is nothing but the crocodile tears of the advocates of serfdom", while Mr. Krishna Menon, on behalf of India, said the discussion could serve no useful purpose. Neither of these critics seemed to realize that Mr. Aiken's starry-eyed indignation was in fact sincere. In another speech at the U.N. Assembly on September 23 Mr. Aiken urged that nuclear weapons should be restricted to the present nuclear Powers and that a standing United Nations force should be set up to ensure the security of the smaller states who had undertaken not to manufacture or acquire such weapons. His proposals, which included the now familiar suggestion concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, resembled those of the British Labour Party. Mr. Aiken did not advert to the question what weapons the U.N. force was to use against the nuclear Powers. *Time* (October 5) commented on Mr. Aiken's proposal that "as a practical proposition it had roughly the value of the perennial resolution, on leaving the dentist's chair, to brush one's teeth three times a day for ever after". Mr. Costello, the leader of the Opposition, has recently criticized the Government's foreign policy on the grounds that although we had for justifiable reasons adopted a policy of military neutrality that did not mean that we should be politically neutral. The fact that we were militarily neutral imposed, he said, a greater responsibility on us to support the Western democracies in the political field. As Mr. Costello is the originator of our present policy this somewhat confused, and confusing, statement is difficult to understand. Mr. James Dillon, T.D., made a more pertinent criticism when he said that the Government's foreign policy was alienating our traditional friends one after another. The truth is that Mr. Aiken's recent performances at U.N. are really a form of *folie de grandeur* arising from a complete failure to realize our political position. Our entire economic and political future is in fact dependent on the prosperity of Great Britain, our principal and virtually our only customer, and so also on that of the British Commonwealth to which we really belong, and our foreign policy should be based on this undeniable fact. That our Government knows this to be the case is proved by their recent declaration on their relations with London. When the British Select Committee on Estimates recently reported that they could see no practical reason why relations with the Irish Republic should not be handled by the Foreign Office instead of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Mr. Aiken promptly issued a statement that it was agreed by the Irish Government in 1949 that its relations with the British Government should continue to be conducted through the Commonwealth Relations Office and that so far as the Irish Government was concerned no need to propose any change in this arrangement had arisen. It is well that the light of reason should occasionally, if somewhat furtively, illuminate our path.

#### Lord Brookeborough's Comment

**L**ORD BROOKEBOROUGH's comments on Mr. Aiken's doings at U.N. were certainly to the point. Speaking at an election meeting in Derry on

October 5 he said he hoped that if representatives of the Republic could plead at the United Nations for the limitation of nuclear armament they would also take the necessary measures to disarm the private armies drilling within their own territory, and that if they could demand recognition of the religious and civil liberties of the people of Tibet he hoped they would recognize the Government of Northern Ireland and the right of its people also to preserve their civil and religious liberties as they understood them. Lord Brookeborough's criticism was justified by the fact that there has been a recrudescence of subversive attacks on the North. It is notorious that the I.R.A. are again drilling in the Republic for the purpose of attacking Northern Ireland, and several youths have been arrested and convicted for doing so. On August 26 two Northern police patrolling a mountain road in County Fermanagh near the Border were ambushed and wounded by armed assailants who escaped into the Republic. Referring to this event the Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Lemass, said it was the duty of the Irish Government to prevent the maintenance of illegal armed forces for any purpose and that duty they would discharge. They regarded these activities as not only a challenge to the fundamental principles of democracy and public order but also directly inimical to every national interest and particularly to the aim of reuniting our people. These are fine words and noble sentiments; but the weakness of Mr. Lemass's position is that his Government's objective, if not its methods, is identical with those of the gunmen he condemns—namely to compel the people of Northern Ireland to accept willy-nilly the rule of a Dublin parliament, quite ignoring the fact that unity is a spiritual condition which cannot be secured by compulsion. Speaking in the Dail on July 21 Mr. Lemass said our national position was that Ireland was historically and geographically one country with a *fundamental right* to have its essential unity expressed in its political institutions. His Government, he said, could not and would not step back from that position. Speaking at the Oxford Union on October 15 he said the goal of the Republic was the reunification of Ireland by agreement, but they could not expect speedy results. As his Government refuses to recognize the Northern Government one may well ask—agreement with whom? The demand for unity as a fundamental right is, however, the same fallacious claim as that made by the I.R.A. and its political wing, Sinn Fein.

The answer to the I.R.A. and to Mr. Lemass was given by Mr. Ernest Blythe in an address to the Irish Association at Belfast on September 29. Mr. Blythe, now the managing director of the Abbey Theatre, is the son of a county Antrim farmer and was a prominent member of Mr. Cosgrave's first Irish Government. He can therefore speak with special knowledge and assurance on the question of Partition. Those who engaged in illegal armed activities against Northern Ireland showed, he said, as little appreciation of present-day realities as if they were carrying on operations with bows and arrows and stone battle-axes. Almost equally unrealistic were those who imagined that by means of a smear campaign against the Northern Government they would ultimately get other countries to apply massive coercion to that Government and the 900,000 people who support it. It was time, he said, that we gave up entirely the witless notion that Irish unity could be brought about by coercion

of any kind and acknowledged that if partition is ever to be ended it can only be with the full and free consent of the parliament and electorate of Northern Ireland. He had no hesitation in declaring that if we could achieve a unity of goodwill, co-operation and trust, lack of constitutional unity would be little more than a source of some administrative inconvenience. The abandonment of the idea of coercing the North would involve full and cordial recognition of the Northern Government as a democratic Irish authority entitled within its jurisdiction to all the respect accorded, within its wider sphere, to the Government of the Republic. Such a policy of common sense, recognition and reconciliation, if once adopted, should be consistently followed. Those in the Republic against whom the Northern police had any charge, whether political or other, should be arrested and handed over for trial, and we should stop referring to the Northern Government and police as if in maintaining order they were engaged in some nefarious activity. Mr. Blythe is right. Only by such an honest renunciation of our present futile and impossible claims can we arrive at a real reconciliation with our Northern fellow countrymen. When it has recovered from its indignation at the wrongs of Tibet our Government might well consider the desirability of adopting this obvious and realistic approach to our only real and pressing external problem. So far as Lord Brookeborough is concerned he has made it clear that his Government would immediately respond to such a policy of sincere and friendly recognition, a policy which incidentally would rob the I.R.A. of its sole *raison d'être*. "I am all in favour of a neighbourly policy", he said recently, "but it must be on a neighbourly basis and not a take-over bid of one by the other." The overwhelming defeat of all the Sinn Fein candidates in Northern Ireland during the general election furnishes conclusive proof that the Ulster Nationalists, who either abstained or in some cases voted Unionist, have renounced the I.R.A. and "all its works and pomps".

### Economic Policy

MEANWHILE the more serious question of our economic future, which depends on our external trade, continues to cause uneasiness. The balance-of-payments position remains the principal economic barometer which must be closely watched by the Government and its advisers. The latest available figures show that for the nine months ended September 1959 the visible adverse trade balance amounted to £65 million, being an increase of £20 million as compared with the same period in 1958. The fall in exports is almost entirely due to the fall in cattle exports which in turn may have been due to the drought and consequent lack of grass in Great Britain. The present visible trade deficit will probably be met by the net earnings from invisible trade, but unless the improvement in September can be maintained for the rest of the year the final deficit may be about £20 million. If there is a decrease in imports and an increase in the export of cattle and manufactured goods a serious deficit may be avoided.

One of the main causes of our balance-of-payment difficulties is the unbalanced character of our trade and tourist traffic with the continent of Europe. For the twelve months ended May 1959 this continental trade showed

an import excess of £29 million as compared with an import excess of £14 million with the United Kingdom. Hitherto our adherence to the multi-lateral trading principles of O.E.E.C has prevented us from tackling this problem. It is primarily due to the severe restrictions on the importation of Irish agricultural produce imposed by the continental countries. With the creation of the Common Market the situation has now changed and we are free to defend ourselves. As our imports from the Common Market and the Free Trade Area (excluding Britain) amount to £26 million our bargaining position is strong and should be used. The steps recently taken by our Government to establish diplomatic relations with the Common Market administration, and the current Anglo-Irish trade negotiations, are obviously exploratory operations, and, as it is hardly likely that the existing continental restrictions will be removed, our obvious and, indeed, only realistic policy must be to develop closer economic relations with our major customer, Great Britain, while remaining neutral as between the two continental blocks. Our imports from Great Britain and Northern Ireland now amount to some £200 million per annum. Outside the Commonwealth countries Ireland is Britain's third largest customer, surpassed only by the United States and Germany. While the Common Market prevents the expansion of Irish trade on the Continent the Free Trade group threatens our position in the British market. Our future in this changing pattern of trade is the central problem confronting the Anglo-Irish negotiators. The main difficulty is that the market for food is limited and negotiation is not on the basis of free trade but for the marginal supplies required by Great Britain after its home producers have been protected. As Britain has progressively lowered her tariffs and raised her quotas the advantages we secured by the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement of 1938 have been automatically reduced, and our present free entry for industrial goods to Great Britain will become worthless when shared with the Free Trade Area. The problem is not of course solely economic. Our whole position has been adversely affected by our refusal to join N.A.T.O, Mr. Costello's crazy decision to leave the Commonwealth, and the failure to teach modern languages in our schools. It seems time that we realized that sentimental politics divorced from trade considerations are not only futile, but may well be disastrous, and that trade in turn depends on policy.

### Hopeful Trends

**W**HILE it is improbable that the Common Market, or the non-British members of the Outer Seven, will ever provide more than a small marginal market for our exportable agricultural surplus, the British market remains certain and profitable if we are prepared to meet its requirements. Even there, however, we must now fight for the share to which our trade with Britain entitles us. Our goods and produce must be competitive in price and efficiently produced. What Mr. Lemass described as a significant development in the extension of Irish manufacturing industry took place in September when the new oil refinery at Whitegate on Cork Harbour was officially opened. This undertaking, which is run by a consortium of the

principal oil companies, has cost about £12 million and is the most costly industrial development in the country. It will improve the balance of payments and increase the tax revenue, but owing to its semi-automatic processes it only employs about 300 people. At the other side of Cork Harbour in Carrigaline a pottery with a capital of only £75,000 employs 200! Total national exports for 1958-59 came to £129,350,000, a decrease of £400,000 as compared with the previous record year. But the tourist trade has risen from an estimated value of £27 million in 1954 to £34 million last year. Next to the cattle trade it is our most important industry, but much remains to be done as regards the enlargement and improvement of hotels and other amenities. The industrial production figures for the second quarter of this year show a rise of 5 per cent and employment in industry also rose. On the other hand there has been a serious decline of 15,000 in the total labour force, mainly attributable to a decrease of 4,000 in agriculture, 6,000 in construction and 1,000 in transport. The new Irish Congress of Trade Unions, which represents all Ireland, signalized the occasion of its first annual conference by calling for a forty-hour working week without reduction of pay. Its president, Mr. John Conroy, attacked the Northern Government for its ostrich-like refusal to recognize the new organization. The trade unions are currently engaged in preparing new claims for wage increases, although since 1957 the cost-of-living index has only risen by four points. In the present state of our economy it is difficult to see how such claims can be justified or met and they may well, if successful, have the effect of pricing us out of our export market. In the agricultural field, however, fruitful developments are taking shape. A new system of adult education for people living on the land is to start in November. It will provide a comprehensive course of instruction for people over 18 years of age engaged in farming. The syllabus includes such subjects as soil science, botany, animal physiology and health, horticulture, forestry, building construction, farm management, rural organization, agricultural co-operation, farm credit and methods of government. This is the first serious attempt to meet the special educational needs of the rural community, and it is to be hoped that the course will be later enlarged to include some cultural subjects. Farmers and labourers do not live by potatoes alone, and part of our rural problem is caused by the incredible intellectual hiatus in rural life. Mr. Patrick Smith, the Minister for Agriculture, has just stated that we shall have a total of more than 1,250,000 accredited cattle clear of bovine tuberculosis by the end of 1960, and that from these about 300,000 head will be available for export to Great Britain in 1961. Plans are also on foot to improve and increase the productivity of our grassland, to export broilers, to study dead meat production and to improve farm management. So far as cattle policy is concerned the long-term objective is to secure an increase in meat rather than milk. It seems that we are at last beginning to realize that agricultural production is the basis of our economy.

Ireland,

October 1959.

# PAKISTAN

## AN ENCOUNTER AT THE SUMMIT

**D**URING the last decade or so there have been several "summits" between Pakistan and India. Each of them was described as an outstanding, even an epoch-making, event. Each of them aroused high hopes of improved relations between the two neighbouring countries, only to be belied by subsequent developments. Therefore any hesitation to describe another Indo-Pakistani "summit" in similar terms is not only pardonable, but understandable. However, things change. We do not live in a static world and it would be ironical not to use the word "outstanding" in regard to the brief and informal meeting between President Ayub and Premier Nehru at New Delhi's Palam Airport on September 1. As the *New York Herald Tribune* said, it "may profoundly affect the future of the sub-continent".

The meeting draws its significance from a number of reasons. In the first instance Pakistan was represented by a person who could speak with an authority on behalf of his people unequalled by any Pakistani since the assassination of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951. In the past India had always complained that she did not know with whom to negotiate in Pakistan. In the second instance the Indo-Pakistani accord on the basic points of the canal waters issue had removed one of the main causes of tension between the two countries, and to that extent had provided an added impetus to get rid of the other irritations between them. And, last but not least, the meeting was held at a time when developments on India's north-east frontiers had high-lighted the common peril to the two countries.

Perhaps no single event since the Bandung conference in 1955 has had a more powerful impact on the minds of the Asian people than the recent Chinese incursions into Indian territory. The Bandung conference had induced a false sense of security in several Asian countries where it was a widely held belief that swearing fealty to Panchshila—the five principles of coexistence which Mr. Nehru worked out with Mr. Chou En-lai—provided adequate guarantees against aggression from any quarter and thereby completely obliterated the need for any defensive alliances. A few months back, when President Ayub made his joint defence offer to India, Mr. Nehru snapped back asking: "Joint defence against whom?" Today Mr. Nehru might not be so certain in this regard. Replying in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) to questions on the Chinese violation of Indian territory, Mr. Nehru said on August 28: "If India fails to do its duty, I suppose next will be Burma. After that it will be Indonesia. It may then be Laos. All these South-East Asian countries look to us for guidance and, if we fail to protect our borders, do you mean to say that smaller countries will derive encouragement?"

However correct this assessment of Mr. Nehru might be, it had a ring of unusualness in it. Hitherto he had doggedly maintained that the Baghdad

Pact (now C.E.N.T.O.) and S.E.A.T.O. were the main threats to peace in Asia. Now, even though reluctantly and hesitatingly, he was pointing to the real threat to Asian peace. Coming as it did only four days before his meeting with the Pakistani President, it only re-emphasized the latter's concern over the shape of things to come in Asia were they allowed to drift any further. And it is significant that after his meeting with Mr. Nehru, President Ayub told newsmen at Palam: "As a military man I can foresee one danger. If we go on squabbling and do not resolve our problems, we shall be defeated in detail as in the past. History tells us that the invasion of the sub-continent comes in this way."

So much for the meeting itself. Now what about the results? There was never any expectation that the brief meeting between the two leaders would, as if by some magic touch, immediately resolve all the issues which have for so long strained relations between the two countries. What was hoped was that it would provide a starting-point for developing a true neighbourly understanding and thus create a congenial atmosphere for resolving these issues. From all indications it is clear that these limited hopes have been more than fulfilled.

Leaving aside its generalities, the communiqué issued after the Palam meeting emphasized the need to conduct relations between the two countries "on a rational and planned basis and not according to the day-to-day exigencies as they arose". The two leaders also agreed that "outstanding issues and other problems should, in their common interest, be settled in accordance with justice and fair play and in a spirit of friendliness, cooperation and good neighbourliness." They also decided to keep in touch with each other to further their common objectives.

One immediate outcome of the Ayub-Nehru meeting was the conference of ministers and military commanders of the two countries to resolve what President Ayub called "pinpricks, firings and other things on the eastern borders". The manner and the speed with which the conference reached accord on many basic points of the border dispute further enhances the prospects of Indo-Pakistani understanding.

However satisfactory these developments might be, the fact remains that truly abiding relations between Pakistan and India can never be established unless the Kashmir issue is amicably resolved. There have been no perceptible signs as yet that India might be re-examining her stand on this most dangerous dispute with her neighbour. The signs are quite the contrary. She is continuing to take unilateral steps—and in defiance of U.N. resolutions—to tighten her grip over Kashmir. Only recently provision has been made to extend the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court into Kashmir, thereby completing the process of its integration with India.

So far as Pakistan is concerned, it is simpler to quote President Ayub's interview with the *New York Herald Tribune*. The President said:

We don't expect (Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal) Nehru to change his stand on Kashmir. I can foresee that this problem will go on for a long time unless America throws her weight into a settlement. The answer lies in American

hands. You might say to me that every time a problem comes up, America says "we are in the middle", but that is the case.

Unless Kashmir is settled, the possibility of war exists, will exist.

For us Kashmir is vital, we cannot exist without a suitable settlement. We will always consider ourselves menaced and in danger. That is why India is there to menace and peril us.

India gets nothing out of Kashmir; it spends far more than it hopes to get out of Kashmir.

### Relations with Cairo and Kabul

THE marked improvement in Pakistan-U.A.R. relations is evidenced in Karachi's invitation to President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R. to visit Pakistan. When the new régime took over in October 1958 this country's relations with the U.A.R. were at their lowest ebb, and even the most optimistic observer could not have foreseen such a swift and well-sustained improvement in them. But President Ayub's government lost no time in putting Karachi-Cairene relations on a friendly basis and sent his Minister of Education and Information, Mr. Habib-ur-Rahman, as an ambassador of goodwill to Cairo in November of last year. The cordial treatment which he received from President Nasser and his colleagues was a happy indication that Pakistan's goodwill was reciprocated by them. Since then friendship between the two countries has grown steadily. The propaganda campaign carried on by Cairo radio and the U.A.R. Press has ceased. Prospects of increased trade between the two countries have been enhanced as a result of the Pakistani Finance Minister's visit to Cairo in June last. Similarly, Pakistan's Ambassador to Cairo has held out hopes of an exchange of cultural delegations between the two countries, when he visited Karachi in August last. In Cairo itself there is a better understanding of Pakistan now. This is reflected in the statement of the U.A.R. Ambassador to Karachi in which he said: "The new régime in Pakistan has fulfilled many promises made to the people by the Quaid-i-Azam."

Apart from the fact that this spirit of friendship between Karachi and Cairo is in keeping with the strong religious and cultural links which bind Pakistan with the Muslim countries of the world, it is to be welcomed also because it has been revived at a time when recent happenings in Asia and Africa have heavily underlined the necessity of unity among the countries of these regions.

Apparently this need for unity among Afro-Asian countries is not being realized by Kabul, which has once again started a virulent campaign against Pakistan. In his Independence Day message the Afghan Premier, Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, said that Karachi-Kabul relations had worsened again. The reasons for this state of affairs may be known to the Afghan Premier himself, but they remain a mystery to the outside world.

It is difficult to recall any factor of recent origin which could be considered to have produced any new strain on relations between the two countries. The Afghan Premier asserted that Pakistan's participation in military pacts and its emphasis on building up its armed forces "is the cause of strained relations once again". But such an assertion is as hollow as it is

impudent. It is hollow in that Pakistan's participation in military pacts is nothing new, and however it might be interpreted no impartial observer has ever thought that they are directed against Afghanistan. It is impudent in that its aim is virtually nothing else than exercising a veto over Pakistan's foreign policy.

Incidentally, it will be pertinent to record here that the extensive road-building programme which Russia is carrying out in Afghanistan constitutes a serious potential threat to the security of this country. This was pointed out by President Ayub after his meeting with Mr. Nehru at the Palam Airport.

The real trouble between the two countries derives from Afghanistan's refusal to respect Pakistan's territorial integrity. She persists in giving all-out support to the Pukhtoonistan movement. But even though Pakistan has failed to wean Afghanistan from its egregious irredentism, she has continued to show a remarkable solicitude for her Muslim neighbour. One of the most important concessions is Afghanistan's trade in transit carried through this country. All this has been taken for granted by Afghanistan. She will really do some good to herself by realizing that there is something called the law of diminishing returns, and even the most forbearing can sometimes lose patience. The sooner this realization dawns upon the rulers of that country the better.

Coming to internal affairs Pakistan celebrates the first anniversary of the rationalization of the revolution on October 27 in the firm belief that those who are guiding the destiny of the country are handling its affairs with the highest sense of duty and responsibility. There has not been much on the internal plane during the period under review, except the implementation of the various reforms introduced in the country during the last year and the shifting of the capital to Rawalpindi, before it is finally shifted to Pothwar. All these have been discussed on appropriate occasions in the pages of this journal.

The most vital and major task now for the new régime is to provide a new constitution for the country. The expectation is that at the end of next year this objective will have been achieved. The country then can look forward to the restoration of full parliamentary life. But even before that democracy would have been given a firm foundation by the introduction of Union Panchayats. President Ayub was assessing their importance correctly when he said recently: "The more I revolve this new system of basic democracies in my mind, the more hopeful I become of the future of our country."

Pakistan,  
November 1959.

# CANADA

## OIL AND ITS RIVALS

CANADA is very richly endowed with a variety of resources, hydro-electric energy, oil, natural gas, coal and uranium, for the development of the power which is needed nowadays to provide her population with light and heat and sustain her systems of transportation and expanding industrial activities. Hitherto these resources have been developed for such purposes in spasmodic fashion mainly by private entrepreneurs, but it has become gradually apparent that consideration ought to be given to the evolution of some broad national policy that will ensure adequate conservation of them and their most efficient use for the benefit of the Canadian people. Accordingly soon after it came to power the Diefenbaker Ministry appointed a Royal Commission headed by Mr. Henry Borden, Q.C., of Toronto, President of the Brazilian Light, Heat and Power Company, and gave it wide authority to investigate Canada's resources in energy and make recommendations about the policies most appropriate for their profitable utilization in the national interest. Last spring the Borden Commission produced its first report, which dealt with the gas industry and made a series of recommendations about the policies it deemed desirable for its regulation. Upon the most important of these recommendations the Government has already acted by the creation of a National Energy Board. The Borden Commission has recently submitted to the Government a second report, which deals exclusively with the oil industry, and its conclusions and recommendations are providing abundant material for controversy. This report points out that, as the result of the rapid succession of discoveries of oil pools since the famous strike at Leduc in Central Alberta in 1947, the production of Canadian oil has climbed steadily from 7 to 181 million barrels per annum and that this huge enlargement of output has altered Canada's position to such a degree that, while she still remains a substantial importer of oil, in 1957 47 per cent of her domestic consumption was supplied from production within her own territory and 47 million barrels were exported. And, with less than half of the area that geologists believe to have potentialities for the production of oil subjected even to preliminary exploration, her proved reserves of oil are now estimated at 3 billion\* barrels and, although this figure represents only about 2 per cent of the aggregate of the world's reserves, the conclusion of the Commission was that Canada's reserves of oil, proved and potential, were adequate to meet all domestic requirements and supply a substantial annual outflow of exports.

But since the oil industry needs a heavy investment of "risk" capital, the figure for 1959 being estimated at a billion\* dollars, the attraction of capital depends upon an extensive program of exploration and development, which

\* In the North American sense of 1,000 millions.

must in turn be justified by a rising trend of production and adequate markets for the output. Today, however, the operation of these stimulants has been temporarily suspended, because Canadian oil, whose cost of production is high, cannot meet the competition of cheaper imported oil in extensive sections of the country and, for lack of adequate markets, a strict limitation upon the daily output of producing wells has been imposed for some years by the government of Alberta.

Faced with this situation the Commission made an exhaustive examination of possible new markets, internal and external, and in its report expressed the view that, since the costs of exploration, development and production in Canada, while they were roughly on a parity with the American scales, were much higher than those of the major exporting areas such as the Middle East and Venezuela, the only possible outlet for exports of Canadian oil was in the United States. Their researches into the domestic demand for oil evoked from the major oil companies an estimate that the market of the three prairie Provinces could absorb 150,000 barrels of oil a day and that, while a recent cut in ocean freight rates had worsened the competitive position of Canadian oil on the Pacific Coast, they could reasonably hope to hold a market of 65,000 barrels a day in Vancouver and the territory adjacent to it. There was also presented to the Commission encouraging evidence about the prospects for an expanded market for Canadian crude oil in Ontario, which with a population now in excess of 6 millions contains more than one-third of the total population of Canada; and it was estimated that the daily consumption of oil in this province, now 150,000 barrels, would be doubled in 1962.

The Commission pronounced itself in favour of a search for additional markets for Canada in areas where it has today only a very limited outlet, and found that the most promising of these were in the north-western and western sections of the United States, and in Montreal and the surrounding territory. But its report admitted that the enlargement of exports of Canadian crude oil to the United States would encounter difficulties. It noted that the recent discovery and development of rich new oilfields in the Middle East and Venezuela had lowered the prices of imported oil so much that the domestic producers in the United States had induced the Eisenhower administration to impose controls by quota upon imports of foreign oil; but it also admitted that, as the result of protests by the Canadian Government against these controls, Canadian oil had been exempted from their operation. However, the Commission did not regard arbitrary restriction as the chief barrier against exports of Canadian oil to the United States, but saw a greater obstacle in the low scale of the freight rates of oil tankers, which gave a marked competitive advantage to foreign crude oil and made it profitable for the major American oil refineries on the Pacific Coast to draw their supplies of it from oilfields in Venezuela and the Middle East, in which they had an interest.

### Markets for Expansion

SO the dimmed outlook for any great enlargement of Canada's exports of oil to the United States has left as the best prospect of expanded outlet

for western oil the large market now supplied by the refineries of Montreal, which secure most of their crude supplies from countries oversea, chiefly Venezuela. A substantial quantity of these imports reaches Montreal via a pipe-line from Portland in Maine which has involved a heavy investment of capital. Competitive access to this rich market in Montreal has become the paramount aim of the oil producers of Western Canada, and certain oil companies made very strong representations to the Commission about the urgent need for financial assistance by the Federal Government for the construction of a pipe-line, which would bring western oil to the Montreal market. But the Commission, after a careful study of this proposal and all its implications, reached the conclusion that the building of such a pipe-line would be an unprofitable enterprise as long as the oil refineries of Montreal were free to import oil, and even went so far as to say that in the absence of restrictions upon imports "the Montreal refiners or any one of them are in a position to block any plans for the use of Canadian crude oil in the Montreal refining area and no pipe-line facilities for such a purpose could be built without their approval and cooperation". This pronouncement obviously implied that some form of control over imports would be essential to make the projected pipe-line profitable. But the imposition of tariff duties or restrictions by a quota system would inevitably mean higher prices for oil in the Montreal area and a rise in costs of living and production; and there was naturally very strong opposition in Montreal to any Federal subsidy for the construction of the pipe-line. So the Commission in its report recommended that for the time being the Federal Government should refrain from giving any financial support to the pipe-line.

But the Commission did not advocate a permanent veto upon the project. Estimating that the Canadian production of crude oil will rise to 500,000 million barrels in 1960, the Commission calculated that an increment of 200,000 barrels daily would be required to ensure a healthy expansion of the oil industry. So it suggested in its report that the major producers of oil in Canada, most of whom are under American control, should take measures to raise in the year the production of Canadian oil to 700,000 barrels a day. The idea of the Commission is that the leaders of the oil industry in Canada should be given a chance to make arrangements with their American associates for a larger southward outflow of Canadian oil, and it made a further proposal that shipments of refined petroleum products from the Montreal area to the market in Ontario should be reduced by 50,000 barrels a day in order to make room for marketing there an equivalent volume of products of Canadian origin. Having offered these suggestions for stimulating the expansion of Canada's oil industry, the Commission indicated that, if the oil companies failed to show a co-operative spirit for carrying them into effect, a nationwide licensing system involving restrictions upon imports of oil would become inevitable as a corollary to the construction of a pipe-line from the west; and it advised the Government to instruct the National Energy Board "to keep the situation under review as well as the question of supplying crude oil to the refinery area of Montreal in the light of the circumstances as they may from time to time develop".

The report of the Borden Commission has had a mixed reception. The international oil companies are pleased about the postponement of Federal financial aid for the pipe-line and the decision to leave the problem of finding additional markets for Canada in the hands of private enterprise, but they are very dubious about the possibility of expanding the daily output of Canadian oil to 700,000 barrels within two years. The independent smaller producers are very disappointed that their plea for the immediate construction of the pipe-line has not found favor with the Commission and they are deriving comfort from the hope raised that the project may be revived with better prospects of success in the near future. They will continue to apply pressure at Ottawa for the pipe-line, and will intensify it if the increase of domestic oil production falls short of the target of 700,000 barrels a day set by the Commission.

### Other Sources of Power

THE Borden Commission gave only cursory attention to the other sources of energy—coal, water power and uranium—and it has issued no reports about them. It has been in the past a handicap to Canada's economy that her coal mines are located either on her Atlantic seaboard or in her two far western Provinces, Alberta and British Columbia, and that no coal of any value has so far been discovered in Central Canada, which is the most heavily industrialized section of the country. But in recent years Canada's coal-mining industry has been suffering from the dieselization of her railway systems and the increasing use of oil, gas and hydro-electric energy as fuels in homes and industries. There has been a progressive decline in the annual output of coal, which fell in 1958 to 11,687,110 tons, a figure about 22 per cent lower than the output in 1954, 14,913,979 tons, and the impact of this decline has been most serious in Nova Scotia, where coal-mining, a contributor of more than one-third of the country's total production of coal, has been one of the most important industries in the Province. The small population of the Atlantic Provinces places limitations upon the local market, and the high cost of transporting Nova Scotian coal to Central Canada makes it difficult to compete in that territory with cheaper coal from Kentucky and other American States. Indeed, it has only been able to keep a market in the central Provinces through the help of generous subsidies on its freight rates. Now, however, the decision of important consumers of Nova Scotian coal in Quebec to switch to oil for their fuel has forced the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation, which owns most of the coal mines in Nova Scotia, to announce its intention of closing down three large mines and, as a consequence, hundreds of miners will be thrown out of work on Cape Breton Island, where very little alternative employment is available. So Premier Stanfield of Nova Scotia has recently led a delegation to Ottawa to request an increase in the existing freight subsidies in order to improve the competitive position of his Province's coal in the central Provinces. The Federal Cabinet has promised sympathetic consideration to this demand and has appointed Mr. Justice Rand, who lately retired from the Supreme Court of Canada, as a special Royal Commissioner, charged with the task of investigat-

ing the plight of Canada's coal industry and making recommendations for the betterment of its fortunes.

Canada with her plethora of swift-flowing rivers has enormous potentialities for the generation of water power and, since this century began, its development for a variety of purposes has been very impressive. In 1900 the installations of hydro-electric energy only produced 173,323 h.p. and by 1920 the figure had been enlarged to 2,513,559 h.p.; by 1950 it had climbed to 13,324,504 h.p. and in the present decade there has been so rapid an expansion that the figure for 1958 was estimated at 22,380,000 h.p.

Today a number of ambitious projects for the enlargement of Canada's supplies of hydro-electric energy either are under construction or have their plans for fruition well advanced. Work has been started on the construction of a great dam on the South Saskatchewan River, which was for years the subject of political controversy. It is the keystone of a scheme for conserving the resources of that river for the purposes of irrigation, the production of power and urban supplies of water and recreation. The estimate for its total cost is 186 million dollars, of which 95 million dollars is allocated to the construction of a huge dam between the towns of Outlook and Elbow. Its length will be 16,700 feet, while its total height will be 210 feet and its width at the base 3,800 feet. It will create a lake 140 miles long with an area of 109,600 acres and a shoreline of 471 miles. The work of construction is expected to occupy between six and eight years and an output of 200,000 h.p. is forecast.

In north-eastern Quebec the State-owned Hydro-Electric Commission has recently developed on the Bersimis River 1,200,000 h.p., which is fed into the area of Montreal by high-tension power lines; it plans to raise the output from this river to 2,000,000 h.p. by the end of 1960. It has also plans well in train for harnessing the abundant power resources of the adjacent Manicouagan River and its plan contemplates the expenditure of 700 million dollars spread over twelve years and the construction of three separate dams and three generating stations. When these developments are all completed, the industrial centers of Quebec will be assured of a supply of 8 million h.p. from this territory, which lies about 250 miles north-east of Quebec City. But even greater quantities of power are estimated to be available at Hamilton Inlet in Labrador, and considerable preliminary exploration of their possibilities has been undertaken. Then in western Quebec the provincial Hydro-Electric Commission proposes to tackle at no distant date the development of the water power at the Carillon Rapids on the River Ottawa. In Ontario the completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway and its ancillary developments of power has placed at the disposal of the Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario a large volume of additional power and come just in time to avert a power famine in this Province.

In British Columbia two important projects for the utilization of dormant water power are in the planning stage. The larger of them involves the co-operation of the Canadian and United States Governments in the development of extensive water power in the upper reaches of the Columbia River, which rises in British Columbia and flows southward across the international

boundary to reach the Pacific Ocean near Portland, Oregon. The dams and other works will be in Canadian territory and, since they will be very expensive, the Government of the United States is willing to contribute a large part of the cost in return for an equitable share of the power that will be developed. The International Joint Commission, which has jurisdiction over boundary waters, has for some years past been engaged in the evolution of a plan, which would be acceptable to both Governments. Its Canadian and American members have now reached an agreement on the principles that should govern the sharing of the benefits to be derived from the co-operative development of the river's water power and are ready to submit their report to both Governments. The same Commission has also completed a report upon the possibilities of power developments on the St. Croix River, which forms part of the boundary between New Brunswick and Maine. Furthermore it has had its experts studying an ancient project, in which President Franklin Roosevelt was keenly interested, the development of power from the strong tides in Passamaquoddy Bay on the coast of New Brunswick. Their report finds that if Canada alone undertook this enterprise it would be uneconomical, but it would be economical if the United States, which can borrow money at a cheaper rate than Canada, would co-operate in it. At the other end of the country the provincial Government of British Columbia has concluded an agreement, severely criticized in certain quarters, with Mr. Wenner-Gren, a wealthy Swedish capitalist, under which the latter and his associates, in return for general concessions of land, mineral and timber rights in the northern part of the Province, have undertaken to provide it with facilities for transportation and hydro-electric energy to be developed on the Peace River.

Uranium, which is the basis of atomic power, is now assuming great importance as a source of energy, and its production in Canada has become so large that only a small part of it can be absorbed in the domestic market. But plans are afoot to make much greater use of it. The well-known plant at Chalk River, west of Ottawa, which is operated by the Atomic Energy Control Board, has through its five reactors done valuable pioneer work in the development of nuclear power and is now operating at its maximum capacity. So the Board has announced that it will build in Manitoba another plant as a center of research and development for nuclear energy, which will match the plant at Chalk River and employ about 2,600 workers. Then there is under construction at Rolpton in the Ottawa Valley an experimental power station called N.P.D. (Nuclear Power Demonstration), which is being built by a co-operative partnership of the Canadian Government, the Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario and the General Electric Company of Canada. It is expected to come into production in 1961 with an output of 20,000 kilowatts of electricity. Plans are also well under way and a site has been acquired nine miles north of the town of Kincardine on the shore of Lake Huron for a much larger atomic power project, whose output will be 200,000 kilowatts, known as CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium).

Canada,

November 1959.

# SOUTH AFRICA

## THE FLUX OF PARTIES

THE South African political situation has never been so fluid since the end of the war as it is now.

Although in the provincial elections on October 14 the Nationalists won by very nearly the expected majority of seats, they failed for the first time to do as well as they expected. Whilst both major parties still share the voters of the country equally, the Opposition has, if anything, a few thousand more voters to its credit. In seats, the results still show a statistical advance for the Nationalists on the previous provincial elections of 1954, when the seats were differently delimited. However, they show none on the general election of last year, where in the two most important provinces the seats were identical.

Probably the most noteworthy single election result from the Opposition's point of view is the capture by the United Party of the constituency of Boksburg by 49 votes. This represents a reversal, in exactly the same constituency, of the general election result of 1958. What is remarkable about this is that it is the first time since 1949 that the United Party has been able to reverse a general election triumph by the Nationalist Party. The impression from a study of the figures is that in this particular constituency numbers of Nationalists must have voted for the United Party.

Another noteworthy development in the provincial election was the apparent big abstention by the Nationalist voters in the East Rand seats—in Geduld, Brakpan, Benoni, Edenvale, Germiston, all industrial areas, the Nationalist totals fell by 1,000 and more voters in each constituency. This is remarkable in a South African election, where any apathy is generally shown more markedly on the United Party side. The significance of these Rand constituencies is that they lie more or less at the heart of the Union's political system. They are areas on which Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister, has for some time concentrated his personal attention and from which much of his principal support is believed to have come.

These East Rand electors were probably protesting against the economic stringency which is beginning to be felt in South Africa. Theirs are the areas most closely affected by the growth of the cheap labour industries which are now in production on the borders of the Bantu reserves in Natal. The Natal factories are producing goods which can undersell those of any Rand factory because the black labour they employ is paid considerably less than the workers on the Rand for the same work. These industries have been developed as a direct result of *apartheid* policy.

Nationalist majorities also dropped in a score of constituencies about the country by fairly moderate margins. This drop may or may not be greatly significant. Nevertheless, it was expected that Nationalist majorities would go up throughout the country, because of the 133,000 voters who were added

to the roll after the lowering of the franchise age from 21 to 18 at the last session of Parliament. The Nationalists believed, on fairly good grounds, that they would get at least three-fifths of what came to be called the "teenage" vote. As far as can be ascertained, the teenage vote was only effective in winning one seat for the Nationalists: that was the Pretoria-Sunnyside seat, held in the last parliamentary election in 1958 by the United Party by 600 votes. In this constituency 2,300 student votes were put on the rolls and the Nationalists took the seat with a 1,000 majority. The validity of 1,200 of these new enrolments is now being challenged in the courts. In all, political organizers calculate that 65,000 of the teenagers voted and their vote seemed fairly evenly divided between the Opposition parties and the Nationalists.

The Queenstown result is also regarded as significant in that it is thought to show that the Nationalist attraction of voters may have reached its exhaustion point. Queenstown was won by the United Party in the general election of 1958 by 13 votes. After the most intensive struggle in the entire elections, into which both the leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister hurled their energies, it was won by the United Party with a narrow margin of 19 votes in a 96.3 per cent poll. Queenstown is also the last Platteland (rural) seat proper held by the Opposition in the Cape. Its retention is, therefore, of double significance for the parties.

Dr. Verwoerd cannot take very much comfort from these elections. They are the first he has fought since obtaining the Premiership in September last year. He demanded from his followers a demonstration of enthusiasm. He himself played a very large part in the entire election. His "new vision" of the Bantustan policy was placed in the very centre of the election. The main controversies and the hottest debates on the hustings surrounded a map said to represent the territories which Dr. Verwoerd intended to become independent Bantu homelands. There were emphatic denials of this and even denials by some Ministers that independence was ever contemplated for the Bantustans. Whatever the elections show, they do not show any upsurge of fresh enthusiasm for Dr. Verwoerd's policies. Indeed, with over 167,000 more votes on the rolls, the Nationalists' totals fell by an estimated 80,000 votes, as compared with the general elections.

This feature of the election may give fresh heart to Dr. Verwoerd's rivals within the party. The United Party, though it has some solid grounds for satisfaction in this election, cannot accept the main results as anything more than a reaction to Dr. Verwoerd and the economic difficulties in which the Union is beginning to find itself.

The most massively unfavourable election result for the Nationalists was the heavy drop in Nationalist totals on the Rand. This, however, did not show any great conversion of voters to the United Party, which also received about 80,000 votes less than in 1958. The Nationalist voters simply stayed away from the poll; traditionally, abstention is the first step to conversion. The United Party has to face the fact that as yet its policies do not convert the voters, in spite of their growing dissatisfaction with the policies of Dr. Verwoerd. There were, nevertheless, certain areas, such as Queenstown, Benoni and Boksburg, where the United Party totals rose appreciably.

The results in Northern Natal were not encouraging to the United Party. Here the Nationalists pushed up their majorities in all four seats which they held, and indeed increased their vote wherever they contested a seat in that very English province.

It was also only in Natal that the United Party had to face any direct electoral consequence of the defection of a group of United Party members, referred to as "Progressives". This took place in August, just before the election campaign began. In Natal three of the Progressives fought seats as independents, without any overt backing from the major leaders of the Progressive movement. These abstained from taking a public part against the United Party in the elections and, indeed, quietly helped the United Party organizations wherever they could, especially in the Cape. The three independent Progressives in Natal, with an organization only six weeks old, achieved 6,000 votes in three constituencies against the United Party's 8,000. Whether this solid vote was won simply because of the personal standing of the candidates, who were all men of some consequence in the community, or showed a solid support for the Progressives is not clear.

### The Land Resolution

THE Progressive breakaway was ostensibly caused at the Bloemfontein Congress of the United Party, by what is known as the "land resolution". This land resolution stated that

1. It (the United Party) is mindful of and maintains the pledge given by General Hertzog in 1936 to provide for the Bantu of the Union 7,250,000 morgen of land under conditions which will maintain the land as an integral part of the Union;
2. Expresses its entire opposition to the acquisition and alienation of more land for the Government's avowed purpose of giving it to Bantu tribes which, under the Bantustan policy of the Government, are to form Bantu States whether such land is today Crown land or in private ownership;
3. Calls on the Prime Minister forthwith to define the boundaries of the proposed new independent Bantu States for the information of South Africa.

The United Party contends that the Bantustan policy, or the making of the native reserves into independent homelands for the Bantu, represents an attempt to break up the Union. The Progressive group stated that this land resolution was a "breach of faith" with the African population, and that whatever ephemeral plans Dr. Verwoerd may have for creating Bantu independent States outside white South Africa, there is no excuse for withholding badly needed land from the African Reserves.

As was remarked by a leading Progressive supporter after the event, the land resolution was, in fact, "the immediate occasion but not the cause" of the break. The cause of the break is a long-standing disagreement within the party about the ultimate political and social implications of acceptance of the fact of economic integration. Members of the group had pressed *inter alia* for the right of non-Whites to sit in Parliament; for an increase to 20 in the

number of representatives of the African peoples (which the United Party at this Congress voted to raise from three to eight); and for the right to plead from public platforms of the United Party for registration on a common roll of Whites and Africans, as well as Whites and Coloured people (which latter is already United Party policy). The United Party leadership feels that any fast move in the direction of integrating the non-European peoples in the Union's political system will so alarm the White electorate as to destroy the solid opposition against Nationalist policies. The Progressives believe that there is very little time left to begin re-educating the White electorate to adapt itself to changing conditions in South Africa and the growing dominance of the black man throughout the rest of the continent.

Altogether twelve members of Parliament have broken away from the United Party. They are headed by Dr. Jan Steytler, United Party leader in the Cape, and another prominent sympathizer is Mr. Harry Lawrence, probably the ablest parliamentarian in the Union House of Assembly. Although Dr. Jan Steytler is a comparative new-comer to politics, in the House since 1953, Mr. Harry Lawrence has been in Parliament for thirty years. Mr. Lawrence was a member of the Hertzog Cabinet and the Smuts Cabinet.

The Progressives, though they refrained from any direct action against the United Party during the elections, did hold many private meetings to sound out the depth of their support. That support has not yet become a popular one, although it has increasing intellectual and professional backing. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, one-time member of Parliament for Kimberley, and now head of the Anglo-American Corporation, is one of the Progressives' most influential sympathizers. This group requires time to put its multiracial policies more coherently before the country. Final policies will emerge from a congress which will be held in Johannesburg early in November. Their programme seems likely to contain suggestion of a move towards a rigid federal type of constitution in contrast with the present completely flexible unitary system.

#### Nationalist Dissensions

ALTHOUGH the Nationalists appear to be far more at one than the Opposition, there is in their ranks a great deal of concealed dissension. The split over the Premiership in the party caucus, where Dr. Verwoerd was voted leader and Prime Minister by 98 votes to 75, has not yet fully healed. Indeed, it shows signs of remaining as troublesome as ever. The first visible sign of the uneasiness in the Nationalist Party was the refusal of the Nationalist member for Namib in South-West Africa, Mr. Japie Basson, to vote for Dr. Verwoerd's legislation to abolish the three Natives' Representatives from the House of Assembly and the four Natives' Senators from the Senate. Mr. Basson said in his speech that Dr. Verwoerd had not put the matter before the Nationalist caucus for debate, in spite of a two-month-old motion by Mr. Basson requesting that there should be a discussion.

Although the Nationalist caucus expelled Mr. Basson for his action, the South-West African head committee of the Nationalist Party refused to throw Mr. Basson out of the party. Dr. Verwoerd was specially represented in the

South-West African Nationalist body by his Chief Whip. The S.W.A. Nationalists contented themselves with suggesting to Mr. Basson that he should try to make up his difference with Dr. Verwoerd and report back to the Nationalist Congress which is being held at the time of writing. Mr. Basson made it quite clear that there was no likelihood of his doing this.

Mr. Basson is a significant figure in the Nationalist Party not so much for his popular following as for his association with the Sabra\* group. The Sabra group can be called the "back-room boys" of *apartheid*. They believe that *apartheid* can only be made to work by full consultation with the African people and the conversion by persuasion of the African people to the ideas and ideals behind this policy. Certain members of the Sabra group have pursued their policy of consultation with Africans contrary to the desires of Dr. Verwoerd. Feelings became so strained between Dr. Verwoerd and this group that the Prime Minister resigned from Sabra. Members of this group openly criticized the Government for going nowhere slowly with its present application of the *apartheid* policy. They also suggest that the Nationalist Party should pay greater attention to what is going on in Africa and make some accommodation with points of view in the North.

Relations between the Prime Minister and the "Sabra intellectuals" were not improved when many of their members criticized the manner of setting up the separate non-White university institutions and the disregard of existing and future university autonomy in so doing. A significant point of difference was that the Sabra men wished the non-White students to go voluntarily to the new university colleges because they were persuaded that they were the better institutions for them to attend. Thus they were against the compulsory closing of the "open" White Universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand to non-White students. Some other evidence of "intellectual" revolt against the brusquer methods of Dr. Verwoerd's policies in the field of race relations was also shown by other Afrikaans University men. This "revolt" was driven underground shortly before the provincial elections, but it is unlikely to remain permanently subterranean.

The lapse of time since Dr. Verwoerd's first full session of Parliament as Prime Minister has only partially dimmed its unpleasant memories and has not undone its effects. His determination to rush the *apartheid* fences regardless and make the parliamentary machine work at his speed rather than the traditional one has alarmed circles wider than the Opposition in the country. Even his own followers have criticized his amazing ability to exhaust opposition by the sheer length of his speeches and the complexity of his arguments. During the coming months it will be interesting to see how he applies the lesson that the elections have taught him—i.e. that a combination of economic uneasiness and popular criticism of himself can make voters unwilling to turn out for the Nationalist Party. He is the first Nationalist post-war Prime Minister to face such a problem.

South Africa,  
November 1959.

\* South African Bureau of Racial Affairs.

# AUSTRALIA

## TRENDS IN PRIMARY PRODUCTION

THE economic depression of the 1930's caused many changes in economic thinking in Australia; it also started a new era in rural development.

The opening of the country had really begun about 1820, with the demonstration that fine wool could be grown effectively in this distant land. Other farm industries developed on an export basis later. Wheat land was cleared in the 1880's in many districts. Where the rainfall was higher forests were knocked down to make way for dairy farms after 1890. Irrigation began on the plains of the Murray and its tributaries about the same time. Refrigeration made practicable the export of meat—beef from the north, mutton and lamb from the south-east.

Most of this expansion, and its necessary services, were financed by loans and the capitalized human sweat of the pioneers who hacked the farms out of the bush in the hope of establishing themselves as independent land-owners. Many failed in the attempt and those who succeeded only did so because occasionally some international crisis upset normal supplies and raised the prices which buyers were forced to offer. A worse but unrecognized feature of this development was the deterioration of the soils in many districts owing to the exploitative systems of farming which were adopted to meet the financial pressure on the settlers.

The basic idea behind this development, which was paralleled in many other countries, was that markets would expand to absorb the larger volumes of produce; but there was no serious attempt to equate the two. Apart from wool and wheat most of the export went to Britain, where it forced prices down to levels which meant disaster to the local farmers; but the system suited the basic British policy of cheap food, low wages and the export of manufactured goods.

World War I disrupted world supplies, raised prices and generated optimism; so an expansion of farming was planned in every State, some of it having the secondary objective of settling returned servicemen on the land. The British Government set up an Empire Marketing Board to investigate and stimulate the marketing of products; it also allocated £34,000,000 for development loans to Empire countries to aid in the redistribution of population. In Australia the Commonwealth set up a Development and Migration Commission to examine schemes put forward by the States. It rejected nearly all of them because the settlers seemed unlikely to be able to establish themselves economically. This idea of analysing land settlement projects, and their partial removal from the controls of politicians and the lands departments of the States was an important point in the history of land settlement in Australia.

The interwar period saw the development of a higher Home Consumption Price principle for farm products. The tariff had become an accepted part of

the Australian economic structure in fostering manufactures and in raising revenue, but inevitably it raised farmers' costs. Where international competition was keen farming industries needed assistance. They also could have protection from the tariff as far as the home market was concerned, but a scheme was required to equalize this benefit among all exporters irrespective of the proportion of their product exported. The individual States and the Commonwealth (which has power to regulate oversea and interstate trade) tried to attain this by legislation. Years of litigation followed but in the end expedients were worked out, for the main export industries separately, and by voluntary action within each of them. A framework of Commonwealth and State marketing legislation was constructed which does not attempt to operate on inter-state transactions. The principle was of great assistance to the dairy industry when its exports were only a half of local consumption, but when they were double local consumption the effect was of less value. In commodities such as wool where local consumption is only about 10 per cent of the clip it has no value; and in wheat and dried fruit where the average percentage is about 25 its merit is limited.

The sugar industry, which benefits both by an internal marketing arrangement and also by participating in the British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, is possibly the best-organized rural industry. Here the acres to be cropped by each farmer are closely defined and a limitation is also placed on the amount which a sugar mill may produce.

This period also saw the first serious stimulation of scientific research for the solution of some of the innumerable problems which occur in developing farm industries in a new environment. In 1926 the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was founded, and in the following twelve years it developed research groups attacking problems of soils, pasture plants, timber, insect and fungoid pests, fisheries, minerals, ceramic materials, and diseases of animals and plants.

### The Depressed Thirties

THE rural depression of the 1930's was partly caused by the over-expansion of farm production in many countries, coupled with a general decline in European birth-rates. In Australia it was disastrous to farmers and many adjustments had to be made. State governments lost many millions over their land settlement schemes. The Commonwealth provided £14,000,000 to assist in the liquidation of farmers' debts, and private business wrote off very large sums. The depression also ended the era of the gold standard; and the Australian pound was devalued. The full development of the Commonwealth Bank on a central bank basis began. Credit policy could in future be adjusted to mitigate recessions, which in the past had usually been caused by low export prices or droughts.

Contrary to common belief the great majority of Australian soils are not particularly fertile. In most districts phosphorus must be added if crops and pastures are to luxuriate. Wheat growers discovered this fact in the 1890's and during the 1920's the same fact was shown for many pastures in moister districts. The Commonwealth then subsidized the use of phosphate on

pastures and many farmers, especially Victorian dairymen, made great changes in the production of their farms; some of the large sheep and cattle farmers also adopted pasture improvement.

The Second World War, which began as farmers were recovering from the depression, brought great changes. Marginal wheat lands were turned over to grazing, all the industries lost part of their labour force and mechanization was accepted in the dairy sheds. Some products, such as wool and wheat for which there were no ships, were stored; others such as apples were not harvested. Wheat silos, cool stores and canning factories were expanded. Superphosphate was rationed, wheat acreage restricted. District Agricultural committees were organized to arrange the distribution of the dwindling supplies of scarce materials. Wool was paid for on an appraisalment basis and stored; as its production required little labour the number of sheep increased to 125,000,000 with no corresponding storage of reserve fodder.

A disastrous drought in 1944/45 reduced sheep numbers by 30 millions, all stocks of wheat were consumed and by 1946 many shortages had developed. Consequently the end of the war found Australia in no position to contribute food towards feeding Europe. In addition so much material had been put into the war effort that all farms and their equipment were dilapidated. All industries were short of materials, labour was scarce, and housing was quite inadequate. But as rural priorities were low the countryside made slow progress.

During the war the Commonwealth appointed a Rural Reconstruction Commission to investigate "the reorganization and rehabilitation of the Australian rural economy during the post-war period". It produced ten reports, in which it dissected the agricultural structure and analysed the prospective needs of the local market and the problem of world supplies. The Commission made the following comment.

Failing a satisfactory prospect for more extensive international interchange of goods both primary and secondary, there is no reason for encouraging an expansion of any of the main lines of production in Australian agriculture after the war except in a few items. . . . It may nevertheless happen that governments will expect to increase the farming population by migration or by settlement of soldiers and will look to the absorption of such migrants in farming. Such expectations are unfounded.

This statement was in violent contrast to the commonly held belief in Australia's unlimited potentialities for agricultural expansion.

A scheme for the settlement of returned servicemen on farms was inevitable. The Commission was requested to indicate the lines it should follow. It advised that only selected men should be accepted, that they should not be expected to clear the land, but should be put on farms ready for commercial production, that interest on the capitalized cost should be at 2 per cent for ten years and thereafter at normal rates, and that, if circumstances made it necessary, the capital indebtedness should be reappraised. The idea was that it would be better to face monetary losses at the outset, give the men a good chance and have satisfied settlers rather than discontented

disruptionists. The technical operation of the scheme mostly devolved upon the States; some have followed the principles more closely than others, but the general trend of agricultural affairs was favourable to the men until about 1955.

During the immediate post-war years both labour and supplies were short, but as large tractors became available the ten-horse teams disappeared from the wheat farms; later the smaller types replaced horses on other farms. Without adequate superphosphate and with rickety fences and a gigantic rabbit plague, production made little progress, especially as the losses of livestock due to the 1944/45 drought had to be made good.

### Politicians and the Land

IN 1950 the slow rate of farm recovery became a political matter and much nonsense was spoken and written about it. A conference of State and Commonwealth Ministers was called. The experts who attended then emphasized the need of the countryside for more materials. A series of production targets was set up. More necessities were subsequently made available and farmers were able to get on with their work. Most of the targets were reached in three years instead of the five allowed in the scheme.

Apart from the scheme for servicemen, private individuals and some large organizations began land development, especially in areas with high rainfall and poor soils which had previously failed as farming districts because of their hitherto unrecognized deficiencies in trace elements. These ventures are encouraged by the income tax acts which permit the deduction of capital costs of land development from taxable income. Much of this development would have been unremunerative without this concession because the total capital cost of developing much of this land is too high for the returns to cover expenses and interest charges at 5 per cent.

The year 1951 saw a sensational rise in the price of wool, caused by the Korean war and by the American panic determination to stockpile regardless of cost at a time when supply scarcely equalled demand. In March the prices realized for greasy wool were eight times the price four years earlier and costs had perhaps doubled. This great increase in the profits of Australia's largest industry caused an equal increase in the purchasing power of many people at a time when goods were still scarce. The resultant inflation of prices had numerous effects. Inflated prices for farm lands increased the cost of farm supplies for all forms of agriculture; this increase went on long after the price of wool had fallen to more reasonable levels. It enabled many farmers to pay off their debts and complete the re-equipment of their farms; it encouraged many to intensify their whole system of farm management. But on the other hand it handicapped men with small capital resources who wanted to start farming on their own account. Those who bought in at the higher prices were in financial straits as soon as the first unfavourable season reduced their returns.

The general effect has been stimulating, especially as sheep can be readily kept in so many regions. The sheep population thus rose to 152,000,000 in

1958; this is a record number and the increase has almost entirely occurred in the regions with better rainfall. Much of it has been stimulated by better knowledge of how to control worms and pests such as the blowfly, and also by the use of trace elements in stimulating better growth on pastures and by the control of rabbits by myxomatosis.

The dairy industry has made progress in Victoria and Tasmania, but in other States where pasture problems are often largely unsolved its costs are very high. The industry, apart from whole-milk supplies to cities, is dependent on the manufacture of butter and cheese; and recently more than half has been exported to the unprofitable London market where margarine largely replaces butter when the price seems high. At present the industry is subsidized by about £A13,500,000 a year, since the government meets the ascertained cost of production on 110 per cent of the amount consumed locally. A committee of inquiry has been set up to investigate all facets of the industry.

The beef export industry has been the subject of prolonged negotiations with the United Kingdom. These started when Argentinian supplies were doubtful and a British committee visited Australia. The northern areas of Queensland and the Northern Territory are the chief sources of supplies for export. This region is divided into large cattle stations, many of which are poorly fenced and equipped. Doubtless they could produce much more efficiently, but for many years their operators had the bitter experience of having to sell four-year-old fat beasts at between £A3 and £A5 per head on the stations. At that price further investment of capital was quite unprofitable. The agreement with Britain, which was for fifteen years starting in 1952, recognized the need for basic prices. If these were not reached the British Government would provide the difference. It required that nearly all export beef was to go to Britain and on the other side Australia would use its best endeavours to increase supplies.

The agreement added some stability to the industry and much progress has been made. Additional watering facilities have been provided along the stockroutes, and exports have increased markedly. But in 1956/57 the Argentine export to London was large, prices fell and the United Kingdom had to pay £A5,930,000 in deficiency payments. Meanwhile other markets seemed more advantageous to Australia and so the agreement was modified, the subsidy being reduced and more freedom being given to the Australian Meat Board in regard to marketing in other directions. Australia knows that its beef industry is inefficient through lack of capital, that its transport is bad, and that it is not in a good position to compete with the Argentine if the industry in that country is reorganized. It also knows that meat production is likely to increase further in Britain and there is little hope of expanding trade except to Asian countries, where markets are difficult and price is the first consideration. The same factors apply to mutton and lamb; here the forthcoming increases in irrigated areas will probably produce more for export. The great increase in pig production in Britain, thanks to the heavy British government subsidy, has meant the cessation of pigmeat exports from Australia; fortunately many of Australia's post-war migrants are accustomed

to pork as their main type of meat, and this has saved the pig industry from disaster.

The wheat industry has improved its efficiency through the replacement of horses by tractors and also by the adoption of a "ley system" of alternating periods of grazed pasturage with periods of cropping. Better methods have led to an expansion in Queensland and Western Australia. The industry has a guaranteed price based on estimated costs for all wheat used for local consumption plus 100,000,000 bushels of export. The disposal of the exportable surplus has not been easy in view of the enormous stocks in North America.

The general picture is one of an increase of 30 per cent in all farm produce since 1939, with no increase in the labour employed. Part of this increase is absorbed by the increase in population of 2,500,000 in that period. The importance of farm products in the overseas trading account is decreasing but they are still dominant. This is illustrated by the export figures for 1956/7, which show that of the total of about £1,000,000,000 nearly 50 per cent was derived from wool, 10 per cent from cereals, meats 4.5 per cent, dairy products 4 per cent, sugar 3 per cent, fruit and hides 2.5 per cent each, while metals and ores made up 6.5 per cent and sundry merchandise 17 per cent. Scientific research has been helpful in many ways and will probably be even more efficacious in the future. Considerable areas of virgin land have been cleared and much propaganda liberated to stimulate others to invest in further developments of this sort; so far the promoters have not been markedly successful. Generally there has been an uneasy feeling in better-informed quarters that land settlement for the production of commodities for which there is no market except at prices which are ruinous to the producer is foolish. It was easy for the British Minister of Agriculture, during a recent visit, to say that Britain was a wonderful market and prepared to accept large quantities of products of the right quality at the right price. But Britain's price has seldom been right from the exporter's point of view.

This account of the position may seem gloomy, but every country which relies on exports of farm products for its income is similarly placed. For Australia wool is of first importance, and unless it maintains its place in competition with synthetic fibres, and unless increased markets can be found for food products in undernourished nations, or more metals, minerals or manufactures exported, the balance of overseas trade may become critical. In 1958/59 it was only maintained by large investments of overseas capital. If the balance is not maintained a large-scale reduction of the imports of manufactured goods will become inevitable.

Meanwhile some pressure is being exerted on State Governments to provide land settlement schemes for civilians, and possibly they will do so. But a sentence from the Rural Reconstruction Commission is worth quoting: "If it is the desire of governments to depress standards of living on farms then there can be no more certain method of doing so than by encouraging land settlement without a reasonable expectation of an increase in the satisfactory permanent markets for agricultural produce."

Australia,

November 1959.

# NEW ZEALAND

## RACE RELATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SPORT

IN comparison with other biracial or multiracial communities New Zealand has been fortunate in the harmony between its Maori and European citizens. The basis for that harmony was the famous Treaty of Waitangi concluded by Captain Hobson on behalf of the British Government and the chiefs of most of the Maori tribes in New Zealand, whereby they placed their people under the sovereignty of the British Crown. The Treaty is an anomaly in that it is not binding on the Crown and has not formed any part of the fundamental law of New Zealand. It may almost be said that, like Magna Carta, the Treaty of Waitangi is less important for what it actually provided than for the beliefs and *mystique* that have been attached to it in popular thought. Although equality has been the keystone of racial relations, there have been general doubts about the wisdom of making total integration the national goal. On the one hand Maori and European are mingled in every phase of society without discrimination and in complete equality; on the other hand, Maori and European alike have taken pride in Maori culture and achievements. There are many separate Maori schools, separate churches, separate clubs and societies. Maoris have their own representatives in Parliament. There is a special Department of State devoted to their interests and to the promotion of their welfare. An accused Maori is entitled to be tried by a jury of Maoris. A Maori may not dispose of his interest in Maori land without the confirmation of the Maori Land Court, a tribunal specifically charged with the responsibility of protecting Maoris from being over-reached in dealings with land, as were their ancestors who over a hundred years ago sold vast tracts of land to eager Europeans for some blankets, a few pounds of nails and a rifle or two. In all this the separateness of the Maori is emphasized. No New Zealander is ignorant of it. Separateness, but not *apartheid*. Maori and European, but all New Zealanders: all equal before the law.

And that is why so much feeling has been aroused in New Zealand among all sections of the community about the proposal of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union to exclude Maoris from selection for the representative team which it hopes to send to the Union of South Africa in 1960. The Rugby Union is, of course, a private body and responsible to no one for its decisions and policies. But few New Zealanders would agree that anything to do with rugby can be the private concern of a handful of administrators of the sport. After all, the game is the national sport; some might almost say, the national religion. The public certainly feel entitled to criticize the Union on any aspect of the game. They would resent any suggestion that they should keep silent on this issue. So it has come about that the tide of popular opinion has been gathering momentum. It started with a sermon which some newspaper reporter heard and published; it was followed by one or two comments in various parts of the country, all critical of the exclusion of the Maoris from

the team to be sent to South Africa. Interest mounted when the New Zealand Broadcasting system favoured its listeners with an interview between a well-known rugby commentator and the minister whose sermon started the trouble. Widespread protests followed. In Wellington a number of citizens, whose only interest in common seems to be their strong repugnance to the Rugby Union's decision, formed a Citizens' Association pledged to bring the weight of public opinion to bear on the issue, with a view to either securing the inclusion of Maoris in the team or, if that should fail, the abandonment of the tour altogether. There have been large public meetings addressed by Europeans and Maoris from nearly every section of the community: the Chairman of the Wellington Association, who is a surgeon, ministers, teachers, university lecturers, trade unionists, students, rugby footballers and Maori celebrities, including a former commander of the famous Maori Battalion. Other associations with similar objects have been formed in many parts of the country, and a national association has come into being, for the purpose, chiefly, of canvassing the whole country for signatures to a petition for presentation to the Rugby Union.

It is hard to do justice to the arguments put forward by supporters of the Rugby Union's policy, and there is some evidence to support the view that all the reasons for its decision have not been made public. Be that as it may, the major argument is one of solicitude for the Maoris' feelings. It would be inevitable, so it is said—and with good reason—that any Maori who went with the team in 1960 to South Africa would suffer from racial discrimination in that country. No New Zealander would like that to happen; *ergo*, send a team of Europeans only. Built on that major premise there are a number of subsidiary arguments: previous teams have toured South Africa and they have not included Maoris; the South African football authorities would, or might, be embarrassed by the inclusion of Maoris; for forty years and more all-Maori teams have toured various countries oversea (but, note, not South Africa); the South African team accepts New Zealand's *mores* by playing Maori teams and mixed teams when it tours New Zealand, so why should the New Zealand Rugby Union not follow suit when it sends a team to South Africa; and, in any event, no Maori might be good enough for selection. At the same time, supporters of the policy of excluding Maoris from the team emphasize the need for giving sympathetic consideration to the very difficult situation in South Africa.

The opponents of the Union's decision take their stand on a question of basic principle. They say that no team should be selected to represent New Zealand, unless all New Zealanders, whether Maori or European, who attain the requisite standard are eligible for selection. To exclude *a priori* any group for whatever reason is to impose here in New Zealand a policy of racial discrimination; to that they are bitterly opposed. If it is not possible to gain an assurance that Maoris in the team will receive the same treatment in South Africa as their European team-mates, then the invitation to tour South Africa should be politely but firmly declined. They regard it as of great importance that no purely European team should be sent, because they realize that such a team would soon become in popular understanding the

official New Zealand team. The arguments marshalled by the opponents of the Rugby Union's decision are many and varied, but readers of THE ROUND TABLE may be interested in one or two contentions based upon considerations of international concern. It is said that New Zealand's reputation for racial equality is deservedly high and that this country is watched by its neighbours, especially in South-East Asia, where New Zealand recently sent a Maori as its first High Commissioner in Malaya.\* The peoples of those countries will be unable to appreciate the niceties about the Rugby Union's being a private body and will find it difficult to appreciate or sympathize with the Union's scruples about the feelings of Maoris who might be included in the team. For them the exclusion of Maoris from the team will be attributed to New Zealand as a whole, with serious consequences for the standing of this country and the European in general. On the other hand, a firm decision on the question of principle will enhance New Zealand's already high reputation. Then again, some supporters of the objects of the Association have appealed to the principles of the United Nations as to freedom from discrimination on the ground of race and as to the promotion of human rights, especially as they are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New Zealand, they say, should be the last country to offend against those principles.

In all this controversy the Government and Parliament have remained silent. No one wants the Government to intervene in a dispute over the policies of a private sporting body. Indeed, the Citizens' Organization have gone on record as saying that they would regard governmental interference in sport as a worse evil than the exclusion of the Maoris from the team. But Ministers of the Crown are not remarkable for their bashfulness on issues of public importance where the conduct of private groups is concerned, and no one would think the worse of them for expressing their personal views on the topic. However, the only Cabinet Minister who has expressed an opinion in public is the Prime Minister's deputy in the administration of the office of Maori Affairs (Mr. Tirikatene), himself a Maori, who published a long statement of his personal attitude, from which it was clear that in his private capacity he opposed the exclusion of Maoris from the team. In this he clashed with a small group of Maori Rugby Football administrators comprising the Maori Advisory Board, which tenders its views to the Rugby Union on questions affecting Maoris and which had declared its support for the decision of the Rugby Union to exclude Maoris. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

But the Government aside, what about Parliament, the Grand Inquest of the Nation? A careful scrutiny of Hansard shows that there has not been the slightest reference in the parliamentary debates† to the question by any of the eighty representatives, including the four Maori members.

Equally remarkable has been the attitude of the government-controlled broadcasting service. The conspiracy of silence which has characterized that medium of information and opinion is hard to justify. The New Zealand

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 194, March 1959, p. 209.

† Two questions, asked by private members, elicited the reply that it was not a matter in which the Government could intervene.

Broadcasting Service considers that it has satisfactorily discharged its obligations by putting on the air an interview between two persons whose views on the issue were poles apart. Since then it has refused to be drawn into the controversy, and has excluded any reference to the point in the daily Maori language broadcasts.

The *cliché* is well-worn in New Zealand, but readers abroad will perceive the irony of the popular title given to New Zealand representative teams—All Blacks.

### Education

SHORTLY after the accession of the present Labour Government to office in 1957 the Minister of Education (Mr. Skoglund) announced that a Royal Commission would be set up to enquire into every aspect of education in New Zealand. There has been some mystification at the delay in announcing the Commission's terms of reference and its composition, but recently the Minister partly satisfied that curiosity by publishing the terms of reference. Two of the problems with which the Commission will have to deal, and which may be expected to give rise to considerable controversy, are that of religious education in State schools and the allied question of the degree of direct State financial assistance by the Government to private religious schools. The provisions of the Education Act, 1914, stipulate that in primary schools only "teaching shall be entirely of a secular character": in Maori schools, district high schools, technical schools and secondary schools there is no such prohibition. By a subtle interpretation of the complicated provisions of the Act relating to the hours during which schools should be open and instruction given it has been possible for more than sixty years now to allow private persons, ministers of religion and others, to give religious education in primary schools for a brief weekly period, usually half an hour in what is considered technically to be not school time. By these means about 70 per cent of the children attending the public primary schools receive religious education. There are some critics of the system (known as the Nelson system), who suspect the legality of the method by which the apparently insuperable obstacle set up by the Act has been overcome; others who favour the Nelson system would welcome a clear and decisive recognition by Parliament of the place of religious education in the primary system. The vast majority of parents would seem to support the continuance of religious education in schools, even on the present exiguous basis.

The Commission will probably have less difficulty with that issue than with the associated question of so-called "State aid" to private schools because of the sectarian feeling it will raise. More than half the private schools in New Zealand are under the control of the Roman Catholic Church, which since 1877, when the first Education Act was enacted, has not ceased from pressing its claim to some form of financial assistance from the State. A couple of years ago a Select Committee of the House of Representatives heard lengthy submissions from Roman Catholic organizations in support and from Protestant groups and others against any proposal to grant any direct financial aid to any private schools. The Committee was unanimous

in deciding to make no recommendation to the Government or to the House. But the issue will certainly be raised again, and fireworks may well be expected.

Higher education has received somewhat speedier consideration from the Government. A Committee on New Zealand Universities is already in the country, visiting the four universities and the two agricultural colleges. The Chairman of the Committee is Sir David Hughes Parry, Q.C., of the University of London and Director of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies; his two colleagues are Dean Andrew of the University of British Columbia, and Dr. R. W. Harman, a New Zealander and until recently the General Manager of the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd., a large Australasian company. The terms of reference of the Committee are very broad. It has been asked to indicate ways in which the university system should be organized to ensure that the long-term pattern of development is in the best interests of the nation. Specifically, the Committee has been requested to direct its attention to such matters as the rôle of the university in the New Zealand community; the number of young persons for whom university education should be provided; the standard of attainment considered desirable for those wishing to enter the universities; the maintenance, extension and co-ordination of university education and facilities; recruitment, staffing and conditions of employment in the universities; and the financial needs of university education and appropriate means of providing for those needs. The universities have welcomed the appointment of the Committee. They look forward to its recommendations in the hope that it will, in principle, follow the invigorating lead of the Murray Commission, which reported on higher education in Australia some years ago.

Even the condition of the pre-school child has not been overlooked. Early this year the Government appointed a Consultative Committee on Infant and Pre-School Health Services to enquire into the existing provision, organization and administration of those services. The main tasks of the Committee were to recommend ways in which duplication of health services for young children might be avoided and to suggest more efficient means of providing such services. Although the enquiry purported to be perfectly comprehensive, the hearings became largely a trial of strength between the Child Hygiene Division of the Health Department and the Royal New Zealand Society for the Health of Women and Children (popularly known as the Plunket Society), which seemed to fear the absorption of its activities by the Government.

The Plunket Society, which was founded by Sir Frederick Truby King, a remarkable pioneer in the field of infant health services, is a wealthy non-profit organization with highly developed facilities and staff. It is firmly established in the public affection and was able to draw on popular goodwill for support in its submissions before the Committee. Its supporters cast the Health Department in the rôle of an expansionist organ of State, whose encroachments should be resisted as a matter of principle. The emphasis upon the clash between the two groups was unfortunate: and it will be difficult for the Committee, whose chairman is Sir George Finlay, a former

Supreme Court Judge, to resist becoming caught up in the vain task of sorting out the rights and wrongs of the controversy.

### Legislative Programme

THE present session of Parliament has not thus far been notable for any startling legislation. A great deal of criticism has been raised by a proposal in the mammoth new Crimes Bill, many of whose provisions have been borrowed from the Canadian Criminal Code, to reduce from five years to three years the sentence of imprisonment for consenting adults who have been found guilty of certain homosexual acts. There are other provisions in the Bill which have given rise to discussion, and, as was expected, the Bill has been referred to the Statutes Revision Committee of the House of Representatives in order to give further opportunity for consideration. Although it has been accused of applying wholesale the recommendations of the Wolfenden Committee in the United Kingdom, the Government has clearly not adopted the major change in the law relating to homosexual offences favoured by that Committee.

For almost forty years a provision in the Immigration Restriction legislation which requires persons not of British birth and parentage to obtain a permit before entering New Zealand has caused heartburning among naturalized New Zealanders from non-British countries who return to this country from a trip oversea. The flood of new immigrants since the war has heightened the dissatisfaction with that law. It is pleasing to note that an Immigration Restriction Amendment Act just passed by the House of Representatives exempts *all* New Zealand citizens from that rather galling condition. Such a change is long overdue.

The Government introduced a Land Settlement Promotion Bill into the House, which contained a clause making it an offence for any person to acquire farming land unless he resided on the land for three years. This personal residence provision was a feature of New Zealand land settlement legislation for some years, and its reimposition has given rise to considerable feeling in farming communities. The country witnessed a rare spectacle when it saw three members of the Opposition, all of them from rural electorates, cross the floor of the House to vote with the Government on the division on the personal residence clause.

By the Samoa Amendment Act, 1959, which has recently been given royal assent, the trust territory of Western Samoa has taken a further step towards complete constitutional independence. The Act makes provision for the establishment of responsible cabinet government modelled upon the New Zealand system. It now remains for New Zealand and the United Nations to agree with Western Samoa on its international status.

New Zealand,  
November 1959.

# RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

## EMERGENCY MEASURES

LIFE in the Federation has gradually returned to normal for most of the people, though not for all families. Some hundreds of men are still detained and public meetings may not be held in Nyasaland. In June eighty-eight Nyasas, who were accused of endeavouring to raise funds for the banned African Congress, were arrested in Salisbury. The Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, said that the accused would be tried in open court and that he would prefer to see cases under the security laws heard in this way, rather than in the secrecy provided for under the Preventive Detention Act. The Presiding Judge of the Tribunal which was set up under this Act in Southern Rhodesia has reported that Southern Rhodesia's declaration of a state of emergency "may well have nipped in the bud any plan for co-ordinated action" by the African National Congress. He stated further that the Tribunal had found proved the general allegations made by the Government against the Congress. The Prime Minister is so right in his comment regarding the desirability of charging men in open court rather than in secret tribunal that it is to be regretted that he does not now free such detainees as cannot be charged in this way. The unsatisfactory nature of a secret tribunal is emphasized by the following comments of the Presiding Judge:

It is fair to say that so far, for one reason or another, most of the detainees who have given evidence have not impressed the Tribunal as being reliable witnesses.

Much of the evidence taken was given on oath in secret. This was done largely because many witnesses

would not have given evidence freely had they felt that there was any risk of what they said being disclosed to the detainees, because of a genuine fear of subsequent reprisals or victimization.

It is of interest to record here that a certain senior court interpreter (an African), when approached, asked if he might be excused from interpreting the proceedings of the Tribunal, because of his fear of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress. It is only fair to point out, however, that another High Court interpreter showed no such reluctance. Pointing out that "the most cogent evidence" relating to the subversive objects of Congress came from secret witnesses, the Tribunal observes that this was "somewhat unfortunate", because such evidence could never be considered as satisfactory as open evidence which had been subjected to cross-examination. This has been borne in mind in assessing the credibility of witnesses. The extent to which Congress meant to use violence was shown in evidence described as vague and not always consistent.

For example, one witness said that a general campaign of violence would be "sparked off" by the playing of a tape-recording of a speech by Dr. Banda. The date when this was to happen would be co-ordinated with similar outbreaks of violence which would occur in the Northern Territories.

Another witness, however, said that he had been told that they were awaiting Joshua Nkomo's return and that on his return he would, from a point somewhere in the bush, "press the button", which would be the signal for a general strike throughout the Colony, accompanied by violence in various forms. This pressing of the button would be co-ordinated with similar outbreaks and disturbances in the Northern Territories, so that the security forces of the Federation would be dissipated over the whole area of the Federation. We attribute this vagueness to the fact that plans had not yet advanced beyond a discussion stage and individual Congress leaders were expressing their own views of what form the final plan would take.

The difficulty of providing a new Constitution for Nyasaland in the middle of an emergency is recognized, but the decision to postpone this step until after the 1960 Conference means that the state of uncertainty continues. The strong emotional reaction against Federation remains, and the decision to nominate two Africans as Ministers and to give Africans a majority of the unofficial members in the Legislature does not meet the need. The Governor has said that the next problem, after getting the interim Constitution to work, was to decide Nyasaland's precise place within the Federation. This would be decided at the review of the Federal Constitution in 1960. Just what the Governor means is not clear; but any decisions of this kind made at the 1960 Conference, if they leave the country within the Federation, will be unacceptable to the people of Nyasaland. If a new Constitution had been granted, and if this Constitution had prepared the way for self-government for Nyasaland at an early date, and had introduced a wide franchise, then the people might have regarded the 1960 Conference in a different light, for they would have had their elected representatives in attendance at it. The fact that the new African members have been appointed by the Governor, instead of elected by the people, makes their position quite untenable. Why simple facts like this are still not recognized is hard to fathom. Two days after nomination to the Legislative Council, the Rev. A. D. Kayira had his home burned down, and a fortnight later he resigned from the Council. This most regrettable happening does underline the need for positive policies, designed to gain the confidence of a majority of the people. At present the Government is endeavouring to carry out its duties under impossible conditions, for the people regard it as a servant of the Federal Government to which they will give no loyalty.

### Financial Stringency

SINCE the last report we have had our four budgets and there is little extra taxation. On the other hand, serious cuts have been made in development plans because it is not possible for the Federation, under existing conditions, to raise all the loan money which is required. Just before the emergency £10 million was raised on the London market and local loans

have been raised, which have helped considerably but still have not met the full need. The Federal Minister concluded his speech by saying that the future was bright, but that the country would only reach its goal by the determination its people showed, not by their wringing their hands in fear and doubt. Concessions, including exemption from income tax, were made to encourage industrial expansion and to attract outside capital. Southern Rhodesia took steps to reduce a possible deficit to less than £½ million. No additional taxation was introduced in Northern Rhodesia, though certain reserves would be used to balance the accounts for 1959/60. The Nyasaland Government also has decided to draw on reserves rather than to increase taxation, but still has to budget for a small deficit. Increased spending on current account at £6 million would be a 10 per cent rise on the past year. "We are displaying a confidence in our economy by using our resources", said the Minister, but he sounded a note of caution when he added that the reserves would not last for ever.

Besides the budgets, which were better than was expected, there have been a number of heartening pointers towards economic recovery. The value of mineral production in Northern Rhodesia this year had, by August, exceeded the total for 1958. Values for the first eight months of 1959 now aggregate £85 million compared with £55 million for the corresponding period for 1958.

The Federal Minister of Finance has stated

I am satisfied that the time is now opportune to rid ourselves of all exchange restrictions on foreign capital investment. As from today, therefore, any foreign capital invested in the Federation, irrespective of the type of investment, will not be subjected to any exchange restrictions.

The city of Salisbury has announced that its ratable valuation is £99 million and it hopes soon to announce that it is the first 100-million-pound city of the Federation.

It is reported that the Japanese are to build a £1 million nickel smelting and refining plant at Bindura in Southern Rhodesia. Work on the plant is to start in 1960 and thirty Japanese engineers will supervise its construction. The whole output will be exported to Japan.

### Race and Employment

**T**WENTY years ago most Europeans in this part of Africa dismissed as quite absurd any suggestion that Africans had it in them ever to compete in industry on equal terms with Europeans. Today there is deep fear not only that Africans are fast approaching the stage where they will threaten the position of Europeans but that employers will employ them at substantially lower rates of pay. The matter has come to a head in the railway undertaking, which is a Federal Government responsibility; for the railways of Southern and Northern Rhodesia are government-owned. Recently the Federal Government produced a plan by which some Africans would set out on a sixteen-year road to reach the present lowest white grading. The period of sixteen years has now been reduced to twelve, and it would only be

practicable if it were reduced to five. At present there are two unions of workers, one for white and one for black, and there are white jobs and black jobs. In the past, when the Railway administration wished to discuss black jobs they went into conference with the black union; but on this occasion it was announced that the new jobs would be non-racial and both Unions were called to discuss the matter. Unfortunately, as the Railways are a going concern, the jobs to be considered were not "new" but resulted from a breaking-down of some of the lower-graded white jobs. The white union refused to attend, so the Administration came to an agreement on jobs that had been "white" with the black union only, and these jobs with their new gradings were listed in a general manager's circular and sent to every stationmaster. It was understood that this constituted a decision on the part of the Administration, backed by the owners, the Federal Government. European employees concluded that the Federal Government had shown clearly that it would be prepared to consider introducing Africans at low grades of pay to other categories of jobs and that there might be no future for whites in the Federation. An assurance by the Administration that no European employee would lose his job because of African advancement was interpreted as meaning that while present white employees would be retained there would be no jobs for their children.

It is unfortunate that African advancement has been confused with the consideration of over-paid white jobs. There are jobs which are over-paid because they have always been done by white men; but there are ten times as many jobs which have been consistently underpaid because they are performed by black men. It is to be regretted that the Railways did not begin their African advancement schemes by raising the rates for responsible jobs already being carried out by blacks. There are many of these and agreement might well have been reached amongst all sections on such action. The confusion that now exists has been added to by a statement from the Minister, which over-rides all negotiations and baldly states that the agreement reached between the Administration and the Africans cannot be ratified unless agreed to by the European union.

The importance of decisions made lies in the fact that the Railways are the largest employers of labour in the Federation and that they are the largest employers of Europeans whose semi-skilled work could easily be carried out by Africans without much training.

The whole problem of industrial relations and conciliation must be faced, not only in industry but in commerce and in the Civil Service. The type of problem which can have such upsetting effects is seen in the following news item:

Africans who, when fully experienced, can earn £20 a month, are employed in the Federal Survey Department as scribes to draw maps, work formerly done by Europeans in the salary scale £35 to £114 a month.

The Federal Director of Surveys said that mapmaking had changed from a craft technique to a production-line technique, making it possible for Africans to do the work. His department was expanding and the only source of labour upon which it could draw was the millions of Africans in the Federation.

Although Europeans earned much more than the Africans, they were employed on many other skilled duties as well as map-drawing. An official of the Federal Public Service Commission said that certain skilled jobs are being "fragmented" into simpler duties so that they can be done by Africans.

The problem of making the maximum use of all available skills and labour, while at the same time maintaining standards of pay and conditions of service, can be solved; but the railway situation is an example of how not to do it. If, each time African advancement is mentioned, European jobs are downgraded, the main effect is to rouse racial feelings.

The whole question of underpayment of Africans must be faced. The total of European salaries and wages in the Federation increased by 24 per cent and African wages increased by 21 per cent in 1957/58, while industrial output in that period totalled £126 million. At the same time the number of white employees rose by 11 per cent from 13,500 to 15,000. Black workers increased by 10 per cent from 91,600 to 100,600. Wages paid to 100,000 Africans totalled £8,400,000, while wages paid to 15,000 whites totalled £17 million. If wages for African workers were doubled, the effect, on balance, would be most beneficial to industry and to the country in general.

Dr. J. W. Rowland has stated that Rhodesia produces less than half of the animal proteins—meat, eggs, milk and fish—needed for minimum health. The effect of this shortfall is felt by the African section of the population; but at the same time, because the African does not have the money to buy meat, Southern Rhodesia searches for export markets. Recently the Minister of Agriculture has urged farmers to ensure that there was an even flow of cattle for the export drive. If the people of the Federation had the money to buy, then cattle farmers would be unable to meet even the needs of the home market.

### Constitutional Review

LOCAL interest in the 1960 Conference is growing, but many Europeans are indignant at the proposal to set up a fact-finding Commission to prepare the way for the discussions. Such a commission was not visualized in 1953 and, under ordinary circumstances, the governments concerned would have provided the data necessary for the deliberations. It is regrettable that there are such strong reasons for the setting up of this Commission, but it is quite obvious that recent happenings demonstrate that the Federal Government does not enjoy the confidence of a majority of all the people. Its own Franchise Law has isolated it from significant African participation in its own party affairs and has made it impossible for Federal Leaders to know what African people are thinking. An example of this is the situation regarding the "B" roll. In 1957 Federal Ministers stated that the limited participation which Africans would receive under the "B" roll would be welcomed by 50,000 of the estimated 80,000 people who would be able to meet the requirements. Despite the use of powerful propaganda only 800 Africans were persuaded to vote. This result, in the light of the assurances given by Federal leaders, was disturbing; but more devastating to confidence in the Federal Government were the disturbances earlier this year, and com-

pletely shattering were the actions of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. This Colony has been self-governing for thirty-six years and had prided herself on her British traditions of justice and fair play, yet overnight, and with the support of the Opposition, the Government closed the Courts of the land to those men and women detained. It was then found that no access was available to the High Court of the Federation either. The Federal Government not only did not admit that race relations were deteriorating rapidly, but it may well be that it did not realize how serious matters had become. Today there are all too many amongst both leaders and people who mistake the present quiescent situation, brought about by police and military action, for a solution to our problems. The attitude of the people in thought and feeling has not changed and no serious attempt is being made to meet the ideological problems which are so vital.

In the light of such happenings, it is obviously necessary that a full inquiry be made so that the people may have an opportunity to express their views. However, the composition of the Commission leaves much to be desired and the inclusion of local men, who are the choice of governments in which the people have little confidence, may yet make it quite impossible for the Commission to obtain the evidence it needs. If the Commission should fail to obtain the views of the people regarding a wide range of subjects, then the 1960 conference will not succeed. It is therefore vital that the terms of reference be made very wide, for if, for example, a Nyasa witness is not permitted to say what he thinks should be the position of his own country within the Federal sphere, he will be unlikely to give evidence at all. One of the most important things is that the 1960 Agenda are adequate. There is no chance of survival for the Federation if the Franchise is not extended to the maximum number of people on a basis of the minimum qualification consonant with literacy and responsibility. Again, the 1960 conference must recognize that when representative governments are established in each State, and these governments, after some years of experience, meet in conference, they must have the right—stated unequivocally and now—to accept Federation, to reject it, or to redesign it in accordance with their unfettered wish.

Rhodesia,  
November 1959.

*N.B. Our correspondent in Central Africa has complete freedom to express his own opinions, which may not always be identical with those of the Editorial Committee. The view of THE ROUND TABLE on such questions as the importance of preserving the Federation and the conduct of the Federal Government in handling the emergency is as stated in the leading article "The Choice for Africa" on pp. 327-30 of the September issue (no. 196).—Editor.*

# DEFENCE BONDS pay 5% *with 3% tax-free bonus after 7 years*

Defence Bonds are a safe and extremely profitable way of saving. As well as the attractive interest of 5% per annum, the Bonds are repayable after 7 years at the rate of £103 for each £100 invested—and this 3% Bonus is U.K. income tax free. The Bonds may, of course, be encashed before maturity. The interest, payable half yearly, is not exempt from tax, but tax is not deducted at source. You can have up to £2000 of these Bonds exclusive of holdings of earlier issues. Bonds inherited from a deceased holder or acquired by conversion of earlier issues can be held in addition. *On sale in £5 units. Buy all you can afford.*



**IN SEVEN YEARS**

5% Defence Bonds  
yield the equivalent of

**£5.12.6**

per cent (gross), per annum if  
you pay tax at the present  
standard rate of 7/9



Full information on Defence Bonds from your stockbroker, banker or other professional adviser, and from your local Savings Committee, Savings Centre, Post Office or Trustee Savings Bank.

*Issued by the National Savings Committee, London SW7*

pletely shattering were the actions of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. This Colony has been self-governing for thirty-six years and had prided herself on her British traditions of justice and fair play, yet overnight, and with the support of the Opposition, the Government closed the Courts of the land to those men and women detained. It was then found that no access was available to the High Court of the Federation either. The Federal Government not only did not admit that race relations were deteriorating rapidly, but it may well be that it did not realize how serious matters had become. Today there are all too many amongst both leaders and people who mistake the present quiescent situation, brought about by police and military action, for a solution to our problems. The attitude of the people in thought and feeling has not changed and no serious attempt is being made to meet the ideological problems which are so vital.

In the light of such happenings, it is obviously necessary that a full inquiry be made so that the people may have an opportunity to express their views. However, the composition of the Commission leaves much to be desired and the inclusion of local men, who are the choice of governments in which the people have little confidence, may yet make it quite impossible for the Commission to obtain the evidence it needs. If the Commission should fail to obtain the views of the people regarding a wide range of subjects, then the 1960 conference will not succeed. It is therefore vital that the terms of reference be made very wide, for if, for example, a Nyasa witness is not permitted to say what he thinks should be the position of his own country within the Federal sphere, he will be unlikely to give evidence at all. One of the most important things is that the 1960 Agenda are adequate. There is no chance of survival for the Federation if the Franchise is not extended to the maximum number of people on a basis of the minimum qualification consonant with literacy and responsibility. Again, the 1960 conference must recognize that when representative governments are established in each State, and these governments, after some years of experience, meet in conference, they must have the right—stated unequivocally and now—to accept Federation, to reject it, or to redesign it in accordance with their unfettered wish.

Rhodesia,  
November 1959.

*N.B. Our correspondent in Central Africa has complete freedom to express his own opinions, which may not always be identical with those of the Editorial Committee. The view of THE ROUND TABLE on such questions as the importance of preserving the Federation and the conduct of the Federal Government in handling the emergency is as stated in the leading article "The Choice for Africa" on pp. 327-30 of the September issue (no. 196).—Editor.*

# DEFENCE BONDS pay 5% *with 3% tax-free bonus after 7 years*

Defence Bonds are a safe and extremely profitable way of saving. As well as the attractive interest of 5% per annum, the Bonds are repayable after 7 years at the rate of £103 for each £100 invested—and this 3% Bonus is U.K. income tax free. The Bonds may, of course, be encashed before maturity. The interest, payable half yearly, is not exempt from tax, but tax is not deducted at source. You can have up to £2000 of these Bonds exclusive of holdings of earlier issues. Bonds inherited from a deceased holder or acquired by conversion of earlier issues can be held in addition. *On sale in £5 units. Buy all you can afford.*



## IN SEVEN YEARS

5% Defence Bonds  
yield the equivalent of

# £5.12.6

per cent (gross), per annum if  
you pay tax at the present  
standard rate of 7/9



Full information on Defence Bonds from your stockbroker, banker or other professional adviser, and from your local Savings Committee, Savings Centre, Post Office or Trustee Savings Bank.

*Issued by the National Savings Committee, London SW7*

Library

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN  
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD  
BY VIVIAN RIDLER  
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

